

SECRET.

SUMMARY OF EVENTS. AFGHANISTAN.

August 8th, 1919 to June 1st, 1920.

COMPILED BY GENERAL STAFF, INDIA.

August 8th, 1919.  
Rawalpindi.

Signing of Peace Treaty.

Article 1.

Article 2.

Article 3.

Article 4.

Freedom of Foreign relations to  
Afghans.

Demarcation of Boundary Tsatsobi to Shinpokh.

Return of Afghan delegates to  
Kabul.

Situation in Afghanistan on signing of Peace Treaty.  
Amir's ambitions.

On 8th August the Peace Treaty was signed by the Afghan delegates.

The terms were briefly :—

That the Government of India withdraws the privilege enjoyed by former Amirs of importing arms, ammunition, etc., through India to Afghanistan.

That the arrears of the late Amir's subsidy are confiscated and no subsidy is granted to Amir Amanulla.

That provided the Afghan Government prove by their acts and conduct during the next six months that they are sincerely anxious to regain the friendship of the British Government, the latter are prepared at the end of that time to receive another Afghan Mission for the discussion and settlement of matters of common interest and the re-establishment of the old friendship on a satisfactory basis.

That the Afghan Government accept the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by Amir Habibullah, and agree to the early demarcation by a British Commission of the undemarcated portion of the line west of the Khaibar and to accept such boundary as the British Commission may lay down.

After the Peace Treaty was signed, the Afghan delegates were handed a letter by Sir Hamilton Grant giving them freedom of control of their Foreign relations.

2. The Boundary Commission under Mr. Maffey commenced to demarcate this boundary from Tsatsobi to Shinpokh on August 23rd and completed their work by 6th September. The new boundary was practically identical with the Durand Line as interpreted by the Government of India, Torkham was definitely included in British territory and Darband left on the Afghan side of the line.

The demarcation was carried out without incident except on the night of 28th-29th August when the British and Indian officers were fired on near Torkham from close range when returning from a dinner party with Brigadier Ghulam Nabbi. No damage was done. This was believed to have been at the instigation of Ghulam Jilani, late Sarhang of Dakka.

3. The Afghan delegates reached Kabul on 14th August where they were received with general rejoicings. On 15th August in durbar Shaghassi Ali Ahmad Jan announced the Peace terms, which were stated to be a complete settlement including peace for the North-West Frontier tribes. There was some criticism at the delegates having failed to secure in writing a guarantee of amnesty for these tribes.

4. The war had left Afghanistan exhausted in money and material, and the Peace Treaty gave the Amir no hope of regaining the subsidy and various concessions enjoyed by his father for at least six months, and then only provided the Afghan's attitude and behaviour was satisfactory during this probationary period from the British point of view.

C. R. Case No. 8620.  
LIST OF BRITISH AND REPRESENTATIVES.  
Sir H. Grant, K.C.I.E., Chief British Representative  
Mr. J. L. Maffey, C.I.E. Medical Adviser.  
Brigadier-General F. J. D.S.O., Military Adviser.  
Nawab Sir Shams Shah, I.S.O., Muslim Representative  
Raja Sir Gurbaksh Singh, C.I.E., Sikh Representative  
*Afghans.*  
Ali Ahmad Jan, Con for Home Affairs, President  
Civil General Sardar Muhammad Yunus Khan.  
Ghulam Muhammad, Commissioner for Commerce,  
Civil Colonel Abdul Aziz, late Afghan Envoy.  
Sardar Abdul Bahman, late Envoy with Government India.  
Doctor Abdul Ghani, (Compilation Department.  
Civil Colonel Diwan Dasa.  
Abdul Hadi Khan, Chief  
Civil Colonel Mirza Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Mir Foreign Department.

C. R. Case No. 680.  
LIST OF MEMBERS OF BO COMMISSION.  
*British.*  
Mr. J. L. Maffey, C.I.E., Brigadier-General S. G. D. S. O.  
Brigadier-General, General Northern Army.  
*Afghan.*  
Brigadier Ghulam Nabbi.

This clause was no doubt galling to the Amir, who was smarting under the realisation that his first venture had ended in failure and had brought himself and Afghanistan perilously near to ruin. His feeling towards the British was one of resentment and, added to this, was the knowledge that any sudden change to a friendly policy would be an admission of the error of his ways which would almost certainly lower his prestige in the eyes of his own people and of the tribes. These considerations predisposed the Amir to endeavour to gain our friendship—or rather the benefits which we held out towards him—by playing on our fears rather than on our affections.

5. The only advantage which the war had brought Afghanistan was the freedom of its foreign relations. This, then, was the obvious point for Kabul to seize and exploit in order to justify the war, and, at the same time, to further the dreams of Afghan greatness cherished by the Amir and his ministers, which envisaged a Central Asian confederacy of Mussalman States under the hegemony of Kabul. The development of this policy would affect Russia rather than Great Britain, but the idea of a greater Afghanistan included the absorption of the Independent tribes of our North-West Frontier, to whom the Afghans had already deeply committed themselves by promises made during hostilities and even after peace, represented by them as an armistice, had been signed.

This aspiration had little hope of realisation if our stipulations regarding friendly conduct were complied with. The opposite line was therefore taken and every effort made by means of propaganda and appeals to religious sentiment to win over the tribes and to inspire a feeling of nationalism and cohesion amongst the various sections. This would provide a strong argument for self-determination and, by giving it an Afghan bias, would greatly strengthen the Amir's hands, should the six months' probationary period end in war and not in a friendship treaty, which, to the Afghan mind, meant various concessions to Kabul.

6. The adoption of this policy led naturally to negotiations with the Bolsheviks. Here was another lever to use against the British and to impress us with the serious potentialities possessed by an unplacated Afghanistan. Agreement with the Bolsheviks held out hopes of territorial concessions in the north and of immediate assistance in money and munitions, which might be extended to active co-operation should war break out again with the British.

Internal situation in Afghanistan.

7. Meanwhile there were many difficulties to be overcome in Afghanistan itself and many internal matters requiring the Amir's immediate attention. The financial situation was very serious; the people were in a state of unrest consequent on the war and the Army were not over contented or loyal. The Amir's own position on the throne was also none too secure. The accusation against him of being a party to his father's murder, which had sunk into insignificance during the war, was likely to be revived. The war itself had made him many enemies in Kabul, and his omission to "put away" his rival claimants to the throne (in this case his uncle Nasrulla and his elder brother Inayatulla) according to the time-honoured Afghan custom made a rebellion in favour of one of them an ever present possibility. The above were the factors, internal and external, which were

mainly instrumental in shaping the policy pursued during the period under review by the Afghan Government, and which may be divided into the following headings :—

- (a) Afghan relations with the British, official and otherwise.
- (b) Afghan relations with other countries, especially the Bolsheviks.
- (c) The methods of dealing with the economic situation.
- (d) The internal military and political situation.

*Afghan relations with the British.*

Official relations.

8. The Afghan-British official relations have been outwardly friendly though the undercurrent of hostility shewing through many of the Afghan Government's actions engendered considerable mutual distrust.

10th September.  
Amir's letter to His Majesty  
the King.

On 10th September the Amir wrote to the Viceroy and Sir Hamilton Grant ratifying the terms of the Peace Treaty. With these letters were received a letter from himself to the King Emperor and one from Mahmud Tarzi, Foreign Minister, to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London. The tone of both these letters was friendly but it was made clear that the Afghan cue was to represent that they had waged war to secure their independence and had succeeded in that object. Case No. 132.

The King Emperor did not answer the Amir's letter himself, but directed the Viceroy to acknowledge its receipt.

Release of British news writer,  
Herat.

Return of British Agent from  
Kabul.

Afghan Envoy to India.

Afghan Post Office and Trade  
Agency, Peshawar.

9. The British news writer in Herat was released at the end of August, and the British Agent in Kabul was set free and, after many delays, arrived in Peshawar on 5th October. He has not yet been replaced (June 1920). With him arrived Sardar Gul Mohammed Khan to take up the appointment of Afghan Envoy in India.

10. On the signing of peace the Afghan Trade Agency, under Faqir Mohammed Khan, Arthi, was reopened in Peshawar.

The Afghan Post Office in Peshawar was not reopened, letters, etc., being sent through the P. A., Khaibar. In January 1920, however, the Trade Agent was allowed to take over letters as an unofficial and temporary measure. Case No. 132.

Re-opening of trade with India.  
Annual Ghilzai immigration.

11. Towards the end of October Ghilzai graziers began to arrive in the Kurram and on 3rd November official sanction was given by the Amir for traders to enter India. Subsequently the Ghilzai migration was fairly normal, though fewer families than usual are reported to have come through the Khaibar and Kurram.

Correspondence leading up to  
Mussorie Conference.

12. On 5th November the Amir wrote to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, proposing a Conference of British and Afghan officials. This proposal was not accepted and on 9th December the Amir wrote to the Viceroy expressing a desire to begin discussions which he hoped would end in a permanent Treaty of Friendship. Case No. 132.

In reply the Viceroy pointed out the many respects in which the Afghan actions since the Peace Treaty fell short of the Friendship Treaty standard but agreed to permit a discussion between representatives of the two Governments with the limited object of clearing away misunderstandings, of frankly examining any obstacles which lay in the way of good relations and preparizg

a firm foundation on which negotiations for a Treaty of Friendship could be opened at a later date.

On 10th February the Amir wrote accepting this proposal, at the same time dilating on the Afghan's claim to the North-West Frontier tribes and pressing for the cessation of operations in Waziristan.

April 7th, 1920.  
Arrival of Afghan delegates.

13. The Afghan delegates arrived at Torkham on the Frontier on 7th April. As no warning had been received of their arrival they were asked to return to Dakka. The Amir's letter announcing their arrival having been received, they were subsequently allowed to proceed to Mussoorie, the place fixed for the discussions, where they arrived on 14th April.

C. R. Case No. 8621.

April 14th.  
Discussions commenced at Mussoorie.

14. The arrival of their delegates in India was apparently regarded by various Afghan Frontier officials as an opportune time to create disturbances across the border.

Frontier incidents,  
10th April.  
Afghan piquet on Tandi Sar.

On 10th April 3 Coys. of Afghan regulars occupied their prepared position on the Peiwar ridge and posted a piquet on Tandi Sar inside British Territory.

For full account see case or Summary of Events, West Frontier tribes, 1920.

17th-18th April.  
Abduction of villagers near Chaman, etc.

On the night 17th-18th a gang of Afghan budmashes, believed to have been instigated by Khairo Jan, a noted outlaw, who was holding an official position under the Afghans, abducted 4 British subjects from near Chaman. On 24th April an attack was made by Afghans on a militia post at Ghwazha on the border south of Chaman and large raiding gangs of Suleman Khel Ghilzais crossed the border north-west of Peshin.

23rd April.  
Afghans occupy Lambabat.

On 23rd April a mixed force of Afghans, reported to include regular troops, occupied the village of Lambabat in Chitral Territory 4 miles within the British border. In consequence of these incidents official discussions at Mussoorie were suspended by the Chief British delegate on 24th April, and were not resumed till 7th June by which date the above incidents had been satisfactorily settled.

24th April.  
Mussoorie official discussions suspended.

#### *'Afghans and the Khilafat question.*

14th January.  
Amir's letter to His Majesty the King.

15. About the beginning of 1920 the Amir began to shew increased sympathy with Indian agitation on the Khilafat question. The first official intimation received on this subject was a letter dated 14th January to the King Emperor from the Amir stating that he shared the opinions of all Mohammadans with regard to the upholding of the Islamic Khilafat and the non-removal of the Holy Places from its control.

Case No. 132.

16. On 9th February, at a ceremony commemorating the anniversary of the death of Amir Habibulla, the Amir made a speech in which he declared he was himself ready to sacrifice his life for the Khilafat and urged his subjects to be of the same mind. He also stated that all muhajirs (people emigrating on religious grounds) from India would be welcomed in Afghanistan. Copies of this speech were widely circulated in Afghanistan and created some excitement.

Amir's letter to Viceroy asking for facilities to send Khilafat deputation to London.

17. On 23rd February the Amir wrote to the Viceroy asking for facilities to send a Khilafat deputation from Afghanistan to London to interview the King Emperor. The request was refused on the grounds that the deputation could not arrive in time to influence the decisions of the Supreme Council on the subject.

Case No. 132.

19th March.  
Hartal in Kabul.

18. On 19th March a Hartal was observed in Kabul by the Amir's orders in sympathy with the Hartal on account of the Khilafat question in India. In April public feeling on the Khilafat question in Afghanistan was reported to be increasing, chiefly on account of the tone of the Afghan Press and of articles in various Indian vernacular papers which were reaching Afghanistan.

19. In durbar on 26th April and in the Juma Mosque on 30th the Amir is reported to have publicly stated that he would declare *jehad* if the British Government would not agree to his proposals regarding the Khilafat question, and again in durbar on 7th April he stated that this question was the only obstacle to peace. In May General Nadir Khan in Jalalabad was reported to be preparing Khilafat leaflets for distribution across the frontier and to Indian troops.

First Muhajirin arrive Kabul.

20. In May, Muhajirs from India began to arrive in Kabul, 48 passing through the Khaibar with the weekly Caravans during the month.

Case No. 161 (A).

Official instructions for Muhajirin.

21. The following official instructions were issued by the Afghan Government for their reception and maintenance :—

- (1) Muhajirin wishing to enter Afghanistan must obtain a verification sheet from Peshawar. They will have equal rights with Afghan subjects and will be bound by the Shariat (Religious Law).
- (2) Land will be given to those accepting Afghan nationality, 6 jaribs to a single and 8 jaribs to a married man, and smaller grants for children and unmarried daughters.
- (3) 5 seers of flour per month per adult and 3 per child will be issued to Muhajirin until they reap their first harvest.
- (4) Advances of money for buying ploughs and of grain for sowing will be given during the first year.
- (5) No revenue will be collected from their lands for 3 years.
- (6) None may enlist without Government sanction.
- (7) Government will be responsible for finding suitable employment for educated men. The remainder may take up any occupation they wish.
- (8) Muhajirin will be kept in Jabal-ul-Saraj for one or two months after arrival, after which they will be given land and housing accommodation.

*Afghan relations with countries other than India.*

Missions and Envoys.

22. In August 1919 the Afghan Government had Missions and Envoys in the following places :—

1. Wali Mohd. Khan's Mission to the Bolsheviks left Kabul April 1919 arrived Moscow October 1919 where Wali Mohd. was well received by Lenin. The main object of the mission was to negotiate for the restoration to Afghanistan of the Panjdeh area wrested from them by Tsarist Russia. The mission returned to Tashkent in November 1919, having secured a promise that the question would be gone into.

2. Mohd. Aslam Khan. Envoy at Tashkent.

3. Abdus Shakur Khan. Envoy at Kagan, Bokhara.

23. The Amir was not slow to avail himself of the freedom of foreign relations granted him at the time of the signing of the peace treaty. Emissaries were sent to various countries announcing this concession and the fact that peace had been concluded, and efforts were made to arrange for the establishment of consulates at various places in neighbouring States.

In December, General Ghulam Mohd. was reported to have proceeded to Andijan as Afghan representative. The same month Abdul Aziz Khan and Abdul Baki arrived in Herat *en route* to take up their respective appointments of Afghan Minister Tehran and Afghan Consul Meshed. Abdul Baki was detained at Herat and his appointment apparently subsequently cancelled. Abdul Aziz arrived at Meshed in March 1920 and proceeded to Tehran the following month.

#### Afghan-Bokharan relations.

24. Considerable sympathy was evinced for the neighbouring Muhammadan State of Bokhara, to which various missions and small batches of military instructors were sent from time to time, including in March 1920 a small party of troops with 6 guns. Rumours were frequently current in Kabul of the proposed marriage of Amir Amanulla to a daughter of the Amir of Bokhara, but no confirmation has ever been received that the marriage has been definitely arranged.

About May a son of the Amir of Bokhara arrived in Kabul. It is generally believed that some sort of agreement has been arrived at between the two Amirs, each promising to assist the other in the event of Bolshevik aggression.

#### Afghan-Bolshevik relations.

25. It is, however, round the Afghan dealings with the Soviet Government that interest chiefly centres.

4th September.

#### Braviné's Mission arrives Kabul.

On 4th September the first accredited Bolshevik Mission under Braviné, consisting of about 18 persons, arrived in Kabul. They were well received by the Amir who, as well as Mahmud Tarzi, Foreign Minister, paid them frequent visits. The members of the mission were allowed little freedom and were always accompanied by an armed escort when they left their quarters. Braviné was well supplied with money but, although he is reported to have made many vague promises of money and material to the Amir and to have urged the latter to renew the war with India, he appears to have accomplished nothing.

In October the Amir refused him permission to send Bolshevik agents to India, but in spite of this he was reported to have enlisted 40 men for this purpose without the Amir's knowledge.

In September a party of 30 Russian artificers with 200 camel loads of stores were reported to have arrived in Kabul.

In October the total number of Russians in Kabul was given as 60.

In November most of the members of Braviné's returned to Russia, leaving Braviné himself, 3 men and 3 women in Kabul.

11th November.

#### 2nd Bolshevik Mission arrives Herat.

26. On 11th November a second Bolshevik mission, to supersede that under Braviné, arrived in Herat,

under the leadership of Suritz, a Russian Jew, who had held several important appointments under the Soviet Government, and was a man of very different calibre to his predecessor.

The mission brought with it a large amount of kit and 2 mule loads of paper money and one of gold. It consisted of some 26 persons including three noted Indian agitators Mahendra Partab, Abdur Rab and Acharia. It was received with much ceremony in Herat and left on 18th November *via* Kandahar for Kabul where it arrived on 26th December. On arrival Suritz lost no time in opening negotiations with the Afghan Government and in trying to ingratiate himself with the people of Kabul. An overhaul of Bravine's methods and accounts proved them to have been unsatisfactory and he was ordered to return to Russia. This he refused to do and in May 1920 he was reported to have become a nationalised Afghan subject.

26th December.

Suritz Mission arrives Kabul.

Arrival of Kamensky with wireless plant.

27. Several small parties of Bolsheviks and various officials arrived in Afghanistan subsequent to the Suritz mission. The only one of importance being Kamensky, Director of Finance in Tashkent, who arrived in Kabul in January, bringing with him important papers for Suritz and a wireless receiving set which was installed in Kabul in March.

Wireless receiving set installed in Kabul.

Negotiations with Suritz

28. In the middle of January, owing to the possibility of an agreement being concluded between the Bolsheviks and England, negotiations in Kabul were suspended under orders from Moscow. In April Suritz, apprehensive of the results of the Mussoorie Conference pressed for and received permission to try to conclude a definite agreement with the Afghans, the chief clauses of which would be that, in return for subsidy, arms, munitions (including aeroplanes) and instructors, the Bolsheviks would be allowed Consulates in various places in Afghanistan and would obtain an uninterrupted corridor through that country for the sending of arms and money to the N. W. F. tribes and their propaganda to India. Negotiations were still in progress on 1st June no decisions having been arrived at.

Afghan-Bolshevik relations on Herat border.

29. Meanwhile interesting developments had occurred on the Herat-Turkistan border. Negotiations for the restoration to Afghanistan of a part of Russian Turkistan, for which the preliminaries had been arranged by the Wali Mohd. Mission in Moscow, were being conducted in Tashkent.

The Afghans claimed the restoration of Russian territory up to a line drawn East and West half way between Panjdeh and Merv. The Bolsheviks expressed their willingness to cede about half this territory and then only provided that no change of Government should take place against the wishes of the inhabitants. Both sides then commenced an energetic canvass of the inhabitants in this area to assure themselves of success were a plebiscite taken.

30. In September numbers of Turkoman refugees from Bolshevik rule began to arrive in Herat. These were well received and given land, about 300 becoming naturalised Afghan subjects.

Herat Shrine Custodians' visit to Turkistan.

31. The same month Mir Gazargah and Hazrat Karokh the Shrine Custodians, Mullahs of considerable influence in Herat, were despatched to Russian Turkistan under orders from Kabul on

a mission, the objects of which were to "counteract British propaganda and to assure the people of Turkistan of the sympathy of Afghanistan." They were turned back from Khusk post by the Bolshevik commander, but succeeded in crossing the border in the following month and proceeded to Panjdeh, returning to Herat in November, with the Suritz mission.

32. In October and November various Afghan officials and enissaries were despatched to Turkistan, and a consul was established at Merv. The Governor of Herat was instructed from Kabul to spare no efforts to keep all these amply supplied with money for propaganda purposes, and to this end large sums of money are known to have been disbursed. So much so, that in December the Governor was instructed not to honour any further drafts for this purpose without reference to Kabul.

Peaceful penetration in Panjdeh Province by Afghans.

33. Finding the Tashkent negotiations were not producing the desired results they expected, the Afghans about October appear to have commenced a policy of peaceful penetration into the Panjdeh Province, with a view to forcing the Bolsheviks hand. One Abdur Rahman was appointed Governor designatē for the Panjdeh Province, large escorts of regulars accompanied various Afghan officials and Consuls and installed themselves in Merv, Kushk and various places across the border and the Afghans behaved generally as if they considered that the disputed territory already belonged to them.

This attitude considerably alarmed the Bolsheviks, who issued orders that no more Afghans were to cross the border without a pass signed by Bravine.

34. From this time onwards the Afghan-Bolshevik relations on the frontier became steadily less and less friendly and constant disputes and bickerings arose between the local officials on both sides of the border. In February the chief complaints lodged against the Bolsheviks by the Governor of Herat were :—

- (1) Disputes concerning the grazing of the flocks near or over the border.
- (2) Russian treatment of the Afghan representative in Kushk.
- (3) Russian intrigues with the Jamshedis.

Raids by Jamshedis.

This last was an open sore, which in April and May threatened to attain serious proportions. The Jamshedis occupy the Badghis area north of Herat. During the reign of Amir Habibulla many of them had emigrated across the border, from where, under the leadership of one Said Ahmed Beg, they made constant raids into Afghanistan. The Herat authorities accused, and with good reason, the Bolsheviks of not only failing to make any effort to curtail the activities of Said Ahmed and his following, but of actually affording them material assistance in the shape of arms and ammunition.

35. In March the Bolsheviks appear to have definitely decided to put a stop to the Afghan attitude of proprietorship in Turkistan. Reinforcements were moved down to Kushk, unauthorised officials were ejected with their escorts, and those Afghans remaining were treated with scant courtesy. By the end of May the



Afghans found themselves no nearer the hoped for acquisition of the Panjdeh Province, and their relations with the Bolsheviki on the frontier were very strained. Successful raids by the Jamshedis were on the increase and this, combined with Afghan intrigues with Fergana and Bokhara and the Bolsheviki attitude towards the latter State, did much to heighten the prevailing atmosphere of mutual suspicion and mistrust.

#### *Indian Agitators in Afghanistan.*

36. The activities of Indian agitators in Afghanistan were not very pronounced for the first few months after the signing of Peace, probably because the Kabul Government realised how much they had been deceived by the very exaggerated reports these agitators had given them of the Rowlatt Act disturbances in India and consequently did not regard them with too much favour.

In December three noted agitators, Raja Mohendra Partab, Maulvi Abdur Rab and Acharia, arrived in Kabul from Russia with the Bolsheviki Mission under Suritz.

In March a split occurred between the Indians in Kabul as to the methods to be adopted for spreading their propaganda.

“ Raja ” Mohendra Partab and Maulvi Obeidulla headed the party in favour of Pan Islamic propaganda, pure and simple, as opposed to the Bolsheviki propaganda advocated by Acharia, Abdur Rab and their following. The two parties were not subsequently reconciled and apparently worked separately under their own leaders.

37. In April the activities of both these parties became more pronounced and an increasingly large number of Bolsheviki and Provisional Government of India leaflets began to come down to India, chiefly *via* Bajaur and Mohmand country.

Copies were also received from Jalalabad of a pamphlet inciting Indian troops to mutiny, probably the work of the Pan Islamic Party, and forms signed by Abdur Rab were distributed in Bajaur and Mohmand country calling on recipients to sign a pledge of hatred of and permanent hostility to the British.

About the same time, Haji Abdur Raziq the Afghan Mullah in Waziristan was joined by one Mohammed Hussan, B. A. of Lahore, a runaway student, with a cyclostyle outfit, who was responsible for many seditious and mutinous leaflets in his own and the Haji's name.

38. On 17th April Mohendra Partab left Kabul on a mission to China, the exact nature of which is not known.

In May Abdur Rab and Acharia were suspected by the Kabul government of spreading Bolsheviki doctrines in Afghanistan, and left for Russia on 30th May in consequence.

#### *Concessions to Hindus in Afghanistan.*

39. With a view to impressing Indian opinion with the impartiality of the Amir towards all his subjects the following concessions were granted to Hindus in Afghanistan during 1920 :—

See *Amir of Afghan No. 3.*  
20th May 1920.

*In April.* Permission granted to Hindus to enlist in the Army. Various restrictions as to dress and riding saddled horses removed.

Proclamation issued by the Amir prohibiting kine-killing in Afghanistan. One of the reasons given in the proclamation for this prohibition being that "Hindus have promised to help us in our difficulties".

Poll-tax on Hindus reduced by half.

*In May.* 100 Hindu boys admitted to the Harbia College for military training.

Hindu recruits being enlisted in Kabul and Jalalabad.

Forcible conversion of Hindus or their children to Muhammedanism forbidden. Hindus given greater freedom in religious ceremonies, and permitted to rebuild any temples which had been destroyed.

Hindus permitted to buy land anywhere in Afghanistan.

Taxes from Hindus reduced to be equal to taxes from Mohammedans.

Hindus' request to be excused from compulsory education granted.

Announcement made that Hindus would be given seats in the Shora or State council, one representative being sent by Jalalabad, Ghazni and Kandahar.

#### *Afghan Intrigues with N. W. F. tribes.*

40. The Afghan Government fully realised the vital importance to themselves of having the support of the British N. W. F. tribes in the event of another war with India. The attitude of these tribes, with the exception of the Mahsuds and Wazirs, had been most disappointing from the Afghan point of view during the 1919 campaign. Moreover it was obvious to the Amir that his failure to secure any sort of amnesty for them in the Peace Treaty rendered what hold he still had over these tribes very precarious.

An elaborate system of intrigue and propaganda was therefore commenced. Every endeavour was made to prevent various tribes complying with the terms of settlement demanded by the Indian government. Their representatives were summoned to Kabul where they were well received and rewarded with medals and presents, and they were offered enlistment in the Afghan Army. At the same time a virulent anti-British campaign was carried on in the Afghan newspapers copies of which were circulated across the border.

#### *Afghan Press.*

41. In August 1919 the Afghan Press consisted of only two newspapers.

(1) The Aman-i-Afghan (Safety of Afghanistan), a weekly paper which took the place of the *Siraj-ul-Akhbar* on Amanullah's accession to the throne. It was edited in Kabul first by Mahmud Tarzi, the Foreign Minister, and later by Abdul Hadi his assistant.

It first appeared as a single sheet containing (a) local news (b) foreign news, the rate of subscription being Rs. 4 per annum in Kabul and Jalalabad and Rs. 5 in other Provinces and Foreign Countries.

On 30th March 1920 it was published as an official Government newspaper containing many pages and illustrations. The new rates of subscription, which were compulsorily deducted from the pay of all officials drawing Rs. 500 per annum and over being :—

In Kabul Rs. 10 per annum.

In Afghan Provinces Rs. 18 per annum.

In Foreign Countries Rs. 22 per annum.

From this date onwards its tone was more violently Pan-Islamic and anti-British, and from articles published it was evident that its editor was well in touch with Indian agitators.

Muarif-wa-Maarif.

(2) The Muarif-wa-Maarif (Introducer of Knowledge) first published in 1919. A monthly magazine written by students in Kabul. The aims of this paper were claimed to be (a) the advancement of knowledge (b) the improvement of religion and morals. Editor, Mujtaba Khan.

While much more moderate in tone than the Aman-i-Afghan this magazine nevertheless frequently dabbles in Pan-Islamic Politics.

Ittihad-i-Mashraqi.

(3) On 23rd February 1920 a bi-weekly paper, the Ittihad-i-Mashraqi (Eastern Unity) was first published in Jalalabad under the auspices of General Nadir Khan. Later this paper stated that it had been given the freedom of the Press by the Amir, and was in no way government inspired. Its tone like that of the Aman-i-Afghan is violently anti-British and Pan-Islamic, and it is largely meant for consumption by the North-West Frontier tribes, to whom copies are distributed free of cost, and for India where copies are exchanged with various vernacular papers. It is edited by Shah Raq Khan, assisted by Zafar Hussain a well-known Indian seditionist. Efforts are being made to increase the circulation of both the Aman-i-Afghan and the Ittihad-i-Mashraqi.

Intrigue with Wazir tribes.

42. On the conclusion of peace Afghan intrigues were at first directed mainly towards Waziristan.

Colonel Shah Daula.

When the Afghan troops were withdrawn across the Durand Line in accordance with the terms of the armistice, an Afghan Colonel, Shah Daula by name, with a Captain, about 12 gunners and two mountain guns (9 pounders) remained in Wana. This officer did his utmost to stop the various Wazir tribes settling with government, and was largely instrumental in persuading the Mahsuds to refuse Government's peace terms. He made innumerable promises of Afghan assistance, enlisted a Mahsud garrison for Sarwakai and some Wazir levies for Wana, and made a tour of the abandoned Gomal Posts, which he stated, were shortly to be occupied by Afghans.

For fuller details see under tribal headings in Summary of Events, North-West Frontier tribes, 1920.

January, 17th.

In January he raised a lashkar of some 1,600 Wana Wazirs and proceeded with them to Mahsud country to assist in opposing the advance of our column up the Tank Zam. On one or two occasions his guns were in action against our forward piquets, but were quickly withdrawn when they found things too hot for them.

Haji Abdu Raziq

43. Shah Daula was joined on 27th January by Haji Abdul Raziq, at one time chief mullah to the Kabul Court, and the Amir's chief propaganda agent in Bajaur country during the 1919 Campaign.

The Haji gave out that he had come to make peace between the tribesmen and the British, and actually tried to open negotiations with the British Commander.

44. Although the Amir denied in a letter to the Government of India, that either the Haji or Shah Daula were his accredited agents, there is not the least doubt that they had the active support of the local Afghan officials, and almost certainly of the Kabul government.

On 20th December a convoy of rations reached Shah Daula from Urgun, and after that date convoys of rations, ammunition and money were constantly sent to him and the Haji from Afghanistan, and these are known to have been accompanied on more than one occasion by small escorts of regular troops.

Lala Pir.

45. In January the Lala Pir, an influential Mullah from Khost, arrived in Mahsud country with about 60 armed Khostwals and a few camel loads of ammunition.

He paid further visits to Mahsud and Wazir country on 23rd February, 31st March and about 15th April.

Ali Abbas Shah Red Crescent Mission.

46. On 6th May a "Red Crescent" medical mission arrived in Wana Wazir country from Kabul. It consisted of about 15 persons including 3 doctors and was headed by an Indian seditionist of the Pan-Islamic school, named Saiyid Ali Abbas Shah, *alias* Mr. Bokhari, who, previous to his emigration to Kabul, had spent some years in the Lahore lunatic asylum.

47. Apart from the activities of these Afghan agents, accredited or otherwise, in Waziristan itself, considerable sympathy was shewn to the cause of the Mahsuds and Wazirs by Afghan officials and even by the Amir himself.

Mahsuds and Wazirs interviewed by the Amir.

On 22nd October the Amir interviewed about 200 Wazir and Mahsud maliks and a number of militia deserters who had accompanied General Nadir Khan to Kabul from Khost. He thanked them for their past services and distributed rewards and medals, and, although he would make no definite promise of an amnesty for them, he promised to intercede on their behalf with the British Government.

Jirgas of Wazirs and Mahsuds were constantly interviewed in Matun by General Shah Mahmud brother of Nadir Khan and Governor of Simat-i-Janubi and by other Khost officials. No active assistance was ever given them, but every endeavour was made by promises and bribes to stop them complying with government's terms, especially those terms relating to the surrender of rifles by militia deserters. These latter were offered service in Khost, sepoy's on Rs. 20 a month and I. Os. at British rates of pay.

Emigration of Mahsuds to Afghanistan.

48. Towards the end of May numbers of families of the recalcitrant sections of Mahsuds began to emigrate to Afghanistan, about 400 families proceeding to Khost. These were well received officially, and offered land on the spot or in the Logar Valley, though their advent was most unpopular with the local inhabitants on whom they were billeted and who suffered severely from their thieving propensities.

Intrigues w<sup>th</sup> tribes other than  
one in Waziristan.

49. On 1st September the Amir interviewed about 400 Afridis to whom he distributed rewards and promised to try to obtain an amnesty from the British.

At the end of September he received a visit from Malik Yar Mohammed Khan of Chora, and is reported to have promised him compensation for the destruction of his fort by the British.

In September and October he interviewed various other jirgas of Afridis and Orakzais to whom he made promises similar to those given to the Mahsuds and Wazirs.

50. From the majority of these Maliks of various tribes who visited Kabul signatures are reported to have been taken on a document requesting that the North-West Frontier tribes should come under the Amir's suzerainty.

51. In November the Mohmand and Bajaur Mullahs received letters from Mir Saiyid Jan Badshah of Islam-pur, an influential Afghan Mullah, calling on them to provide for him, under the Amir's orders, lists of the principal fighting men and of arms in Dir, Swat and Bajaur.

52. The same month General Nadir Khan who commanded in Khost during the 1919 Campaign, was promoted Commander-in-Chief and put in charge of all dealings with the Afghan tribes on the Eastern Frontier. This he interpreted, probably not without reason, as appointing him intriguer in chief with the British tribes of the North-West Frontier.

17th December.

Nadir Khan arrives at Jalalabad.

He arrived in Jalalabad on 17th December and lost no time in commencing an energetic campaign of intrigue with the tribes north of the Kabul river and with the Afridis.

By January a regular weekly post was reported to be running between Tirah and Jalalabad.

53. On 16th January a letter was received by the Afridi Mullahs from Nadir Khan summoning their jirgas to Jalalabad with the ostensible object of settling their feuds with the Shinwaris of Ningrahar.

31st January.  
Hada jirga.

Jirgas of Mohmands and Orakzais were also asked to attend. No Orakzais did so, but a large number of Afridis and Mohmands proceeded to Ningrahar where their representatives were interviewed at a jirga at Hada, on 31st January, which was also attended by a large number of Ningrahar tribesmen.

This jirga was made the occasion for considerable military display and ceremony. Nadir Khan made a speech impressing on the tribes, their unity as Mohammedans and their many obligations to Afghanistan. He stated that another conference was about to take place between the British and Afghan governments and warned the tribes to be ready for war if the British did not accede to Afghan demands. He then presented 28 black standards to the various North-West Frontier and Ningrahar tribes present. These were embroidered with white hands to exemplify unity and crests in Arabic and were stated to have been blessed in a shrine at Mazar-i-Sharif.

On February 4th he again interviewed selected representatives of the Afridi and Mohmand jirgas at Jalalabad, where a further presentation of standards

took place, the total numbers given to the North-West Frontier tribes being 8 to the Afridis, 9 to the Mohmands and 1 to Bajaur. Pay at Rs. 30 per month was fixed for the keepers of the standards.

This Hada jirga had a bad effect on the tribesmen and did much to delay the Afridi settlement.

**Intrigues with Turis**

54. About the end of February proclamations addressed to the Turis of the Kurram Valley were received assuring them of full facilities and comfort for all Shiahs visiting sacred places in Afghanistan.

Shortly afterwards a Shiah of Chandaul named Naurud din Shah was put on special duty by the Amir to conciliate the Turis and took up his headquarters at Kotki behind the Peiwar Kotal, where he remained until recalled to Kabul in June 1920.

55. In February a party of 20 Hindustani Fanatics left Jalalabad for Tirah. They visited Orakzai country and then proceeded to Matun in Khost where they arrived on 29th February and finally joined Haji Abdur Raziq in Shakai on 11th March.

56. Nadir Khan persevered with his efforts to promote unity among the Afridis, Mohmands and other Frontier tribes and early in March parties of Mohmands acting under his orders toured in Afridi country preaching this doctrine.

He also continued to receive numerous deputations of tribesmen and in March he publicly announced that his objects in doing so were :—

- (1) To bring these tribes under Afghan control.
- (2) To unite all Mohammedans under the Khilafat.
- (3) To settle certain political benefits connected with India.

57. Nadir Khan spared no efforts to delay or upset the Afridi settlement with the British.

**Nadir Khan's Afridi Battalion  
in Jalalabad.**

Parties of Ningraharis were given ammunition and privately instigated to snipe and otherwise make themselves a nuisance in the Khaibar, and Afridis were openly encouraged to do likewise, while anti-British propaganda of every description was spread in Tirah by his agents. In March he commenced to enlist Afridis in a tribal Battalion in Jalalabad. The terms offered were Rs. 20 pay 12 seers of wheat and 12 of rice per month. Men enlisting were to provide their own rifles. To make service more attractive liberal leave was granted to recruits of whom there were reported to be about five hundred to eight hundred at the end of May.

Special efforts were made to win over Ghulam Haider, the son and successor of Malik Yar Mohd. Khan of Chora. In May Nadir Khan suggested to him that in return for proprietary rights the Amir would be willing to rebuild Chora Fort.

58. Dir did not escape the wave of propaganda. In April the Nawab was said to have received presents from both Nadir Khan and the Amir, and by the end of that month a regular postal service was reported to be running between Asmar and Dir, and copies of Afghan newspapers were being received regularly in the latter country.

59. In May circular letters were received from Haji Abdur Raziq in Mohmand and Bajaur calling on those tribes to rise and assist the Mahsuds.

The same month Muhasil, the famous Koda Khel outlaw, proceeded to Kabul on a visit to the Amir.

Abdul Qudus appointed Governor Kandahar.

60. In March 1920 Sardar Abdul Qudus relieved Lionab Khushdil Khan as governor of Kandahar. As soon as he was settled in his appointment Abdul Qudus began to adopt methods very similar to those employed by Nadir Khan to keep alive the excitement caused by the 1919 Campaign and to persuade the tribes of Zhob and Baluchistan of the possibility of another Jihad in the near future.

61. Towards the end of May however, owing to the uncompromising attitude shewn by the British delegates over the Frontier incidents referred to in paragraph 12, both he and Nadir Khan received orders from the Amir enjoining caution and their activities, especially in the case of Abdul Qudus, were somewhat modified in consequence.

#### *Economic Situation.*

August 1919.

62. How to deal with the economic situation was one of the most serious problems confronting the Afghan Government on the conclusion of peace. The cost of the war had greatly depleted the reserve, estimated at about 15 crores, collected by Amir Habibulla in the Kabul treasury. The arrears of subsidy due to the late Amir at the time of his death, amounting to about 44 lakhs, had been forfeited under the terms of the Peace Treaty, which also ordained that no subsidy should be granted to Amir Amanulla, at all events until a Friendship Treaty had become a *fait accompli*. The pay of the army was much in arrears, and the rise in pay from Rs. 12 to Rs. 20 granted by Amanulla at the time of his accession was an additional burden to the State revenues. The need for ready money was therefore imperative.

Methods taken to collect money.

63. The Afghan Government set about collecting this in a whole-hearted and characteristically harsh manner. The Amir set a good example by cutting down his personal and household expenses. Government allowances to members of the Muhammedzai clan were reduced or stopped entirely, and the sale of crown lands in various provinces was put in hand.

Orders were issued for the immediate collection of all arrears of revenue, as much as 5 years' overdue in Khost, and fines were levied from officials if the full amount was not forthcoming.

Refunds in full of all advances given to traders and merchants by Amir Habibulla were called for. This order evoked a storm of protest and was subsequently modified to admit repayment by instalments.

Wealthy men were invited, and practically forced, to contribute large sums to the State Treasury.

Many minor officials in unnecessary appointments were dismissed and pensions granted to various sardars, mullahs, etc., were reduced or done away with. Import and export duties were collected in cash on the spot, the export of all gold and silver was strictly prohibited, and orders were issued for all revenue to be collected entirely in cash instead of partly in kind as formerly.

Military Economy.

64. The Army did not escape the general efforts at retrenchment. In common with all government officials

all ranks were cut one month's pay for a mythical aeroplane fund. About December the gradual discharge of old soldiers and unfit men drawing Rs. 20 a month commenced, and recruits were enlisted in their stead on Rs. 14 only, but it seems possible that owing to the discontent caused the pay has again been nominally raised to Rs. 20 in certain areas. Various compulsory cuttings were made from their pay and certain concessions, such as the right to purchase grain from Government granaries at reduced rates, were done away with. This last order was subsequently cancelled owing to the discontent it caused.

65. As was to be expected these various methods of collecting ready cash met with a certain amount of opposition, and many of them do not appear to have been rigidly enforced, but on the whole the Afghan nation played up well and no serious disorders occurred.

66. During this period the one extravagance appears to have been money spent on propaganda, for which purpose large sums are known to have been disbursed both to consuls and agents in Russian Turkistan and to various frontier officials for use across the Indian border. Certain extremist organs of the Indian Press also received financial support from Afghanistan.

**Rouble notes**

67. In October and November, Afghan merchants were reported to be buying up large quantities of rouble notes and were consequently hard hit by the Indian Rouble note Ordinance brought into force in December—which reduced the value of the Bolshevik rouble note to practically *nil*.

**Afghan paper money.**

68. In November the Government ventured on an entirely new departure for Afghanistan in the shape of an initial issue of one crore rupces of currency notes. The denominations of these notes were given as—

|             |   |   |   |           |
|-------------|---|---|---|-----------|
| Re. 1 notes | . | . | . | 10 lakhs. |
| Rs. 5 „     | . | . | . | 5 lakhs.  |
| Rs. 10 „    | . | . | . | 10 lakhs. |
| Rs. 25 „    | . | . | . | 25 lakhs. |
| Rs. 50 „    | . | . | . | 50 lakhs. |

These notes were stamped on inferior paper and were of somewhat crude design. They were apparently intended mainly for circulation in Afghanistan, and not as a medium of exchange with other countries, though orders were issued to merchants to try to exchange them for Indian currency with the Trade Agent in Peshawar, and when they first appeared they often fetched more than their face value in India as curios. They were brought into use slowly at first and strict measures had in some cases to be taken to enforce their acceptance. Government officials were reported to be receiving part of their pay in these notes early in 1920, and they are also reported to have been used to pay troops, but there is no definite confirmation of this up to date.

Re. 1 and Rs. 5 notes were in circulation in March, and Rs. 50 notes shortly afterwards. Rs. 10 and Rs. 25 notes do not appear to be in circulation yet, but reports have been received that Rs. 100 notes are being prepared.

69. In May orders were issued for all Afghan subjects to take out Verification Sheets on a fee of Re. 1 each, and passports to Muhajirin entering Afghanistan were issued in this form.



70. In April and May the Afghan Trade Agent in Peshawar made large purchases of gold bullion from Bombay, 10,000 tolas of gold, worth about Rs. 2,25,000 being exported to Afghanistan.

71. The rate of exchange for the Kabuli rupee was Rs. 81 in January and Rs. 73-8-0 at the end of May.

Trade with India.

72. In November Afghan traders commenced to come down to India and trade was subsequently fairly normal.

The prohibition of rouble notes in India and the prohibition of export of gold and silver from Afghanistan, however, upset the commercial system and reduced trade to barter. Imports to Afghanistan had to be paid for by exports from that country, with the result that dried fruits were brought into India at a loss to pay for cloth. Imports being less bulky than exports many camels returned from Peshawar unladen, an unusual sight in former years.

Trade with Russia, Bokhara and Persia.

Trade with the Russians which was flourishing at the end of 1919 was greatly curtailed in the spring of 1920 owing to the unsettled conditions on the Herat border. A considerable traffic in rifles from Russia was, however, maintained.

Trade relations with Bokhara appear to have been good. There are few details of trade with Persia, but a large number of Afghan camels were constantly employed on the Line of Communication of the Meshed Field Force. In March the Afghans purchased 2½ lakhs of Persian coinage.

#### *Internal Military and Political Situation.*

73. The excitement caused by the war died down slowly in Afghanistan, especially in the Eastern Frontier districts where officials made a point of keeping it alive by insistent statements that a six months' armistice only, and not peace, had been concluded between India and Afghanistan.

74. Spin Baldak was handed back to the Afghans on August 14th and Dakka evacuated by our troops on 13th September.

75. On 15th August orders were issued in Kabul for the dispersal of all tribal levies and of recruits not yet drafted into battalions. Extra formations and new regiments formed during the war were gradually disbanded and the various Cadet Corps—the Sarios, Shahi Rikabi, Mir Aspor and Khan Aspor formed during Habibulla's reign were done away with, members being drafted into regular units.

Return of troops to peace stations.

76. The withdrawal of troops to their peace stations commenced at the end of August all Kabul troops, except some detachments in Khost, returning by the end of October. Alijaris or local irregulars were, however, maintained in various frontier posts.

It should be noted here that during the campaign attempts had been made to keep selected Battalions up to strength by drafting men into them promiscuously from neighbouring units. Various Battalions had been amalgamated and new Battalions formed from odd detachments and drafts. This was particularly the case in Khost. These Battalions in many cases have not since been sorted out and the pre-war nomenclature and composition of Battalions does not always hold good.

Afghans still in Arndawi.

77. The Afghans had not complied with the armistice terms in the case of Arnawi (Arandu) a village within the Chitral Border occupied by them during operations and not subsequently evacuated. Afghan detachments are still in this village (1st June) which is apparently claimed as compensation for the definite inclusion of Torkham within the British border.

78. In October orders were issued for the dismissal of all Shinwaris from the Army, on account of the unsatisfactory behaviour of that tribe during the operations.

79. In November the discharge of old soldiers and unfit men and their replacement by recruits on Rs. 14 pay only commenced. In December there were about 1,000 recruits under training in Kabul.

Precautionary Military measures.

80. In February some excitement was caused by the actions of Nadir Khan and other frontier officials, but the Amir gave orders that he wished this excitement to cease and that no large gatherings of tribesmen would be allowed. At the same time, the probationary period of 6 months having been completed and no decision having been arrived at regarding the sending of a delegation to India, defensive measures were put in progress on the frontier and during March 5 battalions from Kabul were sent to Ningrahar, 2 to Khost and 1 to Kandahar. 5 New Battalions were raised in Kabul and renewed efforts were made to obtain recruits. The despatch of the Afghan delegation to India early in April caused the excitement to subside somewhat, but it was revived with increased force in the latter half of the month by the various frontier incidents mentioned in paragraph 14 and the despatch of reinforcements as a precautionary measure up the Kurram and to Chaman was the cause of some apprehension and hasty military defensive measures by the Afghans along their frontier.

In May there were some 3,000 recruits in Kabul and transport and rations were being collected, but towards the end of the month the transport was released and recruiting in the Kabul district stopped.

Discontent in Army

81. During this period there was frequently much discontent among the Army. This was chiefly over matters connected with their pay which was usually several months overdue and when received was considerably reduced by various compulsory cuttings. This discontent was more marked among the old soldiers, and was increased by the stoppage of certain privileges previously enjoyed by troops, and the Amir was not able to rely implicitly on the loyalty of his Army. In fact it is said that the distribution of many Kabul Battalions to out-districts was partly with a view to preventing the possibility of a military coup in Kabul.

Extension of telephones.

82. In October Matun was connected to Kabul by telephone *via* Waza, Gardez and Altimur.

In November the erection of a double telephone line was commenced from Kabul to Kandahar, and was completed up to Mukur by the end of May. In January the extension of the telephone line from Jalalabad to Dakka was completed, and the erection of a line from Mazar-i-Sharif to Patta-Kesar, on the Oxus near Termez, was put in hand in April.

Anti aircraft guns

83. In April an Austrian was reported to be making anti-aircraft guns in Kabul and had nearly completed

the first gun. In May 6 A.A. guns were reported to have arrived in Ningrahar. Full details of these have not been received but they are probably field or mountain guns, fitted with some form of A.A. mountings.

84. The out-put of the Kabul workshops was reported to be abnormally small owing to shortage of wood fuel. As a protection against air raids, a number of caves have been dug in the hills East of Kabul City between Fort Roberts and Postindozi where practically the whole reserves of arms and munitions, excluding guns, are now stored.

Political situation.

85. The cessation of hostilities and the methods subsequently adopted to deal with the economic situation somewhat strengthened the hand of the anti-Amanulla party, and the Amir had to deal with renewed intrigues against himself.

In September he gave out in durbar that the severest punishment would be meted out to any one spreading rumours that he or his mother, the Ulya Hazrat, were in any way responsible for Habibulla's murder. He offered to reinstate his brother Inayatulla in an official position but the offer was refused, and in spite of the efforts of certain mullahs to effect a reconciliation, the feeling between the pro-Amir and the pro-Nasrulla-Inayatulla factions increased. Nasrulla was kept in strict confinement and at the end of September his son Azizulla and Inayatulla were both arrested, but in March Inayatulla was apparently released for he attended a durbar on 16th of that month.

Attempts on Amir's life.

86. On 7th October an attempt was made on the Amir's life, and further attempts were made on 15th February and on 15th March. These appear to have been the efforts of private individuals rather than the outcome of organised conspiracies.

87. Early in May reports were received that Nasrulla had been murdered, but that the fact was being kept secret. His death on 20th May after one month's illness was subsequently officially announced.

Reforms and Education.

88. The Amir has shewn himself to be a progressive ruler, and when he could spare time from more pressing matters he has dabbled in various reforms.

In December Committees were formed to revise the system of education and prepare codes and laws for the guidance of officials.

His keenness on the spread of education has been marked and he has always shewn a personal interest in the welfare of schools in Kabul and the progress of their pupils. The Government organ, the Aman-i-Afghan, has lost no opportunity in impressing the advantages of learning on its readers.

Efforts have also been commenced to improve social conditions in Afghanistan, special efforts being directed to ameliorate the lot of the hitherto oppressed classes, the Hindus and Shiahhs. Revenue collecting has become a subject in the Kabul schools and attempts made to curtail the corrupt methods of officials in this direction.

These progressive measures did much to increase the Amir's popularity, but were throughout hampered by lack of funds and the pressure of more important business.

Situation on 1st June 1920.

89. On 1st June (when the period covered by this Summary ends) conditions in Afghanistan were still unsettled and uncertain. The freedom of control of their foreign relations had produced little tangible result. Negotiations with the Bolsheviks were still in progress but nothing definite had been settled, and the incidents on the Herat Border coupled with the aggressive attitude of the Bolsheviks towards Bokhara rendered the Soviet's relations with Afghanistan somewhat uncertain.

Discussions with the British at Mussoorie were suspended and though the probability was that they would be resumed in the near future, the likelihood of a definite treaty of friendship being concluded was remote.

Internally the financial situation was still unsatisfactory, and seriously handicapped all attempts to advance on progressive lines. Efforts at retrenchment were proving increasingly unpopular both with the military and the civil population.

The great need of Afghanistan was money, and as there was no hope of this being forthcoming in sufficient quantities in Afghanistan itself, the Amir was prepared to go a long way to obtain it by negotiations from India or Russia, or preferably from both.

## CALENDAR OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN.

(8TH AUGUST 1919—1ST JUNE 1920).

1919.

*August.*

- 8th . . . . . Peace Treaty signed at Rawal Pindi.  
 14th . . . . . Afghan delegates arrive Kabul.  
    Spin Baldak handed back to Afghans.  
 23rd . . . . . Boundary Commission commenced work.  
 During August . . . . . British Newswriter, Herat, released.  
    Afghan Trade Agency reopened in Peshawar.  
    Large numbers of Turkoman refugees arriving Herat  
    from Russia.  
    Withdrawal Afghan troops to peace stations commenced  
    in Ningrahar and Kandahar.

*September.*

- 1st . . . . . 400 Afridis interviewed by Amir in Kabul.  
 4th . . . . . Bravine Mission arrived Kabul.  
 6th . . . . . Demarcation Khaibar Boundary completed.  
 10th . . . . . Amir's letter to King Emperor.  
    Mahmud Tarzi's letter to Secretary of State for Foreign  
    Affairs.  
 13th . . . . . Dakka evacuated by our troops.  
 20th . . . . . 30 Russian artificers with 200 camel loads stores arrived  
    Kabul *via* Mazar-i-Sharif.  
 30th . . . . . Party of drill instructors and artificers left Kabul for  
    Bokhara.  
 During the Month . . . . . Withdrawal of troops in Khost to Peace Stations com-  
    menced.  
    Shrine Custodians crossed border and proceed~~d~~ to  
    Panjdeh.  
    Stopped at Kushk by Bolshevik Commander.

*October.*

- 6th . . . . . British Agent arrives India with Sardar Gul Mohamad,  
    new Afghan Envoy.  
 7th . . . . . Unsuccessful attempt on Amir's life.  
 22nd . . . . . Nadir Khan with Wazir and Mahsud deputation arrived  
    Kabul.  
 During October . . . . . All troops despatched from Kabul at beginning of  
    hostilities returned.  
    Shrine Custodians crossed border and proceeded to  
    Panjdeh.  
    Orders issued for dismissal of all Shi'waris from the  
    Army.  
    Matun connected to Kabul by telephone

*November.*

- 3rd . . . . . Official sanction by Amir for traders to enter India.
- 5th . . . . . Amir's letter to Chief Commissioner suggesting conference of officials to settle border disputes.
- 11th . . . . . Suritz Mission arrive Herat. Left for Kabul on 18th.
- During November . . . Initial issue of 1 crore currency notes.
- Discharge of old soldiers and enlistment of recruits on Rs. 14 pay only commenced.
- Nadir Khan appointed Commander-in-Chief and put in charge of East Frontier.
- Various Afghan officials with large escorts sent to Panjdeh Province.
- Instructions issued by Bolsheviks that no more Afghans to cross border without pass signed by Bravine.
- Telephone line Kabul to Kandahar commenced.

*December.*

- 9th . . . . . Amir's letter to Viceroi suggesting discussions for Treaty of friendship.
- 17th . . . . . Nadir Khan arrived Jalalabad.
- 24th . . . . . Kamensky and party arrive Herat.
- 25th . . . . . Suritz Mission arrived Kabul.
- 29th . . . . . Shah Mahmud arrived Matun as Civil and Military Governor of Simat-i-Janubi.
- During December . . . Circulation of Rouble notes stopped in Afghanistan.
- 1,000 recruits under training in Kabul.
- Abdul Baki, Consul designate for Meshed arrived Herat.

## 1920.

*January.*

- 14th . . . . . Amir's letter to H. M. the King on Khilafat question.
- 14th . . . . . Abdul Aziz, Minister for Tehran arrived Herat.
- 16th . . . . . Afridi Jirgas summoned to Jalalabad.
- 27th . . . . . Haji Abdur Razik arrived Waziristan.
- 28th . . . . . Kamensky's party arrived Kabul.
- 31st . . . . . Nadir Khan interviewed Jirga of Afridis, Mohmands and Ningrahar tribesmen at Hada. 28 Black Standards distributed.
- During January . . . Negotiations with Bolsheviks broken off.
- Telephone extension Jalalabad to Dakka completed.

*February.*

- 4th . . . . . Further distribution standards to Afridis and Mohmands at Jalalabad.
- 5th . . . . . Question of allowing Bolshevik troops to enter Afghanistan discussed in Durbar. General opinion against it.
- 15th . . . . . 2 Battalions arrive Dakka. Some military activity in Ningrahar and Kunar Valley.

- 17th . . . . . Small Afghan Force from Herat sent to collect taxes in Badghis defeated by Jamshedis.
- 20th . . . . . Mission of 25 persons from Ferghana arrived Kabul. }  
 23rd . . . . . First issue of Ittihad-i-Mashraqi published in Jalalabad.  
 23rd . . . . . Amir's letter *re* : sending Khilafat deputation to London.  
 23rd . . . . . Lashkar of Mangals enter Kurram and severely defeated by Turis.
- 29th . . . . . Party of 20 Hindustani Fanatics arrive Matum from Jalalabad *via* Tirah. They left on 2nd March for Waziristan.
- During February, . . . Raids by Jamshedis on increase. Bad feeling between local Afghan and Bolshevik officials on Herat Border.

*March.*

- 1st (approx.) . . . Wireless receiving set installed in Kabul.
- 7th . . . . . Abdul Quddus arrived Kandahar as Governor.
- 15th . . . . . Unsuccessful attempt on Amir's life. " "
- 16th . . . . . Inayatulla present in Durbar.
- 19th . . . . . Hartal observed in Kabul in sympathy with Khilafat movement.
- During March . . . 6 guns sent to Bokhara with small party of Afghan troops.
- Some excitement due to defensive preparations on Frontier. Kabul troops despatched to Ningrahar and Khost.
- 5 new Battalions raised in Kabul.
- Mangals fined Rs. 6,000 for attack on Kurram.
- Excitement in Kandahar owing to Abdul Quddus' war-like and Pan-Islamic speeches.
- A Sart reported acting as Bolshevik representative in Mazar-i-Sharif.
- Feeling against Bolsheviks on Herat Border growing stronger.
- Abdul Aziz left Herat for Meshed.
- Afghans being ejected from Panjdeh area by Bolsheviks.

*April.*

- 7th . . . . . Afghan delegates arrived Frontier.
- 10th . . . . . Afghan piquet posted on Tandi Sar.
- 14th . . . . . Discussions commenced at Mussoorie.
- 17th . . . . . Mahendra Partab left for China.
- 17-18th . . . . . 4 British subjects abducted by Afghans from Chaman.
- 18th . . . . . Birkot reinforced by 1 Battalion and 5 guns.
- 23rd . . . . . Afghans occupy Lambabat.
- 24th . . . . . Unsuccessful attack Ghwazha.
- 24th . . . . . 200-500 Suleman Khel raiders cross border and move towards Barshor and Hindubagh.
- 24th . . . . . Official discussions at Mussoorie suspended by British delegates.

- 23th (Approx.) . Lambabat evacuated by Afghans.
- During April . . . British subjects returned by Kandahar authorities.  
Tandi Sar evacuated by Afghans.  
Red Crescent Mission left Kabul for Waziristan.  
Telephone line commenced Mazar-i-Sharif to Pattakesar.  
Negotiations with Bolsheviks resumed.  
Increased amount of Bolshevik and Provisional Government of India propaganda coming down to India.  
Further concessions to Hindus.

*May.*

- 10th . . . . . 3,000 recruits in Kabul. Transport and rations collected.
- 20th . . . . . Official date given for Nasrulla's death.
- 23rd . . . . . 6 anti-aircraft guns arrive in Ningrahar from Kabul.
- During May . . . . . Muhajirin begin to arrive from India. Official instructions for their reception and maintenance.  
Nadir Khan raising an Afridi Battalion.  
3 crown villages given Mahsud and Wazir refugees in Khost.  
Mahsud immigrants enter Afghanistan.  
Further reinforcements to frontier posts and military defensive measures.  
Import of Rs. 2,25,000 worth of gold bullion from India. Gold coins valued Rs. 75 being minted.  
Increased raiding by Jamshedis. Acute feeling against Bolsheviks.
- End of May . . . . . Transport released. Recruiting Kabul district stopped.
-



Confidential

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
SUMMARY  
OF  
EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

1st June 1920 to 1st July 1922



Compiled by the General Staff

Case No. 25/Books/M. O.



DELHI  
SUPERINTENDENT GOVERNMENT PRINTING, INDIA  
1923



## SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN.

1ST JUNE 1920 TO 1ST JULY 1922.

*Compiled by the General Staff.*

1. The period under review covers a time of peculiar activity. The Mussoorie Conference was sitting at the commencement of the period and terminated in July 1920, after paving the way for the Dobbs Mission which finally succeeded in concluding an Anglo-Afghan Treaty after prolonged negotiations in Kabul in 1921. Treaties were also concluded on the part of Afghanistan with Russia, Italy, the Anatolian Turks, Persia and France. Amanulla has continued to consolidate his hold on his father's throne and the other members of the Royal family have been relegated to comparative obscurity. His most dangerous rival, his uncle Nasrulla, died in jail in June 1920. The country is awakening under a series of reforms. The civil administration has been revised, the army has been reconstituted, education has been introduced and is being vigorously encouraged throughout the country. New newspapers have been founded, a telephone system inaugurated and home manufactures encouraged. In all of these projects the Amir has been the guiding spirit and such results as have been obtained are due to his personal efforts.

### *Political.*

2. The greatest enemies of ruling monarchs of the present dynasty have always been members of their own house. The plurality of wives makes for domestic intrigue, and the large number of exiles in India testifies to the mistrust the Amirs of Afghanistan feel towards members of their own family. The principal members of the present Amir's family from whom trouble might be expected were his uncle Nasrulla and his eldest brother Inayatulla. Of these Inayatulla had always been recognised as the heir-apparent by their father and Nasrulla Khan had been proclaimed Amir in Jalalabad immediately after the murder of Amir Habibulla Khan in March 1919.

3. On seizing the throne Amanulla imprisoned Nasrulla and placed Inayatulla under surveillance. Of the two Nasrulla was the more dangerous as the majority of the leading men in the religious world of Afghanistan were in his favour. He left his prison for the grave in June 1920, having died in prison.

4. Inayatulla steadily refused to take any part in politics and has maintained that attitude to the present time. There were others, however, who were willing to intrigue in his name. His mother, Ulya Jan, hails from Tagao, and a movement in favour of her son manifested itself in June 1920 among the people of her district. This spread to the Safi Battalion which was composed principally of Tagawis and a plot was hatched to murder the Amir. An unsuccessful attempt was made on his life in June 1920. 14 men were blown from guns as a result of an enquiry made into the plot and the battalion was disbanded.

### *Negotiations with Great Britain.*

5. The Mussoorie Conference between the representatives of England and Afghanistan commenced on the 17th of April and was concluded on

the 24th of July 1920. The object of the conference was to find a means by which the British and Afghan Governments could come to an amicable agreement on points at which they were at variance. It is characteristic of Afghan diplomacy that right up to the moment when their delegates were to start for India, the Afghan Government were endeavouring to make a definite alliance with the Bolsheviks with the object of making an attack on the British in Persia.

6. On the 24th of April the conference was suspended owing to acts of aggression on the part of the Afghans on our border. In the North Nadir Khan prompted an unwarranted attack on Chitral territory and the Chitral post of Lambabat was seized by the Afghans. In the Kurram the hill south of the Peiwar known as Tandi Sar was seized by the Afghans although it was clearly on our side of the Durand Line. In the south our border was violated and a prominently loyal headman was openly abducted from near Chaman by order of the Afghan commander of Baldak. Until these points were cleared up it was decided not to continue the conference and the official conversations were suspended. This action had the desired effect for the Afghans evacuated Lambabat and Tandi Sar and released the headman they had abducted from Baluchistan. The conversations re-opened on the 3rd of June and on the 24th of July an *aide memoire* was drafted on which negotiations for a Treaty of Friendship could be commenced at some future date.

7. The *aide memoire* re-affirmed the independence of Afghanistan with complete control of her foreign affairs. The Afghans on their part undertook to prevent intrigue against Britain in Afghanistan to the best of their ability, to prevent arms and ammunition reaching our frontier tribesmen, to prevent raids on British territory being based on Afghanistan and to abstain from anti-British intrigue in India. In return for this the British Government would be prepared to give Afghanistan a subsidy of eighteen lakhs of rupees per annum, help them to educate a certain number of youths in Europe, assist in the construction of railways, telegraphs, etc., give technical advice regarding irrigation and other matters and restore the privilege of importing arms and ammunition through India to Afghanistan. Certain clauses dealt with trade relationship. The Afghans were to be allowed to establish consulates in Calcutta, Bombay and Karachi and the British at Jalalabad, Ghazni and Kandahar. If a treaty of friendship were actually signed certain gifts of telegraph material, etc., were to be handed to Afghanistan by Britain. The question of an Afghan representative in London was reserved till the actual discussion of a treaty of friendship.

8. The head of the Afghan Mission at Mussoorie was Sardar-i-Ala Mahmud Tarzi, the Foreign Minister. During his absence there Nadir Khan, the Afghan Commander-in-Chief, made every endeavour to undermine his influence in Kabul. A shrewd and cultivated Oriental, Tarzi had spent a portion of his life in Damascus and whilst there married a Syrian. The Amir married their daughter in 1914 and she is still his only wife. Mahmud Tarzi is inclined to favour the Bolsheviks rather than the British and has decidedly pro-Turkish leanings. He first came into prominence as the editor of the first newspaper ever published in Afghanistan, the "Siraj ul Akhbar" which was violently anti-British in tone. His rival, Nadir Khan, has been twice Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan Army. In 1919 he was deprived of his appointment owing to his supposed complicity in the murder of Amir Habibulla and was in arrest for a time. He was then sent to Khost where he distinguished himself by his

inroad on Thal during the Third Afghan War. In October 1919 he again became Commander-in-Chief. He is ably supported by his brothers Shah Wali, Shah Mahmud and Muhammad Hashim all of whom hold high military rank. He is popular with the troops and throughout the country generally. He speaks Urdu fluently and has a better command of Pushtu than any of the high officials in Kabul where Persian is the court language and Pushtu hardly spoken. This gives him great influence with the Pathan tribes on both sides of the Durand line. It was with one eye on Kabul where he felt his influence on the wane that Tarzi carried on the Mussoorie Conference. This marks a definite period when the two men joined issue in the political field and this enmity, none the less intense for being concealed, became the dominating factor in the foreign relations of Afghanistan.

9. As Tarzi was staking his reputation on an understanding with Great Britain, Nadir Khan commenced to intrigue with the Bolsheviks. Tarzi arrived in Kabul on the 31st of July 1920, and by the end of August he had regained all his previous influence. A curious condition had been created in the meantime. A shrewd observer stated that Tarzi was anti-British at heart whilst Nadir Khan was pro-British. The struggle for political dominance had thus, for a time, forced each of these prominent men into an attitude to which their natures were fundamentally opposed.

10. A working basis having thus been established at Mussoorie on which negotiations for a Treaty of Friendship could be opened a British Mission consisting of the following crossed the Afghan Frontier on the 9th of January and arrived in Kabul on the 11th of January 1921.

*British Mission :—*

Sir Henry Dobbs, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

Mr. P. J. G. Pison, C.I.E., M.C.

Mr. J. G. Acheson.

Sir Mir Shams Shah, K.C.I.E.

Khan Bahadur Muzaffar Khan.

Khan Bahadur Ghulam Murtaza Khan.

Colonel S. F. Muspratt, C.S.I., C.I.E., D.S.O.

Captain Hanna.

Lieut.-Colonel Ross, O.B.E., I.M.S.

11. From the first it was evident that the Afghans were prepared to drive a hard bargain. Political events in other portions of the world made their influence felt in Afghanistan. In the end of October 1920, the Bolsheviks had made peace with both Poland and Finland. This enabled them to concentrate on Wrangel in South Russia and to force him to evacuate the Crimea in December. After this they were free to overrun the Caucasus. Azerbaijan was conquered, Georgia threatened and a Soviet Government was established in Armenia. 1921 thus opened with the star of Russia in the ascendant.

12. Great Britain on the other hand appeared to be losing ground. The Irish situation had deteriorated, security and stability on the continent of Europe were thrust out of the picture by Germany's recalcitrancy over

the questions of reparations and disarmament. Jamal Pasha, the Nationalist Turk, who had arrived in Kabul on the 27th of October 1920, nominally to help in the reconstruction of the Afghan Army, but really (*inter alia*) as a Bolshevik agent, continually harped on these facts. Our Mission, therefore, were confronted with a hard task and the Afghans put forward some preposterous demands. A treaty had been concluded in Moscow between Russia and Afghanistan but was not yet ratified and this increased the Afghan tendency to bargain.

13. The progress of the negotiations falls into four phases. The first was one of impossible demands on the Afghan side and of insistence on our part that no Bolshevik Consulate should be established in Eastern Afghanistan. After nearly three months argument no definite result was come to and another set of proposals were initiated by the Amir who wished to denounce his treaty with the Russians if he could be assured of British aid in case of Russian aggression.

14. This second phase lasted about three months also, from April to July, but a series of victories of the Anatolian Turks over the Greeks combined with the arrival of a new Russian Minister, Raskolnikov, who relieved Suritz, in Kabul stiffened the Afghans in their demands and this period also closed without any result.

15. The third phase from July to September was the most delicate of all, and was equally indecisive. During this phase the Amir suddenly proposed that he should sever all connection with the Russians and make a treaty with Britain which should guarantee them exclusive rights in Afghanistan in return for which Britain would provide guns, rifles and ammunition to Afghanistan to enable her to oppose any retaliatory action on the part of Russia. This is known as the "exclusive treaty". Various factors however combined to prevent any headway being made as instances the Russo-Afghan Treaty was ratified in July, whilst on the 7th of August all negotiations were broken off owing to the theft of the mail bag belonging to the British Mission, and were not resumed until its restoration on the 20th of August. Again about this time Muhammad Wali Khan, an Afghan diplomatist at the head of an Afghan Mission which had been wandering round the capitals of Europe, arrived in England after a flying (and *unsuccessful*) visit to New York. Muhammad Wali claimed that he should be introduced to His Majesty the King by the Foreign Office and not by the India Office and a refusal to comply with this demand was keenly resented in Kabul. As a result of these adverse factors it seemed so certain that no treaty would be concluded at this time that Suritz who had remained in Kabul to help Raskolnikov left for Europe in the end of August and was followed by Jamal Pasha on the 2nd of September.

16. Up to this time all the proposed treaties had contained some forms of concessions to the Afghans and the promise of a subsidy.

17. The fourth phase from the 18th of September to the end of December was mainly spent in discussing a treaty in which the Afghans were to receive no annual subsidy and were called on to undertake less comprehensive engagements. On the 24th of September Ghulam Siddiq, a member of the above mentioned Mission to Europe, returned from Europe bearing despatches from Muhammad Wali and his report on the conditions obtaining in Europe evidently inclined the Afghans to seek our help rather than that of Russia. The Amir, apparently breaking away from

his ministers, took a lead in the conduct of the negotiations from this time onwards. After a final unsuccessful attempt on his part to obtain a subsidy and a large present of arms and ammunition, in return for an exclusive treaty, the Treaty outlined below was signed on the 22nd of November 1921.

18. The Indo-Afghan frontier was to remain as demarcated by the various commissions from 1893 onwards except for a slight rectification west of the Khyber which gave the Afghans a barren spot known as Torkham. An Afghan Minister was to be established in London and a British Minister in Kabul. British Consulates were to be established at Kandahar and Jalalabad, an Afghan Consul General was to be appointed to Simla (Delhi in winter) and Afghan Consuls at Calcutta, Karachi and Bombay. The Afghans were to be permitted to import machinery and telegraph material without let or hindrance, and also arms and ammunition as long as the Afghan Government should maintain a friendly attitude towards India. Afghan Government goods should be imported without payment of customs dues. The two Governments agreed to inform each other of any military action they propose to take against the tribes on their borders. The question of a Trade Convention was left for a future occasion.

19. There now occurred a typical example of Oriental diplomacy. As the treaty contained no special clause which insisted on the return of Arnawai, a Chitral border village seized by the Afghans in 1919, they flatly refused to hand it over to the Mehtar of Chitral. A raid into Baluchistan carried out by the Wazir exiles who had been persuaded to settle in Afghanistan in which casualties were inflicted at Barshore on one of our columns nearly wrecked the newly signed treaty. As a matter of fact this foray really proved a blessing in disguise. Strong representations were made to the Amir and he gave assurances that Arnawai would be handed over and expressed his horror and regret at the Wazir raid. He also promised to recover the arms taken on that occasion.

20. Arnawai was handed over to the representative of the Mehtar of Chitral on 17th January 1922, and the Afghan authorities are still slowly collecting the arms from the truculent and obstructive Wazirs.

21. As the Treaty provided that the Afghans should have a Minister in London and that the British Foreign Office should appoint a Minister to Kabul, Abdul Hadi Khan was despatched to London and presented his credentials to the Court of King George at the beginning of April 1922. On our part Lieutenant-Colonel Humphrys, C.I.E., was appointed British Minister in Kabul, and arrived at the latter place on 13th of March 1922.

22. The Afghan Envoy Gul Muhammad Khan in India was recalled and Muhammad Haidar Jan, son of the Afghan Prime Minister, Abdul Quddus, assumed the duties of Consul General for Afghanistan at Simla and Delhi on the 3rd of December 1921.

### *Afghan Relations with Russia.*

#### (The Treaty.)

23. The period under review opened with M. Suritz, as Russian Minister in Kabul. His predecessor M. Bravine had become an Afghan citizen, a step which he took on account of his unwillingness to return to Russia as he was uncertain as to his reception there.

24. M. Suritz from the first devoted himself to negotiating with the Afghan Government in the hope of securing a treaty with them.

25. By the end of September 1920, he had settled the details of the proposed Treaty and it was despatched to Moscow, for ratification. At the same time he received information that the Bolsheviks had commenced an attack on Bokhara, with the object of ejecting the Amir of Bokhara and setting up a puppet Bokharan Soviet Government. He informed the Afghan Government of this after they had practically agreed to the Treaty and the news aroused the greatest indignation in Kabul.

26. There had been friction between Afghans and Bolsheviks in Bokhara previous to this. Now Afghan merchants had their goods forcibly seized by the new Soviet and could obtain neither redress nor compensation. Suritz's negotiations therefore fell into abeyance and the draft treaty was not ratified.

27. On the 29th of September, Muhammad Wali Khan, who had previously been in Moscow arranging the preliminaries of the treaty, left Kabul for Moscow with the following staff:—

Sultan Ahmad,  
 Faiz Muhammad,  
 Ghulam Sadiq,  
 Habibulla Khan,  
 Edib Effendi,  
 Mirza Abbas Khan.

28. Though Moscow was their original destination the party toured the Capitals of Europe and visited New York. His object was to carry out negotiations for a Russo-Afghan Treaty.

29. These negotiations were prolonged during the winter of 1920, and the spring of 1921, owing to the many points raised by both sides. On the 26th of May 1921, however, the treaty ratified by the Russian Government arrived in Kabul. It was not until the 13th of August that the Amir finally affixed his signature to the Treaty, the delay being due to friction between the Afghans and Russians.

30. The terms of the treaty engaged both parties from entering into a military or political arrangement with a third power which would be detrimental to either Russians or Afghans. It provided for the opening of seven Afghan Consulates in Russian territory, of which five were to be in Russian Central Asia, and for Russian consulates in Herat, Maimana Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar and Ghazni. Goods imported into Afghanistan from Russian territory should not be taxed. The independence of Khiva and Bokhara was acknowledged by both parties. The Russians offered to hold a plebiscite in the Panjdeh to determine whether this area should belong to Russia or Afghanistan. Financial and other help was offered by the Russians, a secret clause including the gift of aeroplanes, guns, rifles and ammunition. A subsidy of one million gold roubles was also promised and they contracted to build a telegraph from Kushk to Kabul *via* Herat and Kandahar. Further assistance was afforded the Russians by the arrival of Jemal Pasha and a party of Turkish officers including Bedri Bey (known as Enver's jackal) and four Indian revolutionaries including Barkatulla. Jamal was sent to Kabul at the instance of Russia nominally to take charge of the reorganization of the Afghan Army but with the real intention of co-ordinating the various societies who were attempting to penetrate India under Bolshevik direction.



*Russo-Afghan Relations extraneous to the Treaty.*

31. The Russians even while negotiating for the Treaty with Afghanistan were intriguing with the Jamshedis, a tribe of obscure origin who live in Badghis between Herat and the Russian border, and were trying to persuade them to migrate to Russian territory. In the autumn of 1920 they succeeded and a large body of Jamshedis migrated to the Panjdeh. Since that time they have raided into Afghanistan and have been a thorn in the side of the Herat frontier officials. Their depredations have caused constant friction between the Afghans and Russians.

32. A much greater cause of friction was the treacherous attack on Bokhara in October 1920, when the Bolsheviki after inciting the more disreputable elements to form a Soviet party assisted them to expel the Amir of Bokhara. Certain Afghan troops assisted the Amir of Bokhara in the defence of his capital. They were captured but subsequently released. The property of Afghan and Indian traders was confiscated in accordance with the usual Soviet principles. It was only after months of wrangling that the Afghan Consul in Bokhara, Abdul Hadi Khan, was able to obtain the restoration of a fraction of the merchant's goods.

33. After an ineffectual attempt to stem the Bolshevik invasion the Amir of Bokhara was compelled to take refuge in Afghanistan. He crossed the Oxus and arrived in Kabul, on the 23rd of April 1921, where he still remains—naturally a focus for anti-Russian intrigue.

34. On the side of the Russians, also, there was cause for complaint. The Afghan Commandant of the border posts opposite to Kushk, Colonel Abdur Rahim, incurred the enmity of the Russians owing to his obstructive methods and to his conducting propaganda among the Jamshedis and Hazaras in the Panjdeh. He was also credited with conniving at raids in which Russian subjects were the victims. Judging from the action of Afghan officials in Eastern Afghanistan it is more than probable that the Russians were more than justified in their complaints against Abdur Rahim.

35. On the 16th of July M. Raskolnikov reached Kabul to relieve M. Suritz, as Minister Plenipotentiary. His arrival was marked by a renewed activity on the part of the Russians. M. Suritz and Jamal Pasha still remained in Kabul, and finally left for Europe in the end of August and on 2nd of September respectively, as previously related. M. Raskolnikov possesses more personality than his predecessor and at first made an impression on the court at Kabul. He was, however, soon in difficulties owing to his intrigue with tribesmen and to tension between Afghanistan and Russia.

36. Owing to the refusal of the British to conclude any kind of treaty with Afghanistan if Russian consulates were permitted at Kandahar and Ghazni, clause V of the Russo-Afghan Treaty has never been fully carried out. These consulates were merely intended to become propaganda centres and this was recognized by the Afghans. The non-fulfilment of this clause was made the excuse for not handing over certain military stores which were granted to Afghanistan under an unpublished addendum to clause X in the Treaty and on one pretext or another the Russians have failed to hand over these stores up till now (1st July). As a sop, however, three Russian aeroplanes were sent to Kabul. These were old and worn out machines and so far have not left the ground but remain in the hangars on the Khwajah Rawish plain.

37. The subsidy promised under the above clause was, however, handed over in dribblets and the whole sum of about £50,000 sterling has now been paid to the Afghan Government. Russian Consulates have been established in Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif, and Afghan Consulates in Moscow and Tashkend.

38. Early in 1922 the embers of revolt which had been smouldering in Bokhara burst into flame. Enver Pasha, whom the Russians were sending on a special mission to Afghanistan, offered to mediate between the Russians and the insurgents of Ferghana and Eastern Bokhara. Apparently this gave him an opportunity which he had been waiting for and he boldly placed himself at the head of the rebels and commenced a vigorous campaign against his former allies, the Russians. These operations were carried out with varying success.

39. The rebellion in Bokhara was keenly followed by the Afghan Government and the rebels were secretly encouraged and surreptitiously given help in money and material by the Afghan officials. Troops were unostentatiously pushed over the Hindu Kush and Nadir Khan, the Afghan Commander-in-Chief was sent to Kataghan, where he was in a position to act promptly either aggressively or defensively should the turn of events favour Afghan intervention. One of the Amir's favourite ministers, Shuja-ud-Daula, the Minister of Justice, was sent to Herat and the Afghan troops on the Kushk border were strengthened by the arrival of a cavalry regiment and a battery and two infantry battalions from Herat. The Russians promptly countered by concentrating men in the vicinity of Kushk in the end of May and in the beginning of June 1922. At the same time they presented a request which was practically an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of the Afghan troops from the border, the dismissal of Colonel Abdur Rahim and the publication in the Afghan newspapers of a declaration of neutrality. Faced by the necessity either of compliance or of risking war with Russia the Afghans gave way in all three points and the tension for the time being has been relieved.

#### *Civil Administration.*

40. Since his accession to the throne the Amir has been engaged in reforming the civil administration of the country. The chief difficulties he has had to grapple with have been the chaotic state of the revenue department, the arbitrary administration of justice by provincial governors and the minor officials due to lack of any law save that of the Shariat and the corruption existing in every department of the government.

41. The first course taken by the Amir was to regularize the division of the country into provinces. Five first class provinces were created of which four are under governors. These are Kandahar, Herat, Turkistan and the combined provinces of Kataghan and Badakshan. The fifth is Kabul which comes directly under the Crown. Outside these there are four second class provinces under Lieutenant-Governors and these are designated the Eastern Circle, the Southern Circle, Farah and Maimana. All these nine provinces are divided into districts under Commissioners and sub-districts (Ilaqas) under Deputy Commissioners (Ilaqadars). A first class commissioner has second class commissioners under him for the outlying districts but in addition to general supervision has direct charge of those sub-districts which are in the immediate vicinity of his headquarters.

42. The finance problem has been complicated by the slipshod method of keeping revenue accounts and by the prevalence of arrears dating back many years. The Amir formed classes in accountancy and thus endeavoured to introduce a reasonable system of book keeping throughout the country. In some parts of the country where the revenue was much in arrears notably in Kandahar and Kataghan the inhabitants accepted a slight increase in their assessment and the back revenue accounts with their complicated rolls of unpaid arrears were publicly burnt.

43. The Amir has also started an uphill fight against the corruption which is so prevalent throughout his country. It is doubtful whether he has achieved any measure of success against this age-long custom of the East.

### *Afghan Army.*

44. From the experiences of the Anglo-Afghan war of 1919 it was apparent that the Afghan military machine was inadequate to meet the requirements of modern war. It was decided, therefore, to remodel the army, and the services of the Nationalist Turk Jamal Pasha were invoked for this purpose. He arrived in October 1920, and commenced to re-organize the Afghan Army. As a preliminary Afghanistan was divided into Corps areas as follows:—

1. Kabul.
2. Eastern Province (Ningrahar).
3. Southern Province (Simat-i-Janubi).
4. Kandahar.
5. Herat.
6. Afghan Turkishtan.
7. Badakshan and Kataghan,

whilst Maimana remained an independent Brigade.

45. Previous to this the highest formation in the Afghan Army had nominally been a Division but in reality the four mixed brigades stationed in Kabul had been the only formations in the country higher than a regimental unit. These brigades each consisted of three battalions of infantry, a battery of field artillery, a battery of pack artillery, a machine gun battery and a cavalry regiment.

46. In the new organization the corps consists of two divisions of two brigades each thus totalling four brigades to a corps. The cavalry regiment is now removed from the brigade and a cavalry corps is in being, consisting of two divisions of two brigades each. There are two regiments of cavalry in each brigade and the corps thus consists of eight regiments. The intention is to brigade artillery in a similar manner but so far nothing has been done.

47. The corps will eventually have titular numbers but so far only three have been so distinguished, *i.e.*—

- 1st Kabul Corps.
- 2nd Eastern Province Corps (Ningrahar).
- 3rd Southern Province Corps (Simat-i-Janubi).

48. In Kabul the Corps organization has been completed. Progress has been made in the Eastern Provinces corps, but one divisional commander and his staff have not yet been appointed. In the Southern Province Corps even the brigades are not properly organized.

49. Simultaneously with the re-organization of the Army the designations of army formations and of the ranks of army officers have been changed. The new names are given below:—

| British designation. | Afghan designation. | Title of Commander. |
|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Army Corps.          | Firqa.              | Firqa Mishar.       |
| Division.            | Lewa.               | Lewa Mishar.        |
| Brigade.             | Ghund.              | Ghund Mishar.       |
| Battalion.           | Khandak.            | Khandak Mishar.     |
| Company.             | Toli.               | Toli Mishar.        |

50. In order to improve the training of the troops Jamal Pasha formed two training battalions in Kabul which were designated "Qita Namuna." In these he carried out elementary and individual training. Men who qualified under him were sent as instructors to the provinces, and their places were taken by fresh men who in their turn are to be sent out as instructors.

51. The officers are ignorant and lack the spirit of leading. Many of them are illiterate and more of them are nearly so. The younger generation of officers are being brought up on improved lines. The Harbia school at Kabul, under the careful supervision of Muhammad Sami, an Arab from Baghdad, is training cadets whose educational attainments far outrun those of the older officers of the Army and Afghanistan looks to them to create a military force which is more worthy of the name than the Afghan Army of the past has been.

52. In arms and equipment the Afghans are not yet up to modern requirements. Although there are a certain number of units equipped with 303 rifles, nearly a third are still armed with Martinis and even Sniders (the latter in Badakshan). The Amir is busy purchasing rifles in Europe but has met with some set backs for instance many rifles have been held up when passing through Russia and an Italian consignment was dumped at Massowah in July when on their way to Bombay as it was found that they were a job lot which had been foisted on to the purchasers at a cheap rate. As regards artillery, the guns lack the necessary range and weight of metal.

53. The Afghans experience great difficulty in making ammunition. They have no plant for turning out cordite although a certain amount is produced by hand. Fuzes for shells are not at present turned out in the arsenals. The Afghans, however, are negotiating with the Russians for the purchase of plant for a cordite factory and we may expect that they will succeed in obtaining the machinery shortly.

54. With regard to uniform, the crack battalions used to wear Khaki whilst the provincial garrisons seldom wore uniform at all. The army as a whole had a full dress kit modelled on the British pattern which was only worn on ceremonial parades. This has been done away with and all units are now dressed in a serviceable but ugly drab home-spun which is made in the Kabul cloth factory. The round Afghan cap remains the same and

putties and stout marching boots complete the clothing. The equipment is like that of the Indian Pioneers, waist belt with two braces whilst ammunition is carried in three large pouches.

### *Recruiting.*

55. Considerable activity has been displayed in recruiting and the actual numbers in the strength of the Afghan Army has been increased. The system of taking one man in eight for the army (*hasht nafri*) has been rigorously applied and has occasioned discontent in Kandahar and in Khost.

### *Afghan Intrigues with British Tribesmen.*

56. A feature in the political life of Afghanistan is persistent intrigue with the tribesmen on the British side of the Durand Line. Allied as these Pathans are to the Afghans by ties of race, language and religion, it is a comparatively easy matter for the Amir to keep in touch with them and to enlist the assistance of their fanatical and ignorant priesthood on his side whenever his interests demand it. It should also be remembered that until comparatively recent years a large proportion of the Pathan races were part and parcel of Afghanistan. Janrud and Thal were among our frontier posts prior to the Second Afghan War and it was only after the peace of 1882 that the Afridis, Orakzais, Mahsuds, Wazirs, Kakars and Achakzais definitely passed under the protection of the British.

57. The Court at Kabul are always in close touch with the British tribesmen on their frontier and spend much time and money in conciliating them. They pay allowances to certain members of these tribes and there are recognized "Afghan allowance holders" and "British allowance holders." In all cases when the tribesmen are dissatisfied in any way with the British a party is made up to lay their complaints before the Amir at Kabul. But if the Amir were to propose to take their country over they would probably resent this keenly. Their object is mainly to play off Afghanistan against England for their own advantage in normal times. During the periodic outbreaks of fanatical excitement their religious fervour is wholly on the side of Afghanistan, and it is the object of Afghan intrigue to retain this weapon against us.

58. In 1920 the Eastern Province was placed under Muhammad Hashim who relieved his brother Nadir Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, in August. In the Southern Province their younger brother Shah Mahmud was already Governor. All three are descendants of Painda Khan and thus related to the Amir. To the south in the Kandahar Province was Abdul Qudus, their great uncle.

59. Muhammad Hashim early engaged in intrigues with the Afridis, Mohmands and Mamunds. A constant stream of agents passed between Jalalabad and the Tirah, where a controversy was going on as to the advisability of opposing the construction of the Khyber railway and the opposition was kept alive by Afghan intrigues.

60. With regard to the Mohmands the Governor was in correspondence with the Haji of Turangzai, the most bitter of all the anti-British elements in Mohmand country, and with the son of the latter, Fazal-i-Akbar.

61. On the 12th of January, 1921, a jirga of Afridis and Mohmands was held at Jalalabad at which nothing of importance was discussed. A party of sixty men representing all sections of these tribes including the Haji of Turangzai was sent on to Kabul to interview the Amir, from whom

apparently they obtained no tangible advantage. In fact it may be said that Afghan intrigue among Afridis and Mohmands has made little headway during the period under review.

62. In July 1921 Muhammad Hashim went on a month's tour through Kunar. On the 21st of August he summoned the representatives of the Mamunds and Salarzais to meet him in Asmar and distributed allowances among them on the 1st of August. The tribesmen were out for what they could get but none of the more important Khans were mixed up in this intrigue.

63. A more important series of intrigues are those which radiate from the Hindustani fanatic colony at Chamarkand in Bajaur. The ramifications of this sect (which incidentally extend as far as Lahore, the United Provinces and even Bengal) make its members a suitable instrument for the furtherance of Afghan designs which they have not been slow to make use of. The Afghan civil and military officers of the Upper and Lower Kunar have been in constant touch with Fazal Ilahi, the Punjabi leader of this colony, and have encouraged his Pan-Islamic propaganda campaign in Bajaur, Dir, Swat and even the Black Mountain.

64. The Afghan Southern Province has been the most conspicuous for intriguing with our Pathan tribes. The winter campaign of 1919-1920 had left the Mahsuds unrepentant. The Wana Wazirs were truculent and no attempt had been made to punish them for their share in the events of 1919 during the Third Afghan War nor for the help given by them to the Mahsuds in the winter of 1919-1920. The whole of them looked to Afghanistan for assistance and their resolve to persevere in their recalcitrancy was largely due to the encouragement they received from Afghanistan.

65. Haji Abdur Razik, a mulla of Kabul, for years notorious for anti-British intrigue on our borders and his co-adjutor Shah Daula, a Colonel in the Afghan regular army, raised a force of Wazir levies at Wana in 1919 whom they paid as their personal retainers. In support of this movement, Mulla Bashir, a prominent member of the Chamarkand colony of Hindustani fanatics, established himself at Makin with the full knowledge of the Afghan officials. Convoys of ammunition, food, money and clothing were sent regularly to Makin from Matun where Shah Mahmud, the Governor of the Province, had his Headquarters and from Urghun, the Headquarters of Adam Khan, his Deputy Commissioner. These supplies were doled out to Mahsuds and Wazirs to encourage them to further efforts.

66. Similarly the Afghan Commissioner of Khost, one Qazi Shah Bazurg, busied himself with the Tochi Wazirs. He extended his patronage to Tarin, a Wazir jemadar of the North Waziristan militia who had deserted during the mutiny at Miran Shah in 1919, and became the sleeping partner of the latter, taking a regular share of his spoils gathered in raids on British territory. When Tarin was killed at Spinchilla in December 1921, Qazi Shah Bazurg gave him a magnificent funeral.

67. Shah Mahmud was recalled from command of the Southern Province to Kabul in November 1921 and the departure of a man of his standing and character marked a definite decline in the intrigue which had been carried on during his tenure. Qazi Shah Bazrug was recalled to Kabul in February 1922 and Haji Abdur Razik followed in April. Their removal soon cleared the air and of the original intriguers only Brigadier Adam Khan at Urghun was left. The latter has so far confined his attention to an irrigation scheme for Birmal and to attempts to persuade the Wazirs who

are hostile to the British to emigrate from Waziristan and settle on lands in Birmal. He has had little success with either scheme.

68. On the departure of Shah Mahmud the civil administration was supposed to be taken over by Muhammad Ali whilst the command of the troops fell to Muhammad Umar. Muhammad Ali however never arrived in Khost. Muhammad Umar has been guilty of writing letters encouraging hostile Mahsuds in their opposition to Government and a letter from him to certain Jalal Khels dated the 17th of June has been intercepted.

69. To leave Waziristan and pass farther to the South, the presence of a large number of Kakars who have been outlaws in Afghanistan since 1919 has given the Afghan border officials an opportunity of keeping alive unrest in Baluchistan. Thus the Afghan Hakim of Maruf, 80 miles East of Kandahar, entered into partnership with the Kakars in their raids into British territory and shared the spoils.

70. Again in October 1921 the Amir planted a colony of Wazirs in Shahjui, halfway between Ghazni and Kandahar. These men, warlike and well armed, soon followed in the footsteps of the Kakars and their daring raids into Baluchistan which culminated in the destruction of a small column of the 92nd Punjabis at Barshore on the 25th of November brought matters to a head as has been earlier described. Pressure from Kabul caused a cessation of the activities of the Hakim of Maruf and Afghan intrigue on the Baluchistan borders has died down of late.

#### *Indian Muhajarin.*

71. The exodus of Mussulmans from India to Afghanistan which commenced in March 1920 continued until the 12th of August 1920, during which time 50,000 men, women and children passed through the Khyber to Afghanistan. By this time the resources of Afghanistan were strained to the uttermost and the Amir issued instructions to his frontier officials to prevent any further parties of Muhajarin from crossing the Afghan border. Notices to this effect were distributed by the Afghan Trade Agent in Peshawar to the Muslim leaders in India. Defying this prohibition a body of 7,000 people started out for Jamrud on the 12th of August. They arrived at the barbed wire fence marking the boundary between India and Afghanistan at 7 A.M. on the 14th. Here they found the gates blocked on the Afghan side and a body of 50 Afghan soldiers drawn up to oppose their onward progress. They were not to be denied, however, and threatened to force their way through if force was used; they were accordingly allowed to proceed to Jalalabad.

72. The condition of all these wretched dupes was one to excite pity. They had sold their property and voluntarily exiled themselves merely to satisfy the desire for notoriety of a small but virulent anti-English party who battered on the misfortune of their humble and less educated co-religionists. They suffered exile, thirst, hunger and the terrific heat of the frontier summer in striving after an unattainable ideal, only to be callously treated by the country in which they had taken refuge. Some settled in Khanabad in the unprofitable crown lands of Kataghan, others in the vicinity of Jabal-i-Siraj and around Kabul and in Khost. The greater part of them sick at heart and thoroughly disillusioned started back for India and their old homes. A party of 500 reached Landi Kotal on the 19th of August, the advance guard of the returning multitudes. In place of gay processions proceeding west through the Khyber with banners flying and drums beating, a stream of footsore and crestfallen peasants made their

way back to India. They had harrowing stories to tell of the privations of the journey and the harsh and sometimes brutal treatment they had received from the people of their adopted country. Clothes and other possessions had been forcibly taken away from them or sold at ridiculously low prices to procure food. Their women had been insulted and many of them had succumbed to exhaustion. By October only about 2,000 were left in Afghanistan. Of these 160 had taken service under the Amir, 200 more were existing in Kabul as best they could, another 1,500 were settled in Kataghan. Nearly 200 more the most stubborn and adventurous had made their way across the Oxus and joined the Bolsheviks.

73. These latter had many adventures. They arrived at the time when the Russians were attacking the Amir of Bokhara. Some were captured by the Turkomans but afterwards rescued. Others assisted the Russians in the defence of Kilif when that place was besieged.

74. Moving on to Tashkend, they were cordially greeted by the Bolsheviks. Some were enrolled as students in the propaganda schools, others were taught aviation and others were drafted into the local military forces. Certain of them went on to Baku where they stayed for four and a half months imbibing Communist principles. A few of the more educated got as far as Moscow. By slow degrees the greater number have found their way back to India doubtless destined according to Soviet aspirations to form part one day of the Bolshevik organization aimed against British rule in India.

75. The colonists in Kataghan have found that the lands granted to them are not a source of wealth. The remnants of the colony formed a poverty stricken and dispirited community and it is probable that even these will eventually find their way back to India.

76. In comparison with the rest, the educated Indian has found his lot to have fallen in comparatively happy circumstances. In view of the general ignorance of the Afghans, those of the Muhajarin who had any special training found that the reorganization of the Afghan administration gave them opportunities of employment. The Amir's educational programme found room for some as teachers and others as circle inspectors. Their members have penetrated most of the Government departments as minor officials and clerks, whilst others have been admitted to the Afghan Medical Service. Most of them take advantage of their official positions to conduct an anti-British campaign and keep in touch with the revolutionary movement in India.

77. These anti-British tendencies have not escaped the notice of the Amir and he has frequently checked their activities. A few have taken offence and left Afghanistan for Persia but the remainder have been content to wait for further opportunities of intrigue against the British.

*"The Provisional Government of India."*

78. Meanwhile the older revolutionary organization known as the "Provisional Government of India" whilst continuing its activities has been hampered by internal dissensions. The eccentric Mohendra Partap appears to have been startled at the Pan-Islamic tone which was evident among his Mussalman colleagues and gradually broke away from them. He made persistent attempts to communicate with India from the Pamirs and Turkistan during 1920 and even endeavoured to penetrate into Thibet during 1921. But the Chinese authorities refused to allow him to use their country as a propaganda centre and he returned to Tashkent in September 1921.



He then devoted his energies to compiling a book setting forth new tenets which he had invented and which he styled "The Religion of Love."

79. The remainder of the party have divided themselves into two parties, Communist and Pan-Islamic, which have drifted apart. Obcidulla remained in Kabul. To join him came Barkatulla who accompanied Jamal Pasha's mission in October 1920. The pair of them assisted Jamal Pasha in his anti-British intrigues but in a subordinate capacity. The Bolsheviks appear to have lost confidence in the whole movement and find that it is an expensive luxury to keep up. The pure Communists now function in Tashkend, Moscow and Berlin and have left Afghanistan for the present.

#### Press.

80. In June 1920 there were three newspapers in Afghanistan—the "Aman-i-Afghan" and the "Muarif wa Muarif" published in Kabul and the "Ittihad-i-Mashriqi" of Jalalabad. The interests taken by the Amir in the Press soon produced others. Weekly journals were started in Herat, Kandahar, Khanabad, Mazar-i-Sharif and Khost, a ladies' paper is published in Kabul and a service journal is published by the army. The following is a list of the papers in Afghanistan to-day:—

| Title.                               | Description. | Place published. |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|------------------|
| "Aman-i-Afghan"                      | Weekly       | Kabul.           |
| "Afghan"                             | Daily        | Kabul.           |
| "Ishab un Naswan (ladies' paper)"    | Monthly      | Kabul.           |
| "Majmua-i-Askari (military journal)" | Monthly      | Kabul.           |
| "Ittihad-i-Mashriqi"                 | Bi-weekly    | Jalalabad.       |
| "Tulu-i-Afghan"                      | Weekly       | Kandahar.        |
| "Ittifaq-i-Islam"                    | Weekly       | Herat.           |
| "Islah"                              | Weekly       | Khanabad.        |
| "Ittihad-i-Islam"                    | Weekly       | Mazar-i-Sharif.  |

81. In addition to the above named a paper was published in Khost called the "Ghazi." This was merely an organ of the Indian revolutionaries and was intended as a means of spreading their propaganda among our border tribes and in India. It was a vitriolic production and had no other theme than a series of anti-British articles. It ceased publication in June 1922.

82. The growth of the Press would seem to argue the birth of a healthy public opinion. This is far from being the case. The papers are State aided and are merely mediums for giving official views on various matters to the Afghan public. Their articles usually end with highly coloured ecomiums on the Amir and prayers for his success. Their occasional bitter complaints about the non-receipt of subscriptions show that their circulation is largely artificial and a withdrawal of State aid would mean the disappearance of the journal.

#### Education.

83. Another pet scheme of the Amir's is the education of Afghan children. Military schools have been established at Kabul, Kandahar and Herat and nearly forty primary State schools have sprung up in various parts of the country, including a girls' schools in Kabul. The best of these institutions is the Harbia (military) College at Kabul previously referred to (paragraph 51)

84. In his educational and Press schemes, the Amir has been energetically supported by the Commander-in-Chief, Nadir Khan. The recent stay of the latter in Kataghan has been marked by the founding of newspapers and schools North of the Hindu Kush. Whether these will survive Nadir Khan's departure for Kabul remains to be seen, but at present they are monuments to the activity of the Commander-in-Chief.

*General.*

85. The result of two years' hard work on the part of the Amir has been the signing of Treaties with England and Russia, a closer rapprochement with Turkey and Persia, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with European powers. The Civil administration is being overhauled and the army reorganized. Education is being encouraged, communications improved by the construction of roads and telegraphs, and the country is being thrown open to foreign enterprise instead of being a close preserve whence foreigners were strictly excluded. Electric lights and a piped water supply have been introduced into Kabul, the motor car and the bicycle mark the advent of a newer age. Old prejudices are being gradually broken down and the country is awakening from its sleep of centuries. It will be interesting to see whether this progress is maintained or whether a swing of the pendulum will again see the country relapsing into the mediæval condition in which it has previously lived. The priesthood is opposed to education which loosens their authority and to progress which makes their class an anachronism. The older generation of the nobility has its conservative ideas which are outraged by even the moderate progress which has been made. Both factions are strong but probably not strong enough to oppose the gradual march of civilization. In common with the rest of the eastern world Afghanistan is sharing the awakening at the call of science and has commenced an apprenticeship in world politics.



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# SUMMARY

OF

# EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

1st July 1922 to 30th June 1923



Compiled by the General Staff

Case No. 41/Books/M. O.-3

DELHI  
GOVERNMENT CENTRAL PRESS  
1923

(A.02578)



## SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN.

1ST JULY 1922 TO 30TH JUNE 1923.

*Compiled by the General Staff.*

1. The past year has been, generally speaking, one of progress for Afghanistan along the path of civilisation. Amir Amanulla, who is now frequently styled by his officials as "His Imperial Majesty," has consolidated his position on the throne. Great strides have been taken with the assistance of foreigners to open up the country. Financial affairs have been taken in hand, industries promoted, communications improved, and education encouraged. In all this the Amir himself has been the driving force and he has been but poorly supported by the majority of his officials. Powerful factions oppose his policy of progress. The well-to-do classes find their privileges being sapped, the religious leaders realise that education and the enlightenment of the people lessen their influence, the poor suffer from the taxation which civilisation demands, and the tribesmen resent enforced education. Thus the apparent progress achieved has not gone very deep, and the Amir still has an uphill task, if he is to succeed in extending his reforms from the few big towns to the country districts.

### *Internal.*

2. The Amir has so far lost his suspicions of his brother Inayatulla, as to release him from the surveillance to which he had been subjected since the Amir seized the throne of Afghanistan. Inayatulla has shown no signs of wishing to take his rightful place, and has shown little interest in politics.

3. But although there have been no actual plots against the Amir, there has gradually grown up, during this period, a feeling of unrest and insecurity throughout Afghanistan. This has manifested itself in rebellions, in tribal fighting and in a large increase in crime in cities and highway robbery in the country.

From March 1923, onwards raids on the Kabul-Dakka road became frequent and traffic along the road dangerous.

In May, tribal disputes in Kohistan rendered the despatch of troops necessary.

On the 18th May, the day of the Id, a mutiny of troops in Kandahar was very narrowly averted.

In June 1923, trouble broke out in Zamindawar and the Pusht-i-Rud, in the province of Kandahar and troops were despatched from Kandahar to deal with it. The Wazir-i-Dakhlya was sent from Kandahar to Girishk, but up to the close of the period under review he had not succeeded in pacifying these districts.

Simultaneously fighting broke out in the Ghazni district between Hazaras and the Andhar and Taraki sections of the Ghilzais, making the Kabul-Kandahar road unsafe for travellers and caravans.

At the time of writing (July 1st) crime is rife in both Kabul and Kandahar. The Suleman Khel are practically at war with the remaining

Ghilzai tribes and their lashkars are coming into border conflict with the Kakars on the northern borders of Zhob. The Hazaras also are at enmity with the Ghilzais.

4. The causes of this general unrest are not far to seek. Firstly, the extensive reductions in the strength of the Army, of which more will be said later, have left large numbers of soldiers unemployed.

Secondly, attempts to enforce conscription laws are met with the greatest hostility. On March 21st 1923 regulations came into force regarding the registration of all Afghan subjects. These work in conjunction with the recruiting regulations for the army which amount, on paper, to a comprehensive system of conscription. The War Office obtain their annual requirements in recruits through the Civil, who are responsible for the registration of all males and for the supply, by this means, of the required number of recruits of various ages. Every subject is required to be in possession of a census form (Tazkar-i-Nafus), which costs 8 annas (Kabuli). The fine for non-possession is Rs. 350. A man when summoned for service, may purchase exemption by paying to the Treasury the sum of Rs. 300, and this course is almost universally adopted. As for every man who prefers payment to service another recruit is requisitioned, it follows that a very large proportion of the population is affected by these conscription laws.

Thirdly, it is claimed that sufficient energy in the hunting down and punishment of criminals is not displayed by officials, and that the new Penal Code which is based on the Sharia, is not drastic enough to keep in check the unruly elements of the very mixed peoples, who go to make up the so-called Afghan nation.

The above, together with the hostility of the mullahs to the introduction into Afghanistan of European experts and advisers and, in short, to all reforms, and the dishonesty of lesser officials in administering the affairs of their districts, are the chief causes of discontent. At the time of writing it appears that many parts of the country, especially Kandahar and Ghazni, are in a condition which demands energetic action on the part of the Afghan authorities.

#### *Afghan Army.*

5. During the latter half of the period under review very drastic reductions in the strength of the Afghan Army have been made.

These are probably partly for the sake of economy, and partly due to a realisation of the poor fighting value of the regular units. Both Nadir Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Amir himself now fully realise that the first line of defence on the southern and eastern borders of Afghanistan is the tribes.

At the time of writing reductions appear to have ceased, and registration and recruiting, as already mentioned, have recommenced, and are proving fruitful sources of revenue. It is at present difficult to say what the future organisation of the army will be. Several units, including the "Qita Namuna" battalions raised by Jemal Pasha, have been disbanded, others have been amalgamated. Those units which remain, however, appear to have benefited by the extensive "weeding out." Regiments are gradually being rearmed with 303 rifles. At present the largest formation which is likely to take the field, as such, is the Brigade (Ghund). Each

of the seven Corps (*sic*) Areas (Kabul, Eastern Province, Southern Province, Kandahar, Herat, Afghan Turkistan, Badakshan and Kataghan) has a certain number of brigades, and these are, except in Kabul, scattered about as the garrisons of the more important places in the Area. In Kabul the Division still exists in name.

6. As regards armament, a considerable number of British and Russian rifles have been imported from Persia into Afghanistan through Herat. At one time in the month of May 1923, there were 1,300 of these modern rifles, with 50 to 70 thousand rounds of ammunition for sale in Kandahar. Apart from this private trade in arms, the Afghans have not yet succeeded in carrying to a successful conclusion any of their negotiations for the purchase of arms in Europe. Of the consignment of arms from Italy dumped at Massawah as useless in July 1922, only 2 aeroplanes eventually reached Kabul. The Afghan Government refused to purchase the rest. The Russians have not as yet handed over any of the 5,000 rifles promised under the Russo-Afghan Treaty, nor have they presented the plant for a cordite factory.

7. The last of the party of Turkish officers who accompanied Jamal Pasha's mission to Afghanistan in October 1920, left Kabul for Russian Turkistan on the 3rd November 1922. The new Turkish officers, who came with Fakhri Pasha, the present Turkish Minister in Kabul, are not employed as instructors. This is a cause of friction between the Afghan Government and Fakhri Pasha. The latter considers that the non-employment of Turks as instructors in the Army is an infringement of the spirit of the Turco-Afghan Treaty.

8. The Harbia Military College, of which Mahmud Sami is the Principal, has been moved to Mahtab Bagh, seven miles west by south of Kabul.

#### *Communications.*

9. The value of communications is fully realised, at least by the Amir.

At the present time the following motor roads are fit for occasional light motor traffic:—

Kabul to Torkham.

Kabul to Bamian *via* Unai and Hajegak Passes.

Kabul to Bamian *via* Jabal-us-Siraj and the Ghorband.

Kabul to Kandahar.

Kabul to Paghman.

Jalalabad to Laghman with a branch to Shewa in Kanar.

Haibak to Patta Kesar.

Improvements are being made on the Bamian-Haibak road and motors will eventually be able to run from Kabul to Mazar-i-Sharif and Patta Kesar on the Oxus.

It appears probable that the Kandahar-Chaman road will also be metalled in the near future, and a road from Charikar to Khanabad *via* the Salang Dara, is under construction.

Work has also been commenced on the Kabul river route, from Jalalabad to Kabul *via* the Tang-i-Gharo. It is the desire of the Amir to make this the main route and so avoid the difficult Khurd Kabul country.



10. Telephones already exist or are under construction in the cities of Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. There are numerous telephone lines in the country the principal being:—

- Kabul to Khanabad (not yet completed).
- Kabul to Mazar-i-Sharif.
- Kabul to Torkham.
- Jalalabad to Birkot.
- Basawal to Kahi.
- Chigha Serai to Pech.
- Gandamak to Mana Khel.
- Kabul to Matun *via* Logar valley and Gardez.
- Gardez—Ali Khel and Peiwar.
- Ahmad Khel to Pir Sarai.
- Kabul to Kandahar.
- Mazar-i-Sharif to Andkhui.

Telephonic communication between Mazar-i-Sharif and Peshawar regulates the price of Bokharan goods in Peshawar.

11. On the 20th February 1923, the Peshawar-Kabul Telegraph line, with a branch to Laghman the first line in Afghanistan, was completed. It was constructed by Muhammed Qasim of the Indian Telegraph Department.

The Amir now wishes to link up Kabul with Herat, *via* the Hazarajat, but the work has not yet been finally settled. He first asked for the services of Indian experts to construct this line, and finally decided to employ a German.

The telegraph line from Kushk to Kandahar, *via* Herat, which the Russians were to construct under the terms of their treaty with Afghanistan, is now being taken in hand. Negotiations have been in progress regarding the preparation of the telegraph poles, and the erection of poles has already commenced on the section from Kandahar to Girishk.

12. During the year a considerable number of motor cars have been imported into Afghanistan. In November 1922 17 Hudson cars reached Peshawar for Kabul, and on 27th March 5 more Hudsons, a Rover and a lorry were sent to Kabul. The contract for the carriage of merchandise, mails and passengers was given, in November 1922, to an Italian named Gmeiner, who was attached to the Italian Legation at Kabul. This contract fell through in June 1923 before the service was started, and negotiations with another Italian firm are now in progress.

#### *Civil Administration and Development.*

13. Financial reform has been one of the chief concerns of the Amir during the past year. On 11th September 1922 he produced the first budget ever attempted in Afghanistan, and in April 1923 it was announced that the budget surplus was to be devoted to the development of education, agriculture, commerce, Posts and Telegraphs and other peaceful purposes. Merchants have been granted advances from the Treasury to encourage trade. Revenue in Afghanistan is mainly derived from land taxes, animal taxes, customs and excise, passport dues, exemption fees to escape conscription, and the poll tax. In the collection of taxes the Amir has to contend with the venality of his officials, and during the year as in the

past, many cases have come to notice of the arrest of officials for embezzlement, or of their flight to escape the consequences of exposure. The Directory of the Formation of Afghanistan's Foundation Rules contains numerous directions for the auditing of Provincial and District accounts, and to check the extortions of minor officials, a system has been devised under which the amount of assessment on land is notified to each land owner, under the seal of the Home Ministry.

14. The spread of education is another concern of the Amir. Afghanistan's Foundation Rules impose on Governors of Provinces and Hakims of Districts the duty of opening schools in the area under their jurisdiction. Numerous schools have been opened and that the value of education as a pacifying influence is realised, is exemplified by the inclusion of a clause, in the terms issued to the Wazir Colony at Shahjui, which compels the Wazirs to send their children to school. The number of students at present studying in Afghanistan is estimated at about 12,000.

During the year a considerable number of Indian teachers have been dismissed, and replaced by Europeans. In January 1923, a batch of French professors arrived in Kabul to assist the Afghans in their educational programme.

In July 1922, a further batch of 12 Afghan students left to study in Europe, making a total of about one hundred in Germany, France and England.

15. Attempts have been made to exploit the mineral wealth of Afghanistan. On the 16th July 1922 Signor Ferrari of the Italian Legation proceeded on tour of investigation. He considered that until easy communications existed, Afghanistan would not benefit to any great extent from her mineral wealth. None the less a contract has been given to a wealthy Shinwari, named Abdul Wahid, for working the gold and ruby mines near Kandahar, coal mines at Khurd Kabul are to be worked, and the inspection of others at Khak-Jabar has been undertaken.

16. Afghan attempts to establish trade with Europe have not met with much success, and the Trade Agency established in France has been closed down. America is now being looked upon as a likely market for Afghan goods, and in April 1923 Mirza Muhammad was sent there with a view to developing a connection.

17. Afghanistan's Foundation Rules enact that elected representatives of the people should form councils to advise rulers of all grades, from the Central Government in Kabul down to Illaqadars. At the time of writing very small progress, in this first groping after representative government, seems to have been made, at any rate in the frontier districts.

#### AFGHAN RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA.

18. Afghan-Russian relations during the past year have been remarkable for mutual suspicions. The Russians are still desirous of cultivating Afghan friendship to the disadvantage of British interests, but have been loth to present the rifles aeroplanes, anti-aircraft guns and powder factory, promised in their Treaty, for fear that they may be used against themselves in support of the Bokharan rebels.

19. Rascolnikov has been consistently urging his Government to fulfil the terms of the treaty, and his demands became more urgent during and after our aerial operations against the Mahsuds in January and February 1923. The Russians made a definite offer to present the arms, provided they were issued to the tribesmen, but this the Afghans refused.

The Treaty therefore remains mostly unfulfilled. Only a part of the first year's instalment of the subsidy has been paid, though at the close of the period under review it appears probable that 26,000 roubles, the balance of 100,000 due for the 1st year, are about to be handed over. (*Note* — a gold rouble is worth ten roubles at par). Similarly 4 aeroplanes, 4 anti-aircraft guns and 3,000 rifles are now expected, out of the 12 aeroplanes, 12 A.A. guns and 5,000 rifles promised.

20. The progress made in the erection by the Russians of the Kushk-Herat-Kandahar-Kabul telegraph line has already been mentioned in the paragraph dealing with communications.

21. The Bokharan rebels have attracted a great deal of sympathy in Northern Afghanistan. Refugees from Bokhara in March and April 1923 have tended to raise anti-Russian feeling and increase the suspicions existing between the two countries.

In this case Russian suspicions were not groundless. The *ex-Amir* of Bokhara had been given asylum in Afghanistan. Afghan arms had been supplied to the rebels, and Afghan dead had been found on the field after rebel reverses.

The Afghan Government has been vainly endeavouring to obtain control of the Kabul wireless station and in August 1922 closed the station down. Similar action had been taken in September 1921. On both occasions Raskolnikoff succeeded in having the station re-opened with Russian operators and thus ensured wireless communication with Moscow and Tashkent.

22. Afghan relations with the Bokharan Soviet republic are included in these paragraphs since during this period Bokharan independence has been becoming more and more mythical and has now, with the closing down of the Bokharan Legation in Kabul in April 1923, ceased to exist as far as Afghanistan is concerned.

During the month of March 1923 negotiations were opened between the Russians and Afghans for the repatriation of about 35,000 Turkomans from Bokhara, who in the autumn of 1920 had taken refuge in the Andkhui-Maimana districts of Afghanistan. These Turkomans refused to pay taxes to the Afghan Government on the grounds that they were not Afghan subjects and that their original migration was due to the lack of Afghan assistance. The Russians demanded a mixed Russian-Bokharan-Afghan commission to tour Afghan territory and investigate the case. The Afghans refused to allow Russians to participate, arguing that this was a matter for decision between themselves and the Independent Republic of Bokhara. This refusal on the part of the Afghans was one of the reasons for the closing down of the Bokharan Legation in Kabul by the Russians, who are resolved to keep control of the foreign relations of Bokhara.

23. There is evidence to support the belief that the Russians have been using the personnel of the Afghan Mission to Chinese Turkistan as agents for anti-British propaganda. This mission, headed by General Mahammed Sharif Khan, arrived in Yarkand on November 22nd 1922.

#### AFGHAN RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH.

##### (a) *General.*

24. It may be taken as an axiom in Afghan Policy, that the tribesmen on the Indian Frontier are regarded as the chief defensive weapon against

any invasion from the south-east, and that no opportunity must be lost of securing their good will and support in any future conflict with India.

Intrigue will never wholly stop. During the past year Afghan and Frontier newspapers have published articles referring to Pathan territory in British India as "Eastern Afghanistan;" much has been said of the Pathan Nation and the term "Afghanistan irridente," as applied to cis-border Pathan country has been coined.

25. During the first part of the period under review, the Afghan attitude towards the British was friendly, and no special efforts were made by the Afghans to assert undue influence over the tribes.

26. During the week ending August 19th 1922, Khan Sahib Mahmud Khan and Khan Sahib Muhammad Shah Khan passed through the Khyber *en route* to Kabul, previous to taking up the duties of British Consul at Jalalabad and Kandahar, respectively.

27. On 20th October 1922, the majority of Indian seditionists, including Maulvi Obeidulla Khan left Kabul for Tashkent, under pressure from the Amir. Obeidulla Khan had been employed by Raskolnikoff, the Soviet Envoy in Kabul, as his principal agent for distributing money for Bolshevik propaganda in Afghanistan.

28. But roughly from the beginning of the year 1923, the Afghan attitude towards us began to change. The change was probably due to more than one cause. Firstly, the Amir's progressive policy required money, and so economies had to be effected. One of these was the wholesale reductions in the Army. These reductions brought the need for frontier defence to the fore and the Amir turned his thoughts, as usual, to the tribesmen, as a more economical and efficient weapon than his regular army. Secondly, our operations against the Mahsuds at the beginning of the year were made the cause of considerable anti-British propaganda in Afghanistan, and a good deal of pressure was put on the Amir, as "champion of Islam" and the "Ghazi King," to intervene on their behalf. The Indian colonies of agitators on the N.-W. Frontier, the spiritual leaders in Afghanistan and, needless to say, the Bolsheviks, made the most of the opportunity offered.

29. On January 31st 1923, His Britannic Minister in Kabul, received an official protest from the Afghan Government on the subject of British operations in Waziristan. The Afghan Minister in London lodged a similar protest.

30. On February 26th and succeeding days, the Amir, clad as an Afridi, interviewed at Jalalabad large gatherings of Afridis, Mohmands and local Afghans. 5,000 to 6,000 Afridis and Mohmands attended the darbar. He addressed the tribesmen in Pushtu and referred to himself as "King of all Afghans" and to them as "brothers." He announced that he had established Pushtu as the national language of Afghanistan, and dwelt at length on the need for unity. It is still difficult to judge whether the Amir had any motives other than the obvious one of establishing his authority more firmly over the border folk, but there is no doubt that a very large number of tribesmen deduced from his speeches and from favours shown to notoriously anti-British people, that the Amir would not view with displeasure any anti-British activities. The Jalalabad festivities, in short, created an atmosphere in which crime would easily occur, and put a match to material which only too easily breaks into flames.

31. The next incident was a notification which appeared in the *Ittihad-i-Mashrafi* on March 10th over the seal of the Amir, announcing the formation of a council of Pathans (Maraka da Pakhtu), to which one representative of each Pushtu speaking tribe, up to a total limit of thirty, was to be summoned. Up to the time of writing no further news of the actual formation of this Council has been received.

32. During the whole of this period the Afghan Press issued a series of anti-British articles, which continued until the beginning of June, when owing to the pressure of the British Minister in Kabul, the Editor of the *Ittihad-i-Mashrafi*, the most virulent of the Afghan newspapers, was removed.

33. Afghan intrigue on the border simultaneously increased. Agitation in Dir, Swat and Bajaur was carried on more in the name of the Amir, and its real Soviet nature was more concealed. Intrigue in Waziristan broke out afresh, through the agency of Brigadier Adam Khan and Mulla Lala Pir, and this will be described in detail in a subsequent paragraph.

34. In consequence of the above mentioned incidents, His Britannic Majesty's Minister in Kabul addressed a warning to the Afghan Government early in April, and pointed out that the present Afghan policy might give His Majesty's Government the impression that a provocative policy was being substituted by the Afghans for one of friendship.

As a result of these representations Nadir Khan, the Afghan Commander-in-Chief, stated officially that he had issued orders for the recall from Waziristan of Brigadier Adam Khan, and to prevent any action which might encourage the Waziristan tribes to defer a settlement with the British Government. He further promised to remove Burhan-ud-Din, the Editor of the *Ittihad-i-Mashrafi*.

On April 30th His Britannic Majesty's Minister obtained an interview with the Amir, emphasized the gravity of the situation, and insisted on redress.

35. Meanwhile other events had occurred. On April 2nd aerial operations were carried out against the Tazi Khel sub-section of the Ahmedzai Wazirs, who reside during the winter months North of Dardoni, near the Tochi Afghan border. The Afghans claimed that bombs had dropped on their side of the border, causing the death of Afghan subjects and damage to Afghan property. The Afghan Government protested officially. The first protest amounted to an ultimatum, "suspending all kinds of conversations between the two Governments." This was however withdrawn and a joint Anglo-Afghan Committee of investigation was held on the ground where the alleged violation of Afghan territory occurred. The enquiry, held between the Political Agent of the Tochi and the Governor of Khost, was concluded on the 12th of May 1923, and it was agreed that 2 to 4 bombs had fallen at distances from 200 to 500 yards on the Afghan side of the Durand Line, that 2 Afghan subjects had been killed and 5 injured, and some 150 cattle had been hit. Compensation to the amount of Rs. 17,000 (Kabuli), the approximate equivalent of Rs. 10,000 (Indian) was agreed on subsequently.

36. Other incidents were the murder of Major F. Anderson, D.S.O., M.C., and Major N. C. Orr, M.C., of the 2nd Battalion the Seaforth Highlanders near Landi Kotal on April 8th by Afghan subjects, and the murder of Mrs. Ellis, wife of Lt.-Col. A. J. Ellis, D.S.O., of the Border Regiment, and abduction of Miss Ellis, at Kohat on the 14th April by a gang of Afridis.

The Landi Kotal murderers returned at once to Afghanistan, and the Kohat murderers also eventually made their way from Tirah into the Ningrahar district of Afghanistan.

The Landi Kotal murderers, thanks to the continual pressure maintained by the British Government through the British Minister, have been arrested, and at the time of writing are in Kabul, awaiting trial. The Kohat murderers are still at large in Ningrahar and so far the Afghan Government have failed to arrest them. The Amir has promised to do so if they remain in Afghan territory.

37. At present the Anglo-Afghan situation is as follows:—

- (i) The Landi Kotal murderers have been arrested.
- (ii) Adam Khan has been recalled from Urgun.
- (iii) The tone of the *Ittihad-i-Mashraqi* has changed for the better and the Editor has been removed.

The Amir has promised:—

- (iv) to arrest the Kohat murderers if found in his country,
- (v) to disband the hostile Wazir levies,
- (vi) to discontinue all intrigue in Waziristan.

The Amir has protested that his policy and that of his ministers will be directed towards strengthening the bonds between Great Britain and Afghanistan. It has however been pointed out that deeds and not words are required, and a hint has been given that the import of arms through India will depend on the Afghan Government proving their sincerity by actions which will dispel the distrust caused by Afghan policy during the past six months.

38. During the year negotiations have been in progress for a Trade Convention between India and Afghanistan. Discussions were opened on September 19th 1922, closed in January 1923 owing to the incident of the loss of a British mail bag between the Afghan Frontier and Kabul, reopened in March 1923 and finally brought to a close on June 5th 1923, when the Convention was signed. The Convention puts into formal shape the obligations accepted by the British Government, in the Treaty of 1921, in respect of goods in transit through India to Afghanistan.

#### (b) *Shahjui Wazirs.*

39. The colony of Shahjui Wazirs was planted at Shahjui in October 1921. In November 1921 they carried out their daring raid into Baluchistan, which culminated in the destruction of a small column of the 92nd Punjabis at Barshore on the 25th of November. The Amir promised to return the arms captured on this occasion, but although frequently reminded of this during the past year, the promise has not yet been fulfilled.

During the last six months of 1922 unsuccessful efforts were made to recover rifles and compensation from the Wazirs.

40. In December 1922 the Wazirs suddenly left their families at Shahjui and set off to raid into British and Persian territory. One party moved down the Helmund and looted caravans East and North of Duzdap in Persian territory, and another, splitting into two, attempted to enter British territory near Gulistan and near Nushki. Neither of the latter were successful and the Persian raid was little more so.

41. Since these raids, negotiations have been in progress between the Afghan Government and the Wazirs, and during the last six months they have been gradually returning to Waziristan as but few of them will accept the terms offered by the Afghan Government. The terms include the punishment of the Baluchistan and Persian raiders, the handing over to the Afghan authorities of future raiders, and the submission of future disputes to the Ministry of Justice for decision. As an alternative to these complete disarmament is offered. At the present time the Shahjui Wazir Colony is estimated at about 400 families.

(c) *Waziristan.*

42. During the first part of the period under review Afghan intrigue in Waziristan was comparatively slight. Unfortunately, with the long-hoped for settlement which was reached with the Mahsuds in March, intrigues began again with renewed vigour. Brigadier Adam Khan of Urgun began to pay large sums, as arrears of pay, to those Wazirs who are hostile to the British, and to his so-called levies. These levies, or Khassadars, consist entirely of hostiles, both Wazir and Mahsud. They are paid with Afghan money, but live on our side of the Durand Line. Their duties are *nil*, except to commit acts of hostility against the British, and their rank and consequent emoluments are in direct proportion to their inclination and ability to do us harm. Greed of gold being one of the chief characteristics of the tribesmen, the flow of Afghan money into Waziristan continues to keep alive hostility towards the British.

These activities on the part of Adam Khan resulted in considerable restlessness among the Wana Wazirs, and a weakening among the Mahsuds of their intention to carry out loyally the terms of the newly made settlement.

43. Adam Khan was not the only instrument used for intrigue in Waziristan. Early in April Lala Pir, a religious leader of great importance in Khost and an old enemy of the British in Waziristan, arrived in Mahsud country. He assembled a jirga in Kaniguram, and, in the name of the Amir, promised the Mahsuds generous allowances and rewards and also compensation for damage inflicted in recent air-raids. As he had no money, whereas Adam Khan apparently had, a split occurred among the hostiles, and in the course of the dispute Lala Pir was compelled to announce to the Jirga the real object of his visit. He stated that the Afghans had sent him to obtain from representative Mahsuds, a petition to the Amir. This was to be a request to the Amir to intervene in Waziristan affairs, so as to force the British Government to remove all their troops from the country. As a result a considerable number of Mahsuds set out from Waziristan. Few got to Kabul and these, as a result of official representations made to the Afghan Government, got little encouragement or reward from the Afghan authorities.

44. The withdrawal of our Scouts from Wana in April 1923 gave Adam Khan another opening for intrigue, which he was not slow to use. He announced that the transfer of Wana to the Amir would immediately follow the evacuation of that place by the British, and used all his influence to bring about the defection of the Wazir Khassadars, who had taken the place of the Scouts.

45. The Afghan activities mentioned above have called forth official protests by H. B. M.'s Minister at Kabul. As a result the Amir and his Foreign Minister have given assurances that propaganda hostile to the

British will be suppressed, that the maintenance of Afghan levies, on our side of the line, will be discontinued, and that no encouragement will be given to the Mahsuds and Wazirs to oppose our proclaimed policy in Waziristan.

So far these promises have been only partially fulfilled. Pressure on the "friendly" Wana Wazirs still continues, but as already mentioned, the Mahsuds who went to Kabul got scant encouragement, while Adam Khan has been recalled from Urgun to Kabul.

#### AFGHAN RELATIONS WITH THE TURKS.

46. Afghan relations with the Turks require a passing reference. There was very little public excitement over the Turkish victories over the Greeks in the autumn of 1922, though on the 15th of September celebrations and prayers were held in Kabul. Fakhri Pasha the Anatolian Envoy, and Rashkolnikoff, did their utmost to arouse enthusiasm.

47. On October 20th the Amir publicly ratified the Treaty between Afghanistan and the Angoran Government which had been drawn up more than a year previously. The Treaty provides for an offensive-defensive alliance should either Power be attacked, and also contains a clause by which the Amir acknowledges the Sultan of Turkey to be the head of Islam.

48. Early in 1923, the Amir was invited to be Honorary President of a Pan-Islamic Conference, which was being called to meet at Broussa by the Jamiet-ul-Islam. The Amir accepted the invitation and consented to open the Conference, provided that circumstances were favourable to the journey being undertaken.



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*Summary of*  
**Events in Afghanistan**

1st July 1927 to 30th June 1928

*Compiled by the General Staff*

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SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, 1ST JULY 1927 TO 30TH JUNE 1928.

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APPENDIX.

The King's tour in Europe and the Near East.  
M. O. 189 C.G.S.



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## SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN.

1ST JULY 1927—30TH JUNE 1928.

The outstanding event of the year under review has been the visit of H. M. King Amanullah to Europe and the Near East. An account of this visit will be found in the Appendix at the end of the report.

### I.—INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

#### (a) *Kabul.*

(1) The King made a tour of the Southern Provinces between July 15th and August 8th. As a result of this tour the military government of the Provinces was terminated and a civil administration reintroduced in its place. The military government had only been established after the Khost rebellion in 1924-25.

(2) The annual celebration of Afghan Independence was held at Kabul between August 18th and 25th. The celebrations were not on the same scale as in former years, as the King, who is the moving spirit in the organization, had not had the same time at his disposal as previously owing to his absence touring his various provinces.

The European population were not so much in evidence as usual. Members of the Soviet Legation were always in the background, whilst the Italians and the Germans were conspicuous by their absence. The Turks and Persians were well represented, the former in accordance with the present policy of Afghanistan, being well in the limelight. The British Legation were very well received and, as usual, were the only foreigners to take an interest in the sports and compete daily with the leading Afghans in clay pigeon shooting.

One of the outstanding features of the week was the advancement made towards the emancipation of women. The King during his opening speech addressed a few words to them personally, which was an innovation and, in addition to the shooting incident mentioned above, it was very noticeable how many more women were present during the celebrations than usual; they were much less heavily veiled and looked very neat in French dress and hats of the fashion of a generation ago.

(3) Internal affairs in Afghanistan remained exceptionally quiet under the regency of Muhammad Wali Khan the War Minister, during the absence of the King on his tour abroad from December 1927 to July 1928.

There were the expected crop of rumours of trouble in various parts of the country and a short lived scare of the appearance in Khost of a pretender to the Afghan throne. Apart from this the country continued undisturbed and no events of importance occurred.

(4) The British Legation weekly up-mail lorry was fired at about 16 miles from Kabul on November 17th. No damage was done except that two bullets entered the mail bags and tore some papers. The driver and courier had a narrow escape. The matter was reported to the Afghan authorities, who after  
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due investigation, arrested 6 men believed to be responsible for the occurrence. The latest report in May 1928 stated that these men would probably be executed.

5. *Officials.*—*Afghan.*—A large number of officiating appointments were made in Kabul and the Provinces as a result of the departure of certain Government officials on tour with the King.

On his assumption of office as Foreign Minister on 3rd December, Muhammad Wali invited all heads of Missions to separate interviews. He stated that his main aim would be to keep the situation steady during the King's absence. The Foreign Minister is reported to have informed *Sardar* Inayatulla Khan that by the King's orders his movements would be restricted.

*British.*—Sir Francis Humphrys, G.C.V.O., K.B.E., C.I.E., returned to Kabul from leave in England on October 14th, 1927. He left Kabul again on December 1st for England in order to be present there during the visit of the King of Afghanistan, and returned to Kabul on July 1st, 1928. During his absence, Mr. B. J. Gould, C.I.E., acted as His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires.

Major P. C. R. Dodd, M.V.O., D.S.O., left Kabul *en route* to England on January 30th 1928. He also accompanied the Afghan Royal party throughout their stay in England and returned to Kabul on May 18th 1928.

Captain J. Wickham, 3/14th Punjab Regiment, officiated as Military Attaché during the absence on deputation of Major Dodd.

*Russian.*—M. Stark, the Soviet Minister, arrived back in Kabul from leave by air on September 14th 1927.

M. Sokoloff, who officiated as Soviet Chargé d'Affaires whilst M. Stark was on leave in Russia, left Kabul on transfer early in November 1927.

The Soviet Legation at Kabul are in the habit of issuing cheques on a Berlin Bank to travellers from Afghanistan (*via* Russia) to Berlin. It is believed that the Legation does a considerable amount of business of this sort, and is endeavouring to build up a banking system in Kabul without coming into the open.

*Italy.*—M. Cecchi, Italian Minister, left Kabul for Italy on December 15th 1927. It was generally believed that he would not come back again, but he returned to Kabul on April 15th 1928.

*Persian.*—Mirza Mehdi Khan Farrukh, Persian Minister, left Kabul on December 31st, *en route* to Tehran *via* India on leave.

*Turkish.*—Nabil Bey, Turkish Minister, left Kabul for Turkey in March 1928, in order to be present in Angora during the visit of King Amanullah. As, since his departure, the Turkish Legation has been raised to an Embassy, it is probable that he will not return to Afghanistan. The name of the new Turkish Ambassador appointed to Kabul is said to be Hikmat Bey.

#### (b) *Eastern Provinces.*

(1) The Governorship has changed hands twice during the last year.

Shah Mahmud was relieved in February 1928 and appointed Under Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior. Rumour connected this event with

the reported failure of the King to patch up his quarrel with General Nadir Khan whilst he was in France, Shah Mahmud being a brother of Nadir Khan.

Abdul Ahad Khan, an A. D. C. and great favourite of the King, was appointed Governor in his stead. He in turn was summoned to meet the King in Moscow and left by air towards the end of April.

His place as Governor was taken by Mohammed Sarwar Khan, the late Governor of Farah. This is reported to be a bad appointment, as Mohammed Sarwar Khan is said to be corrupt and idle and quite unsuited for the control of a province containing such unruly areas as Shinwari, Laghman and the Kunar Valley. It is probable, however, that the appointment is only a temporary one.

(2) M. Stark, the Soviet Minister, visited Jalalabad with a party on December 5th, 1927, with the intention of leaving his wife there as her health could not stand the severity of a Kabul winter. He is said to have arranged to hire a bungalow, but apparently nothing came of it as the whole party returned to Kabul on December 8th. Whilst in Jalalabad the Soviet party appeared to have behaved normally; a visit was paid to the Governor, the aerodrome, the city, etc. M. Stark is reported to have had a short meeting with *Mulla* Bashir, probably in connection with the financing of the Chamarkand newspaper, "Al Mujahid". This paper which is very *anti*-British in tone, is published at irregular intervals and has no list of subscribers, being issued free to all who ask for it.

(3) During January and February 1928, large sums of money were paid by the Governor to Afridi Afghan allowance holders, whose payments were some years in arrears.

The total amount paid out was said to be Rs. 1,25,300 (Kabuli). The following Tirah Afridi tribes received payments:—

- Malikdin Khel.
- Sipah and Kamar Khel.
- Zakka Khel.
- Kambar Khel.
- Kuki Khel.

Daily subsistence allowance was also paid to the Afridis whilst they were in Jalalabad.

(4) It was reported in February 1928 that the *Mullah* of Chaknaur had been paid a large sum by the Afghan Government to induce him to combine with the Haji of Turangzai in spreading pro-Afghan propaganda amongst the Mohmands.

Both these men are well known for their intense hatred of the British.

#### (c) *Southern Provinces.*

(1) The King paid a visit to the Southern Provinces between July 15th and August 8th, 1927.

Whilst at Gardez the King arrested some twenty *maliks* and influential men who participated in the recent Gurbaz and Zadran disturbances.

The Jaji *jirga* which was seen at Ali Khel petitioned the King that they should be exempted from conscription and compulsory education on the strength of their loyalty during the disturbances and their responsibilities as a frontier tribe.

These requests displeased the King so much that he cancelled the rest of his tour and announced to the Jajis that if they did not repent of their attitude he would drive them from their country and hand it over to the Turis and Mangals.

After interviewing the *jirga* of Jajis on the 4th August when he gave them fifteen days in which to reconsider their attitude, the King left next morning for Chakmanni country, visited Pir Serai and passed on to Ahmad Khel. At dawn on the 7th he left Ahmad Khel on horseback and rode to Gardez, a distance of 33 miles. Arriving at Gardez, he dismounted, and without waiting for food and rest, stepped into his Rolls Royce car and drove it through to Kabul, arriving at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The car was thickly coated with dust and had obviously covered the 85 miles to Kabul at high speed.

(2) After the Khost rebellion of 1924-25, a Military Governorship was established in the Province, and a severe system of martial law was imposed on the recalcitrant tribes of that area. This martial law included heavy punishments, disarmament, forced labour and the rationing of large and tyrannical garrisons without payment.

Following on the King's recent visit to Gardez, it was decided to terminate the Military Governorship and to reintroduce civil administration in its place. Furthermore the King declared a general amnesty and he promised to have all lands, buildings, etc., which had been seized under martial law, returned to their owners and stated that in future forced labour would not be imposed, except for the purpose of road making, which would be a kind of indemnity placed upon them for the rebellion.

As a result of this decision, *Firqa Mishar* Muhammed Sadiq Khan has been replaced by Sirdar Abdul Hakim Khan, as Governor of the Province, and by order of the King, Headquarters of the Province have been transferred from Matun to Gardez.

(3) Khost appears to be still somewhat unsettled and it is reported that the Zadrans have lately been indulging in highway robbery, cutting telephone wires and expelling Afghan tax collectors from their country.

(4) Early in April 1928, an individual was arrested in Khost and reported to be an Afghan refugee from India who was attempting to enter Afghanistan in disguise. The individual apparently used several aliases but eventually stated that his name was Karam, son of Sardar Khan and that he had come from Kashmir. So far his identity has not been established.

#### (d) Northern Provinces.

On the afternoon of the 11th August, the King held a public Durbar in the grounds of the future Secretariat at Dar-ul-Aman. It was attended by the members of the various Ministries, Military Officers and a large number of the better class citizens of Kabul, about 2,000 people in all. In a speech lasting nearly two hours, which was broadcasted to the people by means of loud



speakers, he described his activities in the Northern Provinces. Beside him was a large lecture map of the Eastern half of Afghanistan on which the routes from Kabul to Mazar-i-Sharif *via* Bamian and the Salang Pass were marked in red. With the aid of this map he described in detail his journey to Mazar-i-Sharif *via* Bamian and his return journey *via* the Salang Pass. He expounded at length on the advantages of the Salang route over that *via* Bamian, pointing out that it is better to cross one pass 13,000 feet high than to have to ascend and descend several times over passes between 9,000 and 12,000 feet above sea level. He stated that, provided the Salang Route would not be blocked by snow in the winter, he was greatly in favour of adopting it as the main road to the North. He mentioned another possible road which branches off to the N. W. from Bamian, and following the Surkhab River, joins the Salang Route at Doshi, which is said to avoid the high passes of the Hindu Kush.

He considered that the name "Afghan Turkistan" was objectionable and gave orders that in future it should be known as the "Mazar Province". In the course of his address he announced :—

- (a) That the construction of the telegraph line from Kabul to Mazar-i-Sharif *via* the Salang was progressing rapidly and should be completed in a short time,
- (b) that an aerodrome was to be constructed at Mazar-i-Sharif, and
- (c) that a small W/T set had been installed in Mazar for communication with Kabul and that a powerful W/T "Machine" had been ordered for installation there, by which his speeches in Kabul should be broadcasted in Mazar.

## II.—THE AFGHAN ARMY.

### (a) *Training.*

(1) *Infantry.*—Since the arrival of the Turkish military instructors in January 1927 a system of training seems to have been instituted in the Kabul Infantry Corps. Troops have been seen on parade daily, and section and company drill and elementary skirmishing exercises are carried out. A distinct improvement is to be noticed in the parade work and march discipline of the Kabul infantry.

The following is an example of the influence which is now exercised by the Turks in military matters :

*Ghund Mishar* Muhammad Amin Khan, who was nominally in charge of the new Staff College, had a difference of opinion with one of the Turkish instructors. Although the former is a well-known officer and a relation of the War Minister, he was relieved of his appointment after three minutes' conversation over the telephone. Ismail Hakki Bey, the leader of the Turkish military mission, is now in sole charge of the school.

(2) *Foreign Instructors.*—A further Turkish military mission is on its way to Kabul. The mission consists of General Kiazim Pasha and 7 other Turkish officers and their object is to be to re-organise the Afghan Army. It is said that Kiazim Pasha will become Chief of Staff and Military Adviser to the King, whilst the other officers will supervise various sections of the War Ministry.

A party of 4 Italians arrived in Kabul in May 1928 to act as instructors to the Afghan Army. Their names are :—

Colonel Alberto Civalieri Inviziati Di Masio.

Captain Cafiero Matteo Deodato.

Warrant Officer Rosnardi Aristide.

Guiseppe Pieri.

The first three are Artillery officers and the last named individual is a Radio Telegraphist.

(3) *Cavalry*.—The former Harbiya (Military) School, adjoining the old British Legation, has now been absorbed by the Cavalry School. This school appeared to be doing well and the students working hard and on methodical lines. A large new drill hall or riding school was under construction and some horse lines were also being built. However in March 1928 the Turkish Officer in charge of the Cavalry School informed the British Military Attaché that he had experienced great difficulty in carrying out equitation instruction in the school. He said that none of the horses at his disposal were properly trained, and consequently it was impossible to give the cadets anything but the most elementary instruction. This Turkish Officer had suggested getting some trained horses from India for use in the school, but the proposal had been turned down by the Afghan authorities.

(4) *Artillery*.—A practice shoot with live shell was carried out on the afternoon of the 9th December by a battery of pack artillery. The guns were posted for the shoot on the plain to the North West of the Koh-i-Lula. As there was no range organization and the firing was at point blank range, persons crossing the plain were subjected to a certain amount of danger.

(5) *Machine Guns*.—Orders have been issued by the Wizarat-i-Harbiya that the establishment of machine guns per *kandak* is to be three, thirteen ponies being allotted as transport. The ponies are to be maintained by the Artillery *Ghund*.

Prior to the issue of this order the establishment of Machine Guns had been one Company of 6 guns per *Ghund* (Regiment). Each *Ghund* consists of 3 *Kandaks* (Battalions).

#### (b) *Accommodation*.

A new military school has been opened in the house of Sardar-i-Azim Abdul Quddus Khan. This is a large building in an enclosed compound, 300 yards N. W. of the Habibia College and just at the foot of Koh-i-Lula. It may be assumed that this school is for Staff Officers, as all students who have so far been met with are Staff Officers.

The new barracks at Resh Khor, near Dar-ul-Aman, are now fit for habitation, though not yet occupied. They will house a maximum of 600 men. The few remaining barracks in Kabul continue to be steadily demolished. Those on the East of the Khwaja Rewash road, to the S. E. of the hangars on the aerodrome, have lately been entirely pulled down.

(c) *Military Attaches.*

A new Soviet Military Attache, named Premekoff, arrived in Kabul by air on November 10th. He is a very different type from his predecessor, Sokoloff-Strakhoff. Premekoff has held some important positions in the Soviet Army, and is a smart, distinguished-looking officer.

(d) *Mechanical Transport.*

In February 1928 it was reported that the Commandant of the Air Force, who is also in charge of the Military M. T., had ordered that all the present lorries should be auctioned. He wished to equip the service with a new fleet of lorries, preferably Albions, which he understood that the King would order during his visit to England.

It is not known whether the King placed any orders for lorries in England, but he has bought a large fleet of Fiat Cars and lorries in Italy, which arrived in Kabul towards the end of June 1928. The lorries consist of :

- 20 Two-ton lorries with ordinary lorry bodies.
- 2 One-ton lorries with omnibus bodies each capable of carrying 16 passengers.
- 20 Two-ton lorries fitted with longitudinal seats each capable of carrying 26 passengers.
- 4 Motor Fire engines.
- 4 Two-ton chassis fitted with fire fighting apparatus and road sprinklers.
- 4 Motor pumps.

It will be noticed that the Afghans now have lorries capable of moving a total of 550 men or nearly the equivalent of 2 kandaks (Battalions), the paper strength of which is 600.

(e) *Equipment and Material.*

(1) The Afghan Government has recently purchased a consignment of arms and ammunition in Italy which began to arrive in Quetta by rail from Karachi on May 3rd 1928. The consignment is believed to comprise :—

(i) *Artillery—*

- 4 Howitzer Batteries.
- 2 Field Batteries.
- 2 Pack Batteries.

(ii) *Armoured cars—*

- 2 Lancia Armoured Cars, one of which was a gift from the Italian Government.

Details of these cars are as follows :—

*Machine Guns.*—3 in each car. 2 of a small bore about .275 and 1 of a larger bore about .450. All guns appear to be box fed.

*Wheels.*—Steel disc wheels with pneumatic tyres. Front wheels single and rear wheels double.

*Gears.*—4 forward and 1 reverse.

*Armour.*— $\frac{1}{4}$  inch.

1 car is domed. It was reported that the 3 machine guns were mounted in the dome which could traverse. This is probably not correct. It is more likely that there are 3 machine gun mountings in the dome one of which is alternative.

The other car has no dome but a flat round top which traverses with 2 machine guns. The other machine gun is fixed to the back of the car. The guns in this car appear to be cooled by water circulating in a radiator.

(2) It is believed that the Afghan Government has also purchased a certain amount of war material from the French Government consisting of :

2 Field Batteries.

1 Pack Battery.

5 Light Tanks (Renault).

2 Ammunition Lorries.

Rifles (numbers not known).

But up to the present none of this material has reached Afghanistan.

(3) In October 1927 the Afghan Government purchased 2,000,000 rounds of .303 surplus war time S. A. A. from Messrs. Fleming and Company, London.

(f) *Training of Afghan students abroad.*

(1) A party of 42 students proceeded to Angora in November 1927. These included thirteen young military officers, the senior of whom is *Ghund Mishar Saiyid Abdulla Khan*, Officiating Chief of Staff. The remaining 23 were school boys, varying in age from 8 to 15 years.

(g) *Movements of troops.*

(1) In May 1928 it was reported that owing to frequent desertions, the temporary post established in 1927 at Shalai (Kunar Valley) to check Mohmand raids into Kunar, had been vacated. The garrison of one company of infantry was moved to Chigha Serai.

(2) Three Battalions of Infantry (total strength 900 at full establishment) left Kabul for Gardez, on May 27th 1928.

The movement of these three battalions of infantry was reported by the Afghan War Office as being in the normal course of their duties. Rumours of trouble in the Khost area, to which this move gave rise, were said to be unfounded. The first of these battalions reached Gardez on June 5th, the other two arriving on June 11th. Subsequently one battalion left Gardez for Ghazni.

### III.—THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE.

(a) *New machines.*

(1) The strength of the Afghan Air Force has recently been greatly increased by the arrival of a batch of machines from Russia. These aeroplanes arrived

in Kabul during May and June 1928. So far as is known the numbers and makes of the newly arrived machines are :—

|   |    |
|---|----|
| D. H. 9 A's .. .. .                               | 14 |
| Biplane (possibly of Polish construction) .. .. . | 1  |
|   | —  |
|   | 15 |
|   | —  |

All the new aeroplanes observed have been painted a dark green colour with black markings "Allah-o-Akbar" under the wings.

*N. B.*—2 D. H. 9 A's are known to have crashed *en route*, one near JIZAK and one in British-Indian territory near Parachinar. These 2 are not included in the total of 14.

(2) Whilst in Germany the King was presented with one Junker monoplane and purchased two more. These 3 machines are now on their way to Kabul. It is reported that they will be used in establishing an air line between Kabul and Tehran.

(3) The Polish Government presented the King with an aeroplane of Polish make on the occasion of his visit to Poland. It is possible that this aeroplane has arrived in Kabul *vide* (1) above.

(4) The King has also been presented with an aeroplane by the French Government. This machine will shortly be flown from France to Afghanistan.

(b) *Numbers of machines.*

The following table gives the estimated number of machines in Afghanistan on June 30th 1928.

| Make.                   | Service-able. | Unserviceable but repairable. | Totally unserviceable. | Total. |
|-------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|--------|
| Avro .. .. .            | ..            | ..                            | 2                      | 2      |
| Bristol Fighter .. .. . | ..            | ..                            | 2                      | 2      |
| D. H. 9 .. .. .         | ..            | 3                             | 1                      | 4      |
| D. H. 9A .. .. .        | 17            | 2                             | 1                      | 20     |
| Junkers .. .. .         | 4*            | ..                            | ..                     | 4      |
| Biplane .. .. .         | 1             | ..                            | ..                     | 1      |
|                         | 22            | 5                             | 6                      | 33     |

\*Includes 3 machines on their way from Germany.

(c) *Personnel.*

(1) *Afghan*.—15 students who went to Russia for aviation training in 1925 returned to Afghanistan in December 1927. They consist of 9 pilots, 5 Mechanics and 1 Wireless operator.

25 students were sent to Italy in February 1928 for free aviation training.

It is reported that the 16 students who proceeded to France in May 1927 for aviation training are doing well.

The course lasts for 4 years.

In March 1928 the Commandant of the Air Force called for applications from young Afghans for fifteen vacancies in the Air Force repair workshops.

(2) *Russian*.—The influx of new machines from Russia has led also to an increase in the number of Russian personnel serving in the Afghan Air Force.

There are now believed to be at least 18 pilots and 6 mechanics in Kabul.

(3) Considerable friction is reported to exist between Afghan and Russian personnel of the Air Force. Owing to the jealousy of the Russians, the Commandant gives little work to the Afghans in order to placate the Russians; the Afghans are annoyed and consider their training in Russia to have been a waste of time.

(d) *Workshops.*

The construction of a workshop on the Sherpur (Kabul) aerodrome was started in July 1927. It is situated inside the spinney near the hangars at the S. E. corner of the aerodrome and is partly concealed from view by trees. The workshop covers an area about 45 yards by 15 yards.

(e) *Aerodromes and Landing grounds.*

(1) *Kabul*.—(i) Plans have been prepared for several buildings on the Kabul aerodrome in addition to the workshops under construction. Officers' quarters and accommodation for other personnel will be built when funds are available, also a central building to contain headquarters and other offices.

(ii) Small stone buildings are being constructed over the reserve petrol tanks which are buried in the ground at Sherpur. At present there are four of these buildings under construction. They are situated as follows:—

One on the road in front of the end hangar at the South-East corner of the aerodrome.

Two in front of the transport sheds at the S. W. end of the aerodrome.

One in a line with the two mentioned above and on the slope of the ridge which runs along the N. W. side of the aerodrome.

Three large petrol tanks, each weighing 80 maunds and purchased in Germany have reached the Kabul aerodrome where they are to be used for storing aviation petrol.

(2) *Kandahar*.—(i) It is reported that the War Ministry intend to establish a small air detachment in Kandahar. In connection with this, *Ghund Mishar* Muhammad Ihsan, Commandant of the Air Force, motored to Kandahar

on the 25th June, 1927. He inspected the landing ground and selected a site for quarters of personnel. Subsequently it was reported that a hangar and some accommodation for personnel were being constructed to the West of the Kandahar aerodrome.

(ii) A 500 gallon petrol tank was installed on the Kandahar aerodrome in May 1928.

(3) *Jalalabad*.—A petrol tank, capacity approximately 2,000 gallons and received from Germany, has been fitted underground on the Jalalabad aerodrome. Repair of the aerodrome was commenced in June 1928.

(4) It is reported that a new aerodrome has been constructed at Gardez of the same size as that at Kabul.

A sum of Rs. 3,000 has also been sanctioned for work on the landing ground at Ghazni. The landing grounds at Herat and Mukur have recently been repaired and emergency landing grounds have been prepared at Farah, Sabzawar and on the Helmand.

Most of this work was done on the assumption that the King would do the return journey from Herat to Kabul *via* Kandahar by air. As it happened this was not the case. But, in view of the generally increased aerial activity in Afghanistan, there is every reason to suppose that these landing grounds will frequently be used.

(f) *General*.

(1) It was suggested to the Commandant of the Afghan Air Force in an interview in February 1928 that the Afghans could now, or very shortly, dispense with the services of the Russians in their Air Force. The Commandant thought, however, that the time was not yet in sight when Afghan pilots and mechanics could run the Air Force without any outside help, though he thought that the number of foreign personnel could be decreased.

(g) *Civil Air Service*.

(1) *Kabul-Tashkent*.—An agreement has been reached between the Afghan and Soviet authorities for the initiation of a civil air service between Kabul and Tashkent.

The main points of the agreement are—

- (i) It is to come into force from the 1st January 1928 and is to last one year.
- (ii) Each country will provide ten machines for this service and flights will be made fort-nightly, but more machines may be employed when necessary.
- (iii) Each country guarantees to provide landing grounds, equipment and material in their own territory for the maintenance of the service.
- (iv) The U. S. S. R. agree to supply at Kabul fuel and oil on payment for the purposes of the scheme.
- (v) Aeroplanes and personnel will be supplied by each Government from its available resources, the personnel to be paid by their respective Governments.

- (vi) All expenses incurred by either party in maintaining the air route, aerodromes, equipment, fuel oil, spares, repairs, etc., and the entertainment of air personnel, will be borne by the country concerned, and all income obtained will be at the disposal of the country to which the aeroplane belongs.
- (vii) Each country will give full assistance in case of accidents.
- (viii) The scale of passenger and postal charges will be fixed by special mutual arrangement.
- (ix) Other details will be arranged direct between the Dubrolet of the U. S. S. R. and the Headquarters of the Afghan Air Force.

It will be interesting to see how the Afghan Government fulfil their part of an agreement which would appear to be far beyond their present resources.

It has been officially announced that letters, etc., may now be sent by air mail service between Kabul and Tashkent. If this service were utilised it would be possible to send letters from Kabul to London in 8 days instead of 22 days as by the present mail service *via* India.

(2) Reference Clause (ii) of the Agreement it is believed that the Afghan contribution to machines for this service at present consists of only one Junker.

Reference Clause (iii) the Afghan Air Force has undertaken to construct and prepare landing grounds at the following places not later than August 1st 1928.

1. Haibak.
2. Any convenient place between Haibak and Khinjan.
3. Any convenient place at Khinjan.
4. Any convenient place between Khinjan and Charikar.

It is thought that the finding of a spot suitable for a landing ground between Khinjan and Charikar will not be an easy matter owing to the mountainous nature of the country. This is borne out by a report in May which stated that one Afghan and two Russian Air officers visited Charikar on May 21st to select a site for a landing ground.

Reference clause (viii) the following are the passenger fares charged :—

|   |          |                              |
|---|----------|------------------------------|
| Single fare Kabul-Tashkent .. ..          | £27/10/0 | English or 260 gold roubles. |
| Single fare Kabul-Termez .. ..            | £16/10/0 | English or 156 gold roubles. |
| Single fare Kabul-i-Mazar-Sharif .. ..    | £14/0/0  | English or 130 gold roubles. |
| Single fare Mazar-i-Sharif-Tashkent .. .. | £13/15/0 | English or 125 gold roubles. |
| Single fare Mazar-i-Sharif-Termez .. ..   | £2/10/0  | English or 26 gold roubles.  |



A fortnightly service is maintained.

(h) *Summary of flying Times.*

1st July 1927—30th June 1928.

|             | 1927. |    |    |    |    | D. H. 9A's. |       | Junker. |       |
|-------------|-------|----|----|----|----|-------------|-------|---------|-------|
|             |       |    |    |    |    | Hrs.        | Mins. | Hrs.    | Mins. |
| July        | ..    | .. | .. | .. | .. | 7           | 20    | ..      | ..    |
| August      | ..    | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11          | 00    | ..      | ..    |
| September   | ..    | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3           | 10    | ..      | ..    |
| October     | ..    | .. | .. | .. | .. | 7           | 30    | ..      | ..    |
| November    | ..    | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4           | 30    | 1       | 30    |
| December    | ..    | .. | .. | .. | .. | 27          | 00    | 3       | 00    |
| 1928.       |       |    |    |    |    |             |       |         |       |
| January     | ..    | .. | .. | .. | .. | 8           | 00    | 9       | 30    |
| February    | ..    | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1           | 00    | 8       | 00    |
| March       | ..    | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4           | 00    | 3       | 15    |
| April       | ..    | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11          | 45    | ..      | ..    |
| May         | ..    | .. | .. | .. | .. | 57          | 10    | 17      | 30    |
| June        | ..    | .. | .. | .. | .. | 93          | 05    | 15      | 35    |
|             |       |    |    |    |    | 235 20      |       | 58 20   |       |
| Grand Total |       |    |    |    |    | .. ....     |       | 293 40  |       |

(2) As far as is known, no flying has been carried out by the D. H. 9, Bristol Fighter or Avro machines.

(3) The increase during May and June is a result of the arrival of new machines from Russia.

#### IV. COMMUNICATIONS.

##### (a) *Roads.*

(1) *Jalalabad-Kabul.*—A certain amount of work has been done on this road during the past year under the supervision of German engineers. Work was in progress on the Darunta Gorge sector of the road from January to May 1928, when it was stopped for the summer. 14 miles of well constructed road have been completed from the Kabul end as far as Charki where a new bridge across the Kabul River is being built. On the right bank of the river opposite Charki the new alignment of the road can be seen running in a S. E. direction towards the Lataband Pass. It is reported that the Tangi Gharu alignment has been definitely abandoned. Work on the road from the Western (Kabul) end will be continued through the hot weather.

(2) *Kabul-Mazar-i-Sharif.*—The question of the building of this road to the North *via* the Salang Valley and Haibak has apparently not yet been decided. So far as is known no work on it north of the Hindu Kush has been carried out during the past year. South of the Hindu Kush there has been no road construction beyond Do Ao (70 miles North of Kabul).

(3) *Kabul-Kandahar.*—This road is in good condition. In June 1928 the journey from Kabul to Kandahar was accomplished by car in 12 hours,

and the return journey in  $11\frac{1}{2}$  hours. The distance is 320 miles, so that to enable the journey to be done at an average speed of over 25 miles an hour the road must have been in very good order.

(4) *Kandahar-Spin Baldak*.—This road was repaired to enable the King to motor along it in December 1927 when starting off on his tour. After that it soon lapsed back to its former state.

It is now reported, however, that steps will be taken during the current year to put this road into a proper state of repair. A sum of Rs. 5 lakhs has been sanctioned for work on it. Bridges will be built over the Tarnak and Aighastan rivers and the road is going to be metalled.

(5) *Kandahar-Herat*.—This road assumed importance as soon as it was known that the King might return from Persia by car *via* Herat and Kandahar to Kabul. Work was started on the road at once to make it fit for motors. By the end of June the road was ready and the King motored along it accompanied by a large convoy of cars and lorries. It is reported that boat bridges are in course of construction over the Helmand (at Girishk), over the Arghandab and other rivers.

It may be taken that this road is at the present moment fit for cars, but it is doubtful whether it will remain so unless the work is taken in hand seriously.

(6) *Khost*.—The Kabul-Gardez road is at present in fairly good condition, but no metalling having been done, it would be impassable after heavy rains or snow.

On the North side of the Altimur Pass, the alignment is bad, there being twenty hairpin bends in two miles. Embankments are walled by stones without cement or mortar, and in a few places have been washed away, but are easily repairable and the road is passable.

At the summit of the kotal the road has been blasted through solid rock, dimensions of passage 30 feet broad, 30 feet high and 25 yards long. Easily blocked by explosives. No diversion exists.

It is stated that the road will be metalled next year.

Work on branch roads from Gardez to Ali Khel, Matun and Urghun is in progress, but hampered by the limited labour available.

#### (b) *Telegraphs*.

(1) *Kabul-Termez*.—This line has reached the Zemistan Kotal from Kabul. In the north little progress has been made, but the line is believed to have reached Mazar-i-Sharif from Termez.

(2) *Kandahar-Farah*.—Efforts were made to complete this line before the return of the King. The work was carried out under the supervision of Russian engineers. By the end of May 1928, the line was said to have reached a village in the Kushki Nakhud-Maiwand area about 30 miles short of the Helmand river, when work ceased for the hot weather. The poles for this line have been supplied through Messrs. Balmer, Lawrie and Company, Calcutta.

(3) The Indian and Afghan telegraph systems were linked up at Spin Baldak in November 1927.

(4) The King's approval has been obtained to a scheme for the construction of an improved telephone line between Kabul and Gardez.

(c) *Postal.*

(1) The Afghan Government have signed a contract providing for the arrival in Kabul shortly of a Frenchman to reorganise the postal services.

(2) Afghanistan has joined the International Postal Union. This appears to have been done in a light hearted manner as a sign of progress in the Afghan Public Services which is more superficial than genuine.

(d) *Wireless Telegraphy.*

(1) A broad-casting station has been established in Kabul. This station now broadcasts an entirely local programme every day of the week from 7-30 to 9-30 P.M., daily.

It is reported that a broadcasting station will also be shortly erected at Kandahar.

(2) Listening-in sets are being imported freely into Afghanistan. The licence for these is :—

|                |    |    |    |    | Rs.                    |
|----------------|----|----|----|----|------------------------|
| Crystal Set    | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 (Afghan) per mensem. |
| Two-Valve Set  | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3 (Afghan) per mensem. |
| Five-Valve Set | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4 (Afghan) per mensem. |

V.—CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT.

(a) *General.*

The economic situation in Afghanistan is far from healthy and gives cause for considerable anxiety. The local treasury in Kabul is empty and has exhausted all its resources. As no banking facilities exist in Afghanistan at present, the treasury is freely used by local merchants and officials as being the only place of security in Kabul. Now that there is no money at all in the treasury, trade is practically at a standstill and there is naturally some discontent in the local bazaars. This unfortunate situation is attributed entirely to the expenses incurred by the King during his European tour, as such a state of affairs has never occurred before in Kabul. It will be interesting to hear how the King explains the reason for his depleted treasury and to see what steps he will take to replenish it.

(b) *Banks.*

During the King's tour various rumours were afloat regarding the establishment of a bank in Afghanistan. Certain individuals in Europe are known to have approached the Afghan Government on this matter, but it appears that so far none of the proposals made have been accepted.

(c) *Electrical.*

(1) Work has been commenced on the widening of the Patao Canal with a view to obtaining a sufficient volume of water to operate the electric power station at Sardeh. Local unpaid labour is being utilised for this work.

It is reported that 4½ lakhs of rupees (Afghani) have been allocated in the new budget for the continuance of the construction of the electric works for Kandahar.

(d) *Mills.*

(1) The fire which was reported to have burnt down the electric and wool factory in Herat during the last week of May 1927 is said to have been only a small conflagration which was easily extinguished without causing any serious damage.

(2) It is now reported that a woollen spinning mill in course of erection at Herat is nearing completion. The boiler, which is very heavy, is lying at Kushk, but a special lorry from Germany has arrived at Herat to transport it.

(e) *Trade.*

(1) Negotiations between the Soviet and Afghan Governments regarding their proposed new trade treaty hung fire during the absence of the King on tour. However in May 1928 the Afghan Minister of Commerce, Abdul Hadi Khan, was summoned to meet the King in Moscow presumably with a view to drawing up a final draft of the treaty and discussing it in Moscow with the Soviet representatives.

No announcement has been made as yet, but it is expected that an agreement will shortly be reached.

(2) It is evident from reports received that Russian traders are making strenuous efforts to capture the markets in Northern Afghanistan.

Russian goods are underselling Indian goods in Mazar-i-Sharif and the increase of Russian imports, which has been extraordinary in the last two years, is spreading to the Khanabad and Badakshan markets.

(3) Machinery for the manufacture of cloth was purchased by the King in Germany. Afghan newspapers appear to be trying to create special interest in the manufacture of cloth.

(f) *Currency.*

The question of issuing Afghan currency notes is again being considered. Notes of value from Rs. 5 to Rs. 100 are said to have been printed ready for issue, if approved by King Amanullah on his return.

## VI.—AFGHAN RELATIONS WITH THE POWERS.

(a) *Great Britain.*

A distinct improvement has been noticeable in the tone of Anglo-Afghan relations since the King visited England during his tour abroad. The King himself has made no secret of his appreciation of the warmth of his reception in England. Local opinion in Afghanistan also considers that, in the competition entered into by European nations to make the King's visit a success, England was first.

At a Foreign Office reception held in Kabul in July a few days after his return, the King and his suite were noticeably friendly to the members of the British Legation. His Secretary remarked that it was nothing short of hypnotism that had changed the entire outlook of the King and his ministers in one month in England from deep founded suspicion of British policy to their present friendly and trusting attitude.

Despite these reassuring signs of friendship there are certain matters outstanding between the two countries which have still to be settled.

The Jaji-Turi Commission has not yet assembled. Meanwhile minor incidents continue to occur on this part of the frontier which emphasise the need for an early settlement of this vexed question.

A disturbing feature during the past year has been the revival of Afghan intrigue amongst the tribes on our side of the border, especially in Waziristan.

The Afghan authorities have also renewed their practice of paying tribal allowances to tribes within the Indian border—prominent amongst such tribes being the Afridis, who recently received large sums from the Governor of the Eastern Provinces in Afghanistan, which were said to be their allowances for the last 3 years.

On the whole, however, it may be said that the relations between His Majesty's Government and Afghanistan are decidedly friendly.

(b) *The Soviet.*

Afghan Soviet relations in Kabul have not improved. The fact that strained relations exist is freely mentioned by Afghans and foreigners. There appears to be no specific reason for this, but in a variety of ways the Soviet seem to have annoyed the Afghans. Jealousy in the Air Force can be understood, but the general attitude of the Legations seems to have changed and it is said that the Soviet no longer agree to everything the Afghans say but are now inclined to dispute every point. The King's visit to Russia does not appear to have improved matters, and in Afghanistan the Russian visit created no enthusiasm.

(c) *Persia.*

A Perso-Afghan neutrality pact was signed at Kabul on November 28th 1927 just before the King started on his tour. The pact which had been under consideration for nearly a year, is for a period of 6 years. A protocol to the pact provides for the submission of "differences which cannot be settled through diplomatic channels to an important person from each of their respective Kingdoms" and, in the event of their disagreeing "the contracting parties will jointly nominate an important person from an impartial state as an arbitrator whose verdict ..... will be final". It is rumoured that during his recent visit to Persia the King of Afghanistan concluded a new treaty with Persia, according to the terms of which the Legations of both countries will be raised to the status of Embassies. But at present no further information is available.

(d) *Turkey.*

(1) During the King's visit to Turkey a treaty was concluded between Turkey and Afghanistan. This treaty is most cordial in tone, its object being that unity of action in political and economic questions of national defence may be secured.

By clause 5 of the treaty "the Turkish Republic promises to place the services of Turkish experts of war, education and law at the disposal of the Afghan Government to promote the standard of education and military strength of

**Afghanistan.** A protocol to the treaty states that "The two contracting Powers agree that to take practical steps to make this treaty a success and to achieve unity of action in economic matters, fresh negotiations will shortly begin". In this instance also the Legations of both countries are to be raised to the status of Embassies.

(2) Very little comment has yet been heard regarding the raising of the Turkish Legation in Kabul to the status of an Embassy. The fact has not yet become generally known and the only criticism so far heard is to the effect that this will mean that Afghanistan will follow more closely in the footsteps of Turkey, particularly as regards the vexed question of the abolition of *Purdah*. The Turkish Ambassador will be *ipso-facto* doyen of the Diplomatic Corps in Kabul.

(3) It is a curious fact that the Turks are probably more unpopular than any other foreigners in Kabul. This is due to the fact that the Turk in Government employ draws very high pay which is resented by the Afghan who considers himself as efficient as the Turk ; also of course to their present day unorthodox observance of Islam.

(e) *Egypt.*

A treaty of amity was concluded in June 1928 between Egypt and Afghanistan. The treaty is a short document consisting of only 4 articles and contains nothing worthy of comment. According to the terms of the treaty an economic and commercial convention will shortly be drawn up.

## APPENDIX.

## "TOUR OF KING AMANULLA IN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST".

- I.—Announcement of tour and reception of the news by the people.
- II.—Composition of Royal party.
- III.—Itinerary.
- IV.—Visit to England.
- V.—Purchases and gifts of war material made during the tour.
- VI.—Afghan opinions of the tour.
- VII.—Return of the Royal party to Afghanistan and the task before the King.

## I.

The King officially announced his intention to visit Europe at the end of September 1927. He stated that the object of this tour was to study European civilisation generally and in particular industries and education. Opinion amongst the Afghans was divided on the subject of the advisability of the tour, and at first the general feeling in the country was not in favour of it. The progressive policy of the King was already creating a feeling of nervousness regarding the limits to which he would go and it was felt that after a six months' study of European civilisation further innovations would most certainly be introduced. For some time the people could not bring themselves to believe that His Majesty would really fulfil his intention.

From many other points of view, however, the opportunity for the tour seemed most favourable. There was no unrest in any district of Afghanistan. Trade conditions were satisfactory. Reforms and innovations during the present regime had not gone too far provided a halt was called at the present juncture. Such danger as there was would, it was thought, only be from aspirants to the throne. In some quarters the fear was expressed that bribery, the curse of Afghanistan, would cause unrest as the officiating ministers would be bound to make the most of their opportunities in this respect. Gradually the feeling against the tour subsided and once the King set forth on his journey the whole country followed his progress with the greatest interest.

## II.

The Royal party was composed of the following :—

- Prince Rahmatullah Jan. (eldest son of the King and Queen).
- Princess Noor-us-Siraj. (Sister of the King).
- Madame Bibi Khurd. (Sister of the Queen).
- Mlle. Najiba Begum. (Half sister of the King).
- Mde. Najia Khanum (Turkish Governess).
- H. E. Sardar Muhd. Hassan Khan. (Chamberlain to the King).
- H. E. Sardar-i-Ala Mahmud Beg Tarzi. (Foreign Minister).
- H. E. Sardar-i-Ala Ghulam Sadiq Khan. (Minister of Court).
- H. E. Sardar-i-Ala Muhd. Yakub Khan. (Minister of Court).
- H. E. Sardar-i-Ala Sher Ahmed Khan. (President of the National Assembly).
- H. E. T. A. Ali Ahmad Jan. (Governor of Kabul).
- Lt.-Gen. Sardar-i-Ala Habibulla Khan. (Under Secretary, War Ministry).
- Lt.-Gen. Abdul Rahman Khan. (Commander, Herat Division).
- Lt.-Gen. Mohd. Umar Khan. (Commander 1st Div., Kabul Corps).
- Brig. Genl. Ghulam Dastgir Khan. (Commander Household Troops).
- Dr. Rufki Bey. (Turkish physician to the King).
- Col. Abdul Nawab Khan. (Brother of the Queen).
- Ghulam Yahya Khan. (Nephew of the Foreign Minister).
- Muhd. Amin Khan. (Former Secretary of the Afghan Legation, Berlin).

## III.

The itinerary of the visit was briefly as follows :—

|                            |    |    |    |                                      |
|----------------------------|----|----|----|--------------------------------------|
| Departure from Chaman      | .. | .. | .. | 10th December 1927.                  |
| Karachi                    | .. | .. | .. | 11th and 12th December 1927.         |
| Bombay                     | .. | .. | .. | 14th—17th December 1927.             |
| Egypt                      | .. | .. | .. | 26th December 1927—3rd January 1928. |
| Italy                      | .. | .. | .. | 8th January—22nd January 1928.       |
| France                     | .. | .. | .. | 23rd January—8th February 1928.      |
| Belgium                    | .. | .. | .. | 8th February—11th February 1928.     |
| Switzerland                | .. | .. | .. | 12th February—19th February 1928.    |
| Germany                    | .. | .. | .. | 20th February—7th March 1928.        |
| England                    | .. | .. | .. | 13th March—5th April 1928.           |
| France (unofficial visit)  | .. | .. | .. | 6th April—9th April 1928.            |
| Germany (unofficial visit) | .. | .. | .. | 10th April—28th April 1928.          |
| Poland                     | .. | .. | .. | 29th April—2nd May 1928.             |
| Russia                     | .. | .. | .. | 3rd May—18th May 1928.               |
| Turkey                     | .. | .. | .. | 19th May—4th June 1928.              |
| Persia                     | .. | .. | .. | 6th June—20th June 1928.             |
| Arrived Kabul              | .. | .. | .. | 1st July 1928.                       |

## IV.

Their Majesties left Calais on March 13th on the reserved steamer "Maid of Orleans". They were escorted from mid-channel by 4 destroyers and 1 flight of fighting aircraft. There was an official reception at Dover where they were welcomed by His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales. They then proceeded to London by the Royal train and were accorded an official welcome at Victoria Station by Their Majesties King George and Queen Mary, Members of the Royal Family, the Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers, etc.

The programme which had been arranged for the English visit was carried out completely and without any sort of hitch whatever. No single occasion can be recollected on which H. M. King Amanulla was late for any of the numerous engagements which his programme entailed. His punctuality and good humour throughout infected his Staff. His Majesty King Amanulla and His Ministers were brought into close touch with our Royal Family. They saw the best of English country life ; spent many hours inspecting industrial centres ; attended the chief sporting events, and the Fighting Forces paraded their most efficient and up-to-date material for his inspection. The mere details of the programme, however, cannot tell of the splendour of his reception at Buckingham Palace, nor how well he was received on all occasions by the English people who turned out in full force to welcome him, whether it was in an industrial City or whilst passing through a village hamlet.

The Queen appeared to be even more popular than the King and was always sure of a great ovation, whilst genuine regret was expressed on the few occasions that she did not accompany the party.

The Afghans were agreeably surprised at the clemency of the English climate. Fortunately the weather was much better than can normally be expected in March, and several warm bright sunny days showed them the best of an early English Spring. The only occasion on which the programme was in any way interfered with by bad weather was on the day of the Naval Review when the programme had to be modified, chiefly on account of poor visibility. King Amanulla was greatly impressed by his stay at Buckingham Palace and his visit to Windsor. The magnificence of his reception at the Palace, the stateliness and grandeur of Windsor Castle, and his close personal relations with the British Royal Family, are memories which he will long retain and which will not be obliterated by his visit to Soviet Russia.



It was part of the programme to include road journeys through the prettiest portions of England, and the Afghan party were full of admiration for the English countryside; particularly parts of Surrey and Wiltshire, the New Forest and the peak country between Derby and Sheffield.

The condition of the roads was frequently remarked on, and H. M. Amanulla stated that nowhere in Europe had he travelled on roads which could in any way compare to those in England. Rolls Royce and Daimler cars were used and no mechanical or tyre trouble ever occurred. For railway journeys, the Royal train was put at the disposal of the Afghan party and observed unflinching punctuality on all occasions.

During the tour some of the most important industrial works in the country were inspected. In this connection it should be realised that the Afghan party had already seen works and arsenals in Italy, France, Germany, etc., and for this reason, and also because the technical details were far beyond their intelligence, this side of the programme did not appeal to them as much as it should. It did, nevertheless, give them an idea of the manufacturing ability of the country and H. M. Amanulla was always an interested and intelligent observer. Particularly successful were the visits to the Rolls Royce works at Derby and the soap factories at Port Sunlight.

The tour of the London docks, with many miles of river bank lined with waterside warehouses, and of the Manchester Ship Canal, conveyed some idea of British overseas trade.

The educational and intellectual side, in which H. M. Amanulla takes so great an interest, was not neglected. He was very gratified at the honour of receiving the degree of D. C. L. at Oxford and of being elected an Honorary Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society. He was shown over several Oxford colleges, the Bodleian library, the Royal Observatory at Greenwich, and inspected the R. M. C. Sandhurst and the R. A. F. School of Technical Training at Halton.

It was a little unfortunate that the sporting side of English life which he saw, such as the Grand National, the boat race and an international association match at Wembley, proved uneven contests; but the events themselves, the crowds and their enthusiasm and the surroundings, were at least of great interest.

Thrills were provided by a flight over London, a trip in a submerged submarine and a descent of 950 yards in 50 seconds down a coal mine; the latter particularly providing a test for nerves.

The Royal suite and other accommodation and arrangements at Claridges showed what a standard of comfort can be provided by excellent organisation at the best of London hotels. As a member of the King's suite was heard to remark one day "In the next world the Afghans will enter Paradise—the English have it in this world."

Politics were very little discussed during the visit; only twice on official occasions. The first time a not very convincing protest was made by King Amanulla to Sir Austen Chamberlain against our policy on the North West Frontier, and on the second occasion the officiating Afghan Foreign Minister in an interview at the Foreign Office appears to have suggested in general terms closer relationship between the two Governments and that a gift of Munitions would be very acceptable to the Afghan Government.

The private purchase of War material during the English visit was never seriously contemplated. Interest was evidenced in the steel helmet and six of different patterns were presented to General Habibullah Khan by Messrs. Hatfields. A request was made unofficially to the B. S. A. Coy. for estimates for the supply of 30,000 rifles and 100 Lewis guns.

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## V.

During his tour, His Majesty acquired a variety of War material from the various European countries he visited. In a few cases he was presented with war material but for the most part it has been bought by the Afghan Government.

The following table gives some idea of the heterogeneous nature of this material :—

|         |    |    |                |    |   |
|---------|----|----|----------------|----|---|
| Italy   | .. | .. | Presented with | .. | 1 Armoured Car.   |
|         |    |    | Bought         | .. | { 1 Armoured Car.<br>2 Field Batteries.<br>4 Howitzer Batteries.<br>2 Pack Batteries.               |
| Germany | .. | .. | Presented with | .. | 1 Junker monoplane.   |
|         |    |    | Bought         | .. | 2 Monoplanes.   |
| France  | .. | .. | Presented with | .. | 1 Aeroplane.  |
|         |    |    | Bought         | .. | { 2 Field Batteries.<br>1 Pack Battery.<br>5 Light Tanks.<br>2 Ammunition Lorries.<br>5,000 Rifles. |
| Poland  | .. | .. | Presented with | .. | 1 Aeroplane.  |
| Russia  | .. | .. | Presented with | .. | { 2 Aeroplanes.<br>2 Tanks.<br>4 Tractors.  |

Of the above, the consignment of arms from Italy and the machines from Germany have arrived in Afghanistan so far.

## VI.

Once the people of Afghanistan realised that their King was in earnest in his intention to carry out a tour of Europe and the Near East, their original opposition to the project changed gradually, first to acquiescence in and finally to enthusiasm for the tour. Newspapers cuttings describing His Majesty's reception in the various countries he visited, photographs and films of incidents of the tour were all equally welcome and the Kabul public followed every stage of his journey with the greatest eagerness and interest. Whilst there is no doubt that all the countries visited by King Amanulla did their best to give him a fitting reception and to make his visit a success, opinions in Kabul varied greatly in their estimates of these receptions.

In the opinion of the Afghan Foreign office, England was first in the competition entered into by European nations to make the King's visit a success, Italy was second and the remainder not in the same class, though most advantage was gained from the visit to Germany.

The Belgian reception was considered rather indifferent. Reports of the visit to England were received with great interest and created a very good impression. A member of the King's suite in a letter describing the visit was warm in his praise of all the arrangements made and was apparently very much struck by the sincere welcome which the Afghans received from all classes in England.

As regards Turkey and Persia, local opinion in Kabul considered the Turkish visit to have been very successful, whilst the Persian visit was voted rather poor, despite the efforts of the Persians to make a brave show. The heat in Persia was very trying and apparently the Afghans spent their time in comparing Persia unfavourably with Afghanistan.

The reception accorded to the King in India created a good impression. A film of the King's visit to Bombay was exhibited to packed houses in Kabul and was enthusiastically received despite the fact that the film itself was badly produced.

The visit to Russia, though given great prominence in the Indian press, did not create much interest in Afghanistan.

## VII.

Great preparations were made for the return of the King and Queen to their native land. They arrived in Herat from Meshed on June 22nd and, travelling by car *via* Farah, Girishk, Kandahar and Mukur, they reached Kabul at 10 A.M. on July 1st.

At all the chief towns *en route* they were enthusiastically received and feted. Banquets and garden parties were the order of the day.

In Kabul the authorities had spared no pains in their preparations to give Their Majesties The King and Queen a reception fitting the occasion and, as they drove slowly in an open car through crowded and gaily decorated streets, they were accorded a tumultuous welcome. The King is now resting in his summer quarters at Paghman before taking over once more the reins of State from the Regent.

The King is faced with no easy task for the future. The state of the treasury has already been referred to in a previous paragraph. It seems that the question of finance will shortly become so acute that it will be the foundation on which all political military and economic policy will be based. The present revenue of Afghanistan is derived mainly from customs dues and land taxes. An increase of revenue under these heads cannot be expected nor do there appear to be any new sources of income which could be readily tapped. In the face of such a situation what will the King do? His eagerness for the spread of education and other social reforms is well known. His recent tour can but have whetted his appetite for such reforms. This is in fact, clearly shown in the speeches he made at Kandahar and Kabul on his return journey. In Kandahar the King told the women of Afghanistan that they were deplorably idle in comparison with the women of Europe. He referred to the unfortunate inability of his countrymen to tackle any constructional work with vigour and he said that in Europe work was not stopped on such pretexts as heat, cold or rain. Finally he deplored the disgraceful condition of communications in Afghanistan and said that they would receive his immediate attention. In Kabul his theme was the same and he told his audience that he had done his best to ascertain the causes of progress of the Western nations and he would inform them shortly of the conclusions at which he had arrived. This is sufficient to show that the King's reforming zeal has not abated and that he means to go forward with his schemes for the extension of education and the improvement of communications. Indeed it would appear inevitable that he will have to justify his heavy expenditure in Europe by the introduction of some fresh reforms. These reforms, however, modelled as they undoubtedly will be on European methods, are bound to be to some extent unpopular and, what is more important, expensive. The necessary expense can only be met by an increase of revenue, unless the King has recourse to other methods, which will not be considered here. Such briefly is the problem which awaits His Majesty's attention, the solving of which will demand of him the full application of his abilities both financial and political.

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Serial No 21



*Summary of*  
**Events in Afghanistan**

1st July 1928 to 30th June 1929

*Compiled by the General Staff*

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## SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN.

1ST JULY 1928—30TH JUNE 1929.

The outstanding event of the year under review is the Rebellion which broke out in the Eastern Province in November 1928 and which culminated in King Amanulla's abdication and eventual flight from Afghanistan. The history of the rebellion is given as an Appendix to this summary.

### I.—INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

#### *Kabul.*

1. *The King's Return.*—After the King's return, interest in the internal affairs of Afghanistan was centred entirely in Kabul. Kandahar, Herat and the Provinces remained quiet, though agitation became noticeable as news of events in Kabul became known. The internal affairs of the Provinces, as affected by the spread of the revolt, will be found described in the history of the rebellion, given in the Appendix.

2. King Amanulla, accompanied by Queen Souriya and the members of his suite arrived in Kabul on July 1st, 1928, on return from his European tour. He travelled from Meshed by car, *via* Herat and Kandahar, and was accorded an enthusiastic welcome on his arrival. The whole of Kabul went *en fete* for three days. A dinner was given at the Foreign Office to which the heads of all Legations were invited, other members of the Diplomatic Corps attending a reception afterwards. The King was noticeably friendly to all members of the British Legation.

3. *The Loe Jirga.*—After a few days rest at his summer residence in Paghman, King Amanulla turned his attention to affairs of state. He arranged for a *Loe Jirga* (or Grand Assembly of Peoples' Representatives) to be held in Kabul after the usual *Jashan* (Peace celebrations). The delegates to the Jirga numbered 1,001 in all, and they soon commenced arriving from all over the country. Under orders from the King, they were compelled to wear a form of dress provided free by the Government, consisting of a black morning coat and trousers, white shirt, with a black tie and black soft hat. The delegates dressed thus were an unhappy and pathetic sight. The majority looked ridiculous and knew it.

Perhaps in anticipation of opposition to the Reforms which he intended to introduce at the *Loe Jirga*, King Amanulla had a party of delegates specially selected, with whom he discussed some of his more important subjects. His programme was coldly received, and it is believed that he modified it accordingly. The Jirga held five sittings, at which the following items were amongst those which were discussed :—

- (i) The present Council of State (Shora-i-Daulat) should cease to exist, its place being taken by a National Assembly (Shora-i-Milli) consisting of 150 representatives elected by the people. Officials, not to be eligible for election. The National Assembly to be in addition to, and not in substitution of, the *Loe Jirga*.
- (ii) Power to grant pardons should be withdrawn from judges and Hakims and invested in the King only, to prevent bribery and abuse of their power.



- (iii) The period of military service to be extended from two to three years. Compulsory service to be enforced, and no exemption or substitution allowed.
- (iv) All Afghan official titles to be abolished. Civil officials to wear dark civilian dress, and military officers to wear khaki.
- (v) The abolition of bribery. It was decided that a Committee should be formed to enquire into the pay of officials, and that a record should be kept of officials' private accounts and mode of living.
- (vi) Mullas who act as teachers or preachers to be examined, and given certificates if considered to be sufficiently expert to undertake these duties. Any foreign religious teachers trained at the narrowly orthodox Deoband Seminary in India, were to be expelled from Afghanistan.
- (vii) To pay for 50,000 rifles and 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition ordered in Europe, it was decided that a levy of Rs. 5 (Afghani) per head should be imposed on every male over 15 years of age ; each government servant was to contribute one month's pay.
- (viii) The question of *purdah* was left to the discretion of the individual. A proposal to legislate for a minimum age for marriage was strongly opposed, and rejected.

Before the conclusion of the proceedings, King Amanulla introduced to the Assembly, his son Prince Rahmatulla Jan, aged 7 years, as the Crown Prince of Afghanistan. This was very heartily acclaimed. An official intimation that Prince Rahmatulla Jan had been approved as heir to the throne was received by the British Legation.

Mohammed Wali Khan, who acted as Regent during the King's absence in Europe, was appointed permanent Regent with powers to act for the King in event of his absence from the capital.

An item which it is believed was to have been discussed, was the introduction of monogamy, commencing with Government officials. As this point was not brought up at the *Loe Jirga*, it is probable that the anticipated opposition to it, caused the King to omit it from his programme.

There is little doubt that the discussion of such matters as monogamy, and the abolition of *purdah* gave rise to much anxiety, and that grossly exaggerated reports of the King's intentions reached the provinces.

Before the *Loe Jirga* was dissolved, administrative reports from all the Ministries were laid before it. The following extracts give the items of chief interest, and indicate progress made :—

*Ministry of War.*—A method of learning to read, called the Gazi-phone system, invented by the King, has been introduced into the Army with good results.

*Ministry of Finance.*—Increase in the Revenue since 1925 is Rs. 22,000,000 (A.).

*Ministry of Education.*—151 students have been sent abroad for education since 1926.

Since 1925 the increase of attendance in primary schools is 32,000, and in Middle Schools 4,600.

The budget allotment for Education has increased by Rs. 6,000,000 (A.).

3. *The King's lectures.*—Shortly after the dissolution of the *Loe Jirga*, the King gave a series of lectures on his European tour to audiences of about 600 people. Each lecture lasted about 3 hours. He stated that he was greatly pleased by the reception accorded by the Government of India, and by Indians. The voyage on S.S. "Rajputana" he described as most delightful. Referring to his visit to England he said :—"The people, the Government, and the Royal Family showed me great affection." He stressed the sincerity and goodwill he met with everywhere, and stated that he received the degree of Civil Law from Oxford University as a favour which was not unsuitable, as he had framed and organized the laws of his own country.

Passing to the visit to Russia he said :—"From Poland I proceeded to Moscow and met with a magnificent reception. Although they are Bolshevik and do not like a King, yet they, for my sake changed some of their principles. I am exceedingly grateful to them. I met the Prime Minister and found the President an unassuming man. The War Minister and Mr. Chicherin paid me great respect, so much so that the War Minister remained with me even on occasions when his presence was unnecessary. They wished to conclude a Trade Treaty, but I was too busy, and sent for my Minister of Commerce to discuss the matter."

Referring to the benefits received from his visit to Germany, the King said that the German Government had allowed Afghanistan a credit of 6 million marks for the purchase of materials from their factories.

In subsequent lectures he outlined some of the Reforms which were then under consideration. A brief summary is given below :—

#### *Military.*

- (a) Higher educational qualifications to be required from students entering Afghan Military Colleges.
- (b) A special Military Treasury to be formed by the War Ministry.
- (c) Students of the middle school not to be conscripted in the usual way but to pass automatically into the Military College for one year, joining the reserve of officers thereafter.
- (d) The present War Office building to be turned into a military club for officers. To meet the initial expenses, one month's pay to be deducted from all military officers.

NOTE.—The following deductions from Officers' pay have been ordered : pay for July to meet the expenses of the King's reception on his return to Kabul : pay for August for a levy for the purchase of rifles : pay for October for the establishment of the Military Club.

#### *Civil.*

- (a) Municipal reforms to be instituted, including sanitation, improvements of markets and provision of playing grounds, and baths.

- (b) The police to be removed from the control of the Ministry of Justice and placed under the Ministry of the Interior. A gendarmerie to be formed to relieve the police of the more combatant part of their duties, and the army from such civil duties as the collection of revenue.
- (c) Students to be sent abroad, some to study oil production and carpet making, and others to work in European factories. Specialist schools to be established. Higher general education to be given at Kabul, students being drafted from the provincial schools.
- (d) Latin figures to be adopted in future for all Government work.
- (e) A provident fund to be started for civil and military officers, both the individual and the State subscribing.
- (f) New laws for trade, Posts and Telegraphs, to be prepared; Police Regulations and conscription rules to be revised.
- (g) Government holidays to be laid down.
- (h) General conduct rules regarding dress and the wearing of veils to be laid down.
- (i) Medical services to be improved and touring dispensaries to be organized.
- (j) Two hotels, one in Kabul, and one in Dar-ul-Aman, to be built from subscriptions collected from the merchants of Kabul, or, if necessary, from the whole of Afghanistan.

The King concluded his lecture by saying " I am a revolutionist and desire to cause a revolution in every phase of work in the country." He stated that he had now expounded his programme and every official who felt that he could not conscientiously work under it should resign.

Abdur Rahman Khan, Chief Customs Officer of Kabul, did so.

4. *The Adoption of European Clothing.*—The King's determination to westernise his country was soon evident in the regulations he issued regarding the mode of dress, and veil, to be worn by persons visiting Paghman. Some form of European hat was ordered to be taken into use forthwith, and instructions were issued regarding the manner of greeting friends and acquaintances. These regulations were soon extended to Kabul, and a small fine was imposed by the Municipality on persons who were found to be improperly dressed. Much ingenuity was shewn by all and sundry in their efforts to comply. Unfortunately many exaggerated reports regarding the King's " Dress Regulations " came to be circulated in the Provinces.

5. *Indications of impending trouble.*—The first sign of opposition to these Reforms appeared in September in the form of a manifesto signed by 400 Mullas at the instigation of Gul Agha, Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazaar, and his nephew Fazal Rahim, to the effect that the King's proposals for westernizing Afghanistan were contrary to Islam, and should not be obeyed. These two men went to Khost with the intention of raising the country, but the King had them arrested and brought back to Kabul for trial. Persons who sheltered them were punished.

At about the same time a series of raids were perpetrated in the Koh-i-Daman District, North of Kabul, by one Bacha-i-Saqao (otherwise known as Habibulla Khan). These raids assumed a serious character and necessitated the employment of Government troops to quell them. The action of the troops was not successful and Bacha-i-Saqao was able to take advantage of the situation created by the rebellion in the Eastern Province, and attacked Kabul itself. A description of his attack and of the subsequent rebellion, will be found in the Appendix.

6. *Officials—Afghan.*—As a result of the rebellion, and the accession of Habibulla, practically all the appointments made by Amanulla automatically lapsed. Habibulla made the following appointments :—

|  |    |    |                     |
|--|----|----|---------------------|
| Commander-in-Chief and Minister for War. |    |    | Syed Hussein.       |
| Prime Minister                           | .. | .. | Sher Jan.           |
| Foreign Minister                         | .. | .. | Ata-ul-Haq.         |
| Governor of Herat                        | .. | .. | Abdur Rahim.        |
| Governor of Kandahar                     | .. | .. | Said Mahommed Khan. |

7. *Legations.*—During the year both the Turkish and Soviet Legations in Kabul were raised to the status of Embassies. Yusuf Hikmet Bey presented his credentials as first Turkish Ambassador to Kabul, and M. Stark, as Soviet Ambassador. Consequent upon the abdication of King Amanulla, the British, French and Italian Legations were withdrawn, and arrived in Peshawar by air on 25th February. The Turkish, and Soviet Embassies, and the German and Persian Legations remained, but all of the staffs were reduced.

M. Stark, Soviet Ambassador, returned to Tashkent by air during April 1929, for reasons of health. M. Riks, first Secretary to the Embassy, remained in charge.

8. *Missions.*—A Turkish Military Mission arrived in Kandahar from Quetta on 5th January 1929, and left for Kabul on 10th January. The Mission was composed of the following members :—

General Kiazim Pasha.  
 Colonel Rashid Bey.  
 Colonel Djemil Tahir Bey.  
 Colonel Mouharrem Mazloum Bey.  
 Major Halim Ismet Bey.  
 Major Izzet Bey.  
 Major Hidayat Bey.  
 Captain Kiazim Bey.  
 Captain Rashid Bey.

with their wives and families. Owing to the disturbed state of Afghanistan at the time of their arrival, the ladies of the party were detained in Quetta. On the 9th April the officers composing the Mission left Kabul and returned to Turkey, travelling *via* Russia.

9. *The British Legation Lorry Incident.*—Umar Khan, leader of the gang which fired on the British Legation lorry on November 17th, 1927, was sentenced to death in May 1928. He and his three accomplices were executed on September 24th, 1928.

## II.—THE AFGHAN ARMY.

### (a) *Training of Afghan Cadets in England.*

As a result of King Amanulla's visit to England, arrangements were made for twenty young Afghan cadets to be sent for training to the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. The party was due to sail from Bombay early in January, 1929. Owing to the outbreak of the rebellion however, the arrangement fell through.

### (b) *Purchase of War Material from France.*

The War material purchased from France by King Amanulla arrived at Chaman during October, 1928. The consignment consisted of :—

Two Field Batteries.

One Pack Battery.

Five Light Tanks (Renault).

Two Ammunition Lorries.

The five tanks are still at Spin Baldak, and they were not used during the rebellion.

### (c) *The part played by the Afghan Army in the Rebellion.*

The Afghan Army as a whole took little part in quelling the rebellion which started in the Eastern Province. The troops themselves were affected ; many deserted to the rebels ; others went off to their homes. A large proportion of *ex*-regular soldiers enlisted again to serve under Habibulla, but the Afghan army as organised and existing up to November, 1928, has disintegrated and ceased to exist.

## III.—THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE.

### (a) *New Aircraft.*

On the 10th July, 1928, there arrived in Kabul from Herat, three Junker monoplanes. One, a ten seater, was presented to King Amanulla by the German Government. The other two (three seaters), were purchased by him. The machines were flown from Germany by German pilots, two of whom definitely refused an offer of employment from the Afghan Government.

On August 22nd, a Potez biplane presented to King Amanulla by the French Government arrived in Kabul. The aeroplane was flown *via* Aleppo-Baghdad-Tehran-Meshed-Herat and Kandahar. It is reported to have covered the last stage of its flight, Meshed to Kabul *via* Kandahar, without landing, a distance of about 800 miles.

These four aeroplanes represent the only addition to the Afghan Air Fleet during the year under review.

(b) *Numbers of machines.*

On 27th December 1928, the Afghan Air Force was believed to have the following serviceable machines in Kabul :—

|            |    |    |    |    |    |
|------------|----|----|----|----|----|
| D. H. 9 A. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 13 |
| Junker     | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5  |
| Potez      | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1  |
| Biplane    | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1  |

Casualties are known to have been incurred since then, but owing to the difficulty of obtaining reliable information, the strength of the Air Force at present can only be estimated. It is considered that there are now not more than the following serviceable machines :—

|            |    |    |    |    |   |
|------------|----|----|----|----|---|
| D. H. 9 A. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4 |
| Junker     | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3 |
| Potez      | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 |
| Biplane    | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 |

The remainder are considered to be temporarily unserviceable but repairable. In addition, there are 5 other old machines in Kabul which are wholly unserviceable.

It is probable that there are no pilots available who are sufficiently skilled to fly either the Potez or the Biplane.

(c) *Summary of flying times.*

1st July, 1928—30th June, 1929.

| 1928.           | D. H. 9 As. |       | JUNKERS. |       | POTEZ. |       |
|-----------------|-------------|-------|----------|-------|--------|-------|
|                 | Hrs.        | Mins. | Hrs.     | Mins. | Hrs.   | Mins. |
| July .. ..      | 46          | 30    | 7        | 45    | ..     | ..    |
| August .. ..    | 8           | 00    | 17       | 10    | ..     | ..    |
| September .. .. | 30          | 00    | 22       | 45    | 2      | 20    |
| October .. ..   | 30          | 45    | 18       | 50    | 0      | 35    |
| November .. ..  | 74          | 00    | 19       | 30    | 0      | 50    |
| December .. ..  | 97          | 20    | 36       | 00    | ..     | ..    |
| Total .. ..     | 286         | 25    | 122      | 00    | 5      | 00    |

It has been estimated that during January, 1929, the total of flying carried out was :—

|             |    |    |    |           |
|-------------|----|----|----|-----------|
| D. H. 9 As. | .. | .. | .. | 55 hours. |
| Junkers     | .. | .. | .. | 18 hours. |

After January 31st. very little flying took place and no information is available on which to base calculations.

For the seven months from July 1928—January 1929, both inclusive, the total of flying hours is :—

|                     |    |    |                       |
|---------------------|----|----|-----------------------|
| D. H. 9 As. . . . . | .. | .. | 341 hours 25 minutes. |
| Junkers . . . . .   | .. | .. | 140 hours.            |
| Potez . . . . .     | .. | .. | 5 hours.              |

(d) *Identification Marks.*

Early in January 1929, it was reported that the identification marks on Afghan aeroplanes were being changed. In place of "Allah-o-Akbar" in Persian script under the bottom main planes, a bull's eye after the R. A. F. pattern was being painted in the Afghan national colours. The centre circle was green, the inner circle red, and the outer circle black.

Four of the D. H. 9 As. were also painted a light green.

The rudders of the D. H. 9 As. were also painted with the Afghan national colours, with their numbers in white on the fuselage.

(e) *Commercial flying.*

The Kabul-Tashkent Commercial Air Line has worked irregularly during the year. But in spite of this it is believed that the machines employed on it have been maintained at a high standard of efficiency. It is certain that this service evacuated to Tashkent a large number of the Russian, Turkish and German colonists in Kabul.

(f) *Works and buildings.*

(i) *Kabul.*—Three large hangars were in course of construction at the Sherpur aerodrome in September, 1928. They were of a similar pattern to the existing hangars and were being built in prolongation of the line of hangars and to the East of them.

Five hangars on the old Kabul aerodrome (Khwaja Rawash) have been repaired and are now reported to be serviceable.

(ii) *Jalalabad.*—The hanger on the Jalalabad aerodrome is unserviceable.

(iii) *Kandahar.*—Hangars for two machines with quarters for two pilots were under construction in September, 1928. These have not been completed.

(g) *The Afghan Air Force in the Rebellion.*

Soon after the outbreak of the rebellion in the Eastern Province, Afghan aeroplanes piloted by Russians were used for bombing villages in Ningrahar. During Bacha-i-Saqao's attack on Kabul aeroplanes were used for bombing and reconnaissance work. Two D. H. 9-As. are known to have crashed, and it is probable that others were rendered temporarily unserviceable. After Habibulla's accession, it was reported that Mohd. Ihsan Khan, Commandant of the Afghan Air Force, had been imprisoned. It is not clear whether the Russian personnel remained in Kabul or whether they returned to Russia.

Though there may be some machines in Kabul which are fit to fly, the Afghan Air Force, like the Afghan Army, has ceased to exist.

## IV.—COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) *Roads.*

(i) *Dakka-Jalalabad-Kabul.*—No work has been reported during the past year. It is probable that the general condition of the road has deteriorated on account of the rebellion.

(ii) *The Salang Road to Mazar-i-Sharif and Termez.*—Work on the road appears to have been discontinued. Travellers reports indicate that the portion of the road between Termez and Mazar-i-Sharif is becoming unfit for motor traffic owing to drifting sand. South of the Hindu Kush, the road between Do Ao and Jabul-us-Siraj is unfit for motor traffic, as all the bridges have been washed away by heavy spates. Only donkeys are able to traverse the Salang route at present.

(iii) *Kandahar-Spin Baldak.*—An Irish bridge was completed over the Tarnak River at the end of August, 1928. The surface of the road is in bad condition, but it is used frequently by cars and light lorries.

(iv) *Kandahar-Herat.*—The following extract from a report by one of King Amanulla's motor drivers, who went to Herat to meet the King on his return from Europe, is interesting. His report probably represents the normal condition of the road.

“ The journey was performed in six stages. Water in the Arghandab (June 1928) was about two feet deep, and was no obstacle. The Helmund was crossed by a boat bridge at Girishk, details of which are as follows :—

Breadth of river—70—90 feet.

Number of boats—5.

Size of boats—about six feet wide, and 20 feet long.

Distance between boats—about ten feet.

Width of roadway—about six feet.

A charge of Rs. 45 (*Afghani*) was made for using the bridge.

Before reaching Washir, the road became very bad in the hilly portion and was impracticable. Cars were driven along the *nala* beds with difficulty. A good ford existed across the Khash Rud. After leaving Dilaram, the sand in the Dasht-i-Bakhwa made heavy going and cars took their own line, as it was as easy off the road as on it.

From Farah the road along the river bank was very sandy, and entailed several stoppages. The Farah Rud was driven through without any trouble. Hilly country near Jija and about Kala Adraskand proved difficult and was negotiated sometimes by the help of workmen on the road, and sometimes by diversions along *nala* beds.

Nearly all the cars had damaged springs on arrival at Herat. Generally speaking the section Kandahar-Farah was worse than the section Farah-Herat.”

(v) *Gardez-Urgun.*—It is reported that this road has been completed, and that motor cars are now plying between the two towns.

(vi) *Gardez-Mirzakai.*—This road is reported to have been repaired and to be fit for motors as far as Serai in the Koshin Valley, 19 miles from Gardez.



(b) *Railways.*

During the year, Afghanistan has been visited by two Railway Survey Missions. The first, a French Mission, headed by M. Clemenceau, grandson of the famous Premier, arrived in Kabul early in July 1928, and surveyed the following lines :—

Kabul-Kandahar.

Kandahar-Chaman.

Kandahar-Herat.

Herat-Kushk Post.

The mission was working under a contract from the Afghan Government, and left Afghanistan early in November, just before the outbreak of the rebellion. Definite plans and proposals had not been submitted at the time of departure.

The second Mission was a German one, connected with the German firm of Lenz and Co., Berlin. It surveyed on the same lines as the French Mission, but had no contract for construction.

Owing to the disappearance of Amanulla, it is presumed that all contracts between the Afghan Government and the Railway Survey Missions are automatically terminated.

(c) *Telegraphs.*

Little, if any, progress has been made in telegraph construction during the year.

(i) *Kabul-Termez.*—This line has already been reported to have reached the Zemistan Kotal, from Kabul. In the North the line is believed to have been completed from Termez as far as Haibak. Reports indicate that the Russian telegraph construction personnel were withdrawn soon after the outbreak of the rebellion in the Mazar Province.

(ii) *Kandahar-Farah.*—This line is not yet finished. A gap exists between the Helmand and Farah.

## V.—THE ECONOMIC SITUATION.

The financial difficulties which confronted Amanulla's Government at the time of his return, were overwhelming, and reacted unfavourably on the economic condition of the country. The cost of the King's tour in Europe and his extensive purchases had depleted a treasury which was already being called upon to finance an ambitious but superficial programme for the improvement of communications, the promotion of education, and the support of an expensive army, all of which involved the employment of foreigners. There was no banking system, consequently the extensive use of credit, so valuable to more advanced Governments, was not available to the Afghan administration. Trade was maintained in a primitive fashion, and was based almost entirely on agriculture and cottage manufactures. These commodities depended for their sale on an equally primitive system of mule and camel transport. When civil war broke out, this trade was seriously affected and the caravans in some places temporarily disappeared, but trade has now been resumed subject to the handicap of heavy fees paid to escorts, and severe risks of being looted, or be-

coming the bone of contention between bands of alleged escorts. Cultivation, moreover, has been interfered with by the assembly of and movements of fighting men; reserves of grain have been depleted, and the general sense of insecurity engendered by civil war has seriously impeded any form of trade. In spite of the remissions of taxation made by Habibulla, no improvement can be expected in the economic situation until a settled form of Government has been established. A primitive State has been prematurely forced to meet heavy financial burdens, for which it is unprepared. Economic distress was therefore almost certain, even if Amanulla's Government had continued, but the advent of civil war has hastened the crash and the economic situation at present can only be described as chaotic and distressed.

## VI.—AFGHAN RELATIONS WITH THE POWERS.

### (a) *Great Britain.*

Prior to the rebellion, relations between Amanulla's Government and both the Home and Indian Governments were friendly. Shortly after the outbreak of the rebellion, the Government of India announced that its policy was one of strict neutrality and non-interference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan, a policy which has been most scrupulously observed. Steps were at once taken to prevent the tribesmen on the British side of the border from taking sides, and great credit is due to the Frontier Administrations for the success that has attended their efforts.

The Imperial Government decided that the British Legation should be withdrawn from Kabul as soon as measures had been completed for securing the safety of British and Indian subjects in Kabul, and of those foreign nationals who desired to avail themselves of our good offices. In consequence, the British Minister, Sir Francis Humphrys, returned to Peshawar by air on 25th February, 1929, with the whole of his legation staff, leaving the legation buildings in charge of a caretaker.

Habibulla's Government has not as yet been officially recognised, though communications have passed between Habibulla's Foreign Minister and the Government of India. Relations between the two Governments have been friendly and correct.

### (b) *The Soviet.*

The Soviet Embassy has remained in Kabul, though the Staff has been reduced. Soon after Ghulam Nabi's appearance in Mazar-i-Sharif on Amanulla's behalf, some friction was noticeable between Habibulla's Government and the Soviet Charge d'Affaires.

The former alleged that the U. S. S. R. had been helping Ghulam Nabi with men, arms and munitions, and also that Russian aeroplanes had crossed into Afghan territory and had bombed Habibulla's troops in the vicinity of Mazar-i-Sharif and Khanabad. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires denied this accusation, and countered by accusing the Afghan Government of instigating raids by Basmachi into Soviet territory. Some heated discussions took place before the Afghan Government accepted the Soviet denials. Reports went so far even as to indicate that Habibulla was preparing for war with the U. S. S. R.

(c) *Other Powers.*

The French and Italian Legations were withdrawn from Kabul by order of their respective Governments and availed themselves of an offer of transit by air to Peshawar in British R. A. F. machines. They withdrew from Kabul on the same day as the British Legation. The Turkish Embassy, and the Persian and German Legations remained in Kabul. Generally speaking, all other powers evinced a desire to remain neutral, and to avoid any form of interference with Afghanistan's internal affairs.

Shortly after King Amanulla's return from his European tour, treaties providing for peaceful friendship and the exchange of diplomatic representatives were arranged with Latvia, Poland and Switzerland.

## VII.—THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN ON 30TH JUNE 1929.

At the close of the year under review, Habibulla claimed to be ruler of Afghanistan, with the exception of the Southern and Eastern Provinces. He certainly was in a strong position. North of the Hindu Kush, Ghulam Nabi had withdrawn to Soviet territory, leaving the Mazar Province in the hands of Syed Hussein, Habibulla's War Minister. Herat was controlled by Abdur Rahim, ostensibly on Habibulla's behalf. Kandahar was held by him, and the road between Kabul and Kandahar was open to traffic, though elements of danger existed.

The threat to Kabul inherent in Nadir Khan's presence in the Southern Province had been averted in some measure by the capture of Gardez, and by the withdrawal to Hariob of Nadir Khan and his brothers. The Eastern Province was to all intents and purposes neutral. Hashim Khan was making little headway, and the various tribes comprising the population of the Province were too much concerned with profiting from the situation that had arisen, to take much interest in the struggle going on for mastery.

On 30th June 1929, therefore Habibulla was the paramount power in Afghanistan, with no immediate danger threatening him.

Bearing in mind the national tendency towards treachery and intrigue, the inevitable inter-tribal feuds and dissensions, and the impending collapse of the economic structure of the country, it will be of the greatest interest to see whether Habibulla can consolidate himself as ruler of Afghanistan, and establish once again that stable form of Government so earnestly desired by the Government of India.

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**APPENDIX.**  
**The Rebellion in Afghanistan.**  
**1928-1929**

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## APPENDIX.

## THE REBELLION IN AFGHANISTAN.

1928-1929.

## I.—CAUSES OF THE REBELLION.

Ever since Amanulla ascended the throne, and introduced new rules and laws into the country, there has been an under-current of unrest throughout Afghanistan. Although, after the Mangal rising of 1924, he rescinded some of the more unpopular of the regulations there remained some which have always rankled in the minds of the people. Among these were "Hashtnafri" (recruitment of one in eight) and the stoppage of allowances which had been granted to Saiyids, Mullas and certain Maliks for many years past.

Amanulla returned from his European tour in 1928, imbued with ideas of Western progression and a resolve to modernise his country in the shortest possible time. He immediately introduced a long list of Reforms, which, had they been carried out, would have revolutionised the life of the country completely. These Reforms were most unpopular and led to more unrest and to a feeling that the King was departing from the laws of Islam. In order to give effect to his schemes, he summoned a "Loe Jirga" or Grand Assembly consisting of 1,001 members drawn from all over the country to meet him in Kabul. He announced his intentions to these representatives, in the course of the sitting, which lasted for several days. His proposals covered practically every branch of the administration; some were accepted without demur; others aroused heated discussion and considerable opposition. The proposals outlined below are those which created the deepest stir, and aroused feelings of resentment which eventually grew into open revolt. It must be borne in mind, that the majority of representatives whom the King addressed were wholly illiterate. They could not absorb ideas at the pace with which the King pronounced them. Consequently when the meeting broke up, and the delegates returned to their homes, distorted and exaggerated reports of the decisions arrived at were spread about the country side. The King started badly by compelling all delegates to discard their customary dress, and adopt trousers, morning coats with white shirts, collars and black bow ties, and black soft felt hats. The delegates both looked and felt ridiculous.

Amongst the projected Reforms were the following :—

- I. The emancipation of women, including abolition of the heavy veil of the country, and adoption of a light veil. (This latter was voluntary.)
- II. To make marriage illegal for youths under 22, and for girls under 18 years of age. (This was received very unfavourably, and was subsequently withdrawn.)
- III. The introduction of monogamy, commencing with all Government officials.
- IV. The abolition of bribery.
- V. The despatch of Afghan women to Turkey for training in hospital and maternity nursing, and of girls for education.
- VI. The adoption of European dress in Kabul.



- VII. The period of compulsory military service to be raised from 2 years to 3, without exemptions.
- VIII. Mullas from India or other countries not to be permitted to enter Afghanistan. No Afghan mulla to be allowed to preach without a certificate.
- IX. A forced contribution of Rs. 5 (A.) from every Afghan male over 15 years of age, and one month's pay from every official in order to pay for 50,000 rifles and 50 million rounds of S. A. A. which the King desired to purchase in Europe.
- X. The formation of a military club for officers, one month's pay to be deducted to meet initial expenses.

It can readily be imagined that Reforms such as these, struck at the very root of national and religious customs, and alienated every branch of the population. Small wonder that in course of time reports were heard from the outlying districts that the King was mad. It was not long before opposition to these projected Reforms began to make itself felt.

Early in September 1928, Fazl Rahim and Gul Agha, two Hazrats of Shor Bazar, Kabul, who were considered throughout Afghanistan as the most influential religious leaders in the country, obtained signatures of 400 Afghan mullas to a manifesto declaring that the King's proposals for westernising Afghanistan were contrary to Islam and would not be obeyed. The two Hazrats started for Khost with the manifesto, with the intention of raising the country. On being apprised of their action however, Aman-ulla had them arrested and brought back to Kabul for trial.

So far, he had the situation in hand.

But reports from the Khyber and Kurram indicated increasing resentment towards these Reforms, especially those connected with Purdah, female education, and polygamy. Lawlessness, both in the Eastern Province (Jalalabad) and in Kandahar began to increase. The depredations of a well known highwayman, Bacha-i-Saqao, in Kohistan to the North of Kabul, necessitated the despatch of troops in order to deal with him. But the army, and state officials were affected, and failed to carry out their duties whole heartedly. Officials from Kabul got into touch with the tribes of the Eastern Province and promised support if they would rise against the King. At a Jirga held at Deh Sarak on the 11th November, it was decided that the Shinwaris would rebel and on the 12th November lashkars started collecting. It was soon noticeable that there appeared to be a desire to avoid bloodshed, wholesale looting, and destruction, and that the revolt was aimed at the regime, rather than at individuals. It was not spontaneous throughout the country, and spread slowly. The fact that it did, in time, cover practically the whole of Afghanistan, without any central organising figure-head or leader, shows how widespread was the resentment at the proposed Reforms, and the rebellion of 1928-29 may be directly attributed to them.

## II.—HISTORY OF THE REBELLION.

### (a) *The original outbreak in the Eastern Province.*

The rebellion was started on 14th November 1928, by a lashkar of about 300 Sangu Khel and Alisher Khel Shinwaris attacking and looting Pesh Bolak and Government buildings at Achin ; cutting the telephone and

telegraph lines between Dakka and Jalalabad, and holding up motor traffic between these two places. The British Legation lorry on its way to Kabul was stopped at Dakka by the Sarhaddar, and sent back to Peshawar. On the night 16th|17th November, Dakka was attacked without success, one Afghan gunner being killed. Sniping occurred again during the night 18th|19th. Small Afghan posts in the vicinity of the Dakka-Jalalabad road were disarmed, and the Afghan Government Treasury at Achin was looted of Rs. 60,000. The fort of Kahi was attacked and captured during night 19th|20th November. The garrison made a show of resistance, and then deserted. The Shinwari leaders at this period were Mohammed Alam, and Mohammed Afzal. Mohammed Alam had held the appointment of Civil Brigadier and was the chief instigator of Shinwari opposition to "Hasht Nafri" (compulsory recruitment of 1 in 8, introduced by King Amanulla). Mohammed Afzal was in command of the Jalalabad Division in 1926; and served during the 3rd Afghan War, and the Khost rebellion of 1924.

The Afghan Government appeared to take no active measures to crush the rebellion by force at the outset. 10 lorries carrying troops and munitions were sent to Dakka from Jalalabad on 18th November, and some bombs were dropped on Shinwari villagers by aeroplanes from Kabul, piloted by Russians. Subsequently

2 Battalions Infantry.

1 Squadron Cavalry.

12 Pack Guns.

6 Machine Guns.

12 Lewis Guns.

were sent to Jalalabad from Kabul.

On 26th November, Ghulam Sadiq, the Afghan Foreign Minister, and Sher Ahmad Khan, President of the Council of State, were sent to Jalalabad by King Amanulla, with full powers to deal with the situation.

The Shinwaris endeavoured to persuade the Mohmands to join them, but, restrained by the Chaknaur Mullah, the Mohmands showed no real inclination to do so. During the night 29th|30th November some lorries and Government buildings outside the city of Jalalabad were burnt. The King's Palace was completely destroyed.

The investment of Jalalabad by Shinwaris, assisted by Khugianis and a few Mohmands, then commenced. On the 1st December the garrison made a sortie under cover of artillery and machine gun fire, and drove the insurgents back to the hills South of Jalalabad. The investment was, however, continued. On the 9th December, an armistice was arranged between the two sides, pending negotiation of a settlement.

During the night 7th|8th December, Mohmands under the leadership of the Chaknaur Mullah occupied Dakka without fighting. There was no disturbance, and the Sarhaddar remained in the town.

In Kabul, the Afghan Government began to recruit tribal levies with energy. The reason for this step appeared to be that no reliance could be placed upon the troops.

The negotiations between the insurgents and the Afghan Government were unsuccessful. Ghulam Sadiq returned to Kabul, by air, taking with him the rebels' terms, which included :—

- I. Cancellation of the Reforms.
- II. Abolition of Hasht Nafri.
- III. Recall of Afghan girls sent to Europe for education in Afghanistan.
- IV. No interference with Mullahs.
- V. No retaliatory measures to be taken against the rebels.

These terms were never agreed to by the Afghan Government ; in fact it is doubtful if they were ever considered. The negotiations had one successful result, in that the Mohmands withdrew their support to the rebels. It is probable that they were heavily bribed to do so. During the truce, a party of Khugianis attacked and captured Nimla (on the Kabul Jalalabad road, 27 miles West of Jalalabad) and looted the camp of Yawar Mahmud Jan, a Foreign Office representative, who had been sent from Kabul to assist in the negotiations. Some 1,000 tribal reinforcements who were at Nimla on their way to Jalalabad from Kabul were disarmed and dispersed. This success heartened the insurgents, whose numbers increased considerably.

On the 20th December it was reported that Laghmanis had joined in the rising, and that considerable concentrations of rebels with standards had been seen at Darunta, 12 miles West of Jalalabad. Besud, a small town opposite Jalalabad, and on the North bank of the Kabul river was looted by insurgents during the night 21st|22nd December. The investment of Jalalabad continued, but the threatened attack on the town did not take place, because of the general desire, already noticed, to avoid bloodshed and rioting on a large scale. The rebels are reputed to have stated that their quarrel was with Afghan Government officials alone.

The investment of Jalalabad gradually slackened however, due probably to the appearance of Ali Ahmed Jan, a former Governor of Kabul who had been sent to the Eastern Province by Amanulla, with orders to take charge of the situation. His activities will be described under para. (e).

Meanwhile the revolt had spread to Kunar, and to Khost in the Southern Province. In Kunar, the regular Afghan garrisons of Sarkani and Chigha Serai deserted. Their example was followed later by the garrison of Asmar, the few remaining loyal members of which crossed over into Chitral. All government control vanished from the valley, resulting in the resumption of long standing feuds and the consequent outbreak of inter-family and inter-tribal fighting.

In Khost, Zadrans occupied three Afghan posts, the garrison of which handed over their arms without even a show of resistance. Afghan posts on the Peiwar were occupied by Jajis, and the regular garrison of Patan near Kharlachi, were called upon to surrender, but refused to do so.

The British Consulate in Jalalabad did not escape unscathed. It appears that the Consul, Khan Sahib Mohammed Jahangir Khan, was caught unawares in the Consulate at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of 29th November, by a mob of Shinwari tribesmen. When they told him that they had decided to loot the Consulate, he protested, saying that he and his staff were the guests of King Amanulla and of the Afghan State,

and he appealed to the tribesmen, some of whom he knew personally, to respect the sanctity of the Consulate. The leaders replied that Amanulla was an infidel and that his guests were entitled to no consideration. They then stripped the Consulate, and set fire to the buildings. All archives were destroyed in the fire. The Consul and his staff made their escape and eventually took refuge in the Fort of the Naqib Sahib of Baghdad where they were treated as guests till 9th March, on which date the Consul made his way back to Peshawar *via* the Kurram.

All British Indian subjects in Jalalabad, with the exception of one Veterinary Surgeon who preferred to remain had returned to India before the attack of the 29th November.

(b) *The Attack on Kabul by Bacha-i-Saqao resulting in the abdication of Amanulla.*

“ Bacha-i-Saqao ” (“ The son of a water carrier ”) is a Tajik of Kala Khan, a village situated near Khwaja Serai half way between Kabul and Charikar. At the time of the rebellion this modern “ Robin Hood ” was about 40 years of age. He began life as a servant to an Afghan official living in Kila Murad Beg, near his own home, and then served for one and a half years in the “ Qita Namuna ” regiment in Kabul, after which he deserted with his rifle. He worked for some time as a tea-seller in Peshawar City, after which he went to Parachinar, where he was sentenced to eleven months’ imprisonment for house breaking. He sided with the Mangals during the Khost rebellion of 1924 and shot a party of soldiers sent by the Afghan Government to arrest him. He then became a highwayman, showed considerable generosity to the poor, but was merciless to Afghan officials and wealthy travellers.

As an independent raider he caused considerable trouble in Kohistan during the three months prior to the outbreak in the Eastern Province. The Afghan Government, in spite of the employment of regular troops, were unable to bring him to heel before the rebellion started.

Such is the man who brought about the downfall of Amanulla. His attack on Kabul does not appear to have been carried through in co-operation with the rebels in the Eastern Province, but seems to have been due to his astuteness in taking advantage of the difficult situation with which the Afghan Government found itself confronted, owing to the Shinwari revolt and the defection of the army.

It appears that he captured Jabel-us-Siraj on or about the 10th December. The garrison, consisting of 900 men, surrendered to him, handing over the Fort, their arms and ammunition. This came as a surprise to the King and his Government who had under-estimated the strength of the brigand band.

The attack on Kabul began on December 14th, 1928, with a rush down the Bagh-i-Bala road, on which the British Legation is situated, by a large *lashkar* of insurgent tribesmen who had apparently seized the adjacent Bagh-i-Bala fort the same afternoon. The Afghan guard at the Legation fled in face of superior numbers. The Minister, however, closed the gates and spoke through them to the rebel leaders (including Bacha Saqao) warning them of the sanctity attaching to all Legations. The leaders thereupon announced that they had no intention of harming the Legation, their quarrel being with the Afghan Government alone.

The rebels captured the Koh-i-Lula forts with their stocks of rifles and ammunition, and established themselves on the Asmai heights, west and south-west of the Legation. Their advance appears to have been checked in the area between the Legation and the city. In consequence, the British Legation was cut off from the city and from other Legations, and became the recipient of shells and bullets directed at the rebel forces. Wireless communication between the Legation and India ceased on the morning of the 17th December and was not re-opened until 26th December.

On 18th December fierce fighting took place between Afghan Government troops and rebels under Bacha Saqao. Royal troops advanced up to the Eastern wall of the Legation grounds, rebel tribesmen being in position at a fortified village a few yards beyond the Western wall and in two forts 1,000 yards west of the Legation. The Legation was consequently under heavy fire all day, considerable damage being done to buildings inside the grounds. The Military Attaché's house was burnt and completely destroyed. The chief difficulty was to keep the combatants out of the grounds. Royal Troops were the offenders and it was only by means of remonstrances to the officers that the sanctity of the Legation was preserved.

Fighting continued in the vicinity of the Legation for three days, during which time the Legation buildings were hit by 62 shells and thousands of bullets, practically all the windows being broken. In addition to the destruction of the Military Attaché's house, the Counsellor's house was rendered uninhabitable, the stables were badly damaged, one horse being killed, and the water tank in the tower was perforated and had to be plugged under fire. There were many narrow escapes, but casualties within the Legation were confined to the Afghan watchmen, one of whom was killed and two wounded.

After heavy fighting on the 24th December, the rebels retired to the North-West during the night.

The vicinity of the Legation was thereafter no longer exposed to fire, and the road from the Legation to Kabul City was open to traffic again on 25th December, having been closed since the 14th.

On the 26th there was further fighting, as a result of which the rebels fell back to Jabul-us-Siraj, where they put the hydro-electric power station out of action by diverting the stream from the Salang river which supplies the power. Kabul was in darkness and all work in the arsenal and factories came to a stand-still. Bacha Saqao himself, reported wounded, retired to Paghman, the King's summer residence, where two forts containing ammunition had been occupied by the rebels.

Thereafter a lull occurred in the fighting. Bacha-i-Saqao established himself near Kila Murad Beg, 15 miles North of Kabul, where he defeated and drove back a body of regular troops marching towards Kabul from Kataghan.

In Kabul itself, large quantities of sandbags and ammunition were withdrawn from the forts in the neighbourhood and placed in the Palace. A force of 1,600 regular troops, with 8 pack guns and some treasure arrived in Kabul from Mazar-i-Sharif, marching *via* Bamian and the Unai Pass; while another force of approximately 1,500 men arrived from Kandahar. It was reported that the King had offered a reward for

the head of Bacha-i-Saqao, while extending a pardon to all other rebels of his gang except his immediate adherents ; also that he had closed the girls school in Kabul, and re-instituted Friday as the weekly holiday. The monthly pay of soldiers was raised from Rs. 5 with rations to Rs. 20. Rations were to be issued free while men were on service. Meanwhile the Afghan Press was skilfully used by the authorities in Kabul to minimize the dangers inherent in the rebellion.

On 29th December a detachment of reinforcements from the Kandahar area, commanded by Brigadier General Abdul Rahim arrived in Kabul, consisting of—

800 Infantry.

200 Gunners.

300 Cavalry and miscellaneous details.

8 Guns.

This was followed by another detachment of 300—400 regulars and ex-regulars from Ghazni on 31st December.

On January 3rd, 1929, Mahommed Wali Khan, the Regent, left Kabul at the head of some regular troops and joined battle with Bacha-i-Saqao on January 8th in the Koh-i-Daman Valley, 7 miles North-West of the British Legation.

The King's troops were defeated and lost heavily. At the end of the day Bacha-i-Saqao was at the foot of the Khairkana Pass which separates Kabul from Koh-i-Daman. In consequence, consternation reigned in Kabul city, where people commenced burying their valuables. Troops, estimated at 600 men were assembled for the defence of the Sherpur aerodrome.

Instead of pressing home his advantage, however, Bacha-i-Saqao appears to have split his force up into small parties for the purpose of raiding the villages in the vicinity of Kabul, tactics which proved to be very harassing to the other side.

On the 5th January it was stated that the King had made many important concessions, cancelling his recent orders regarding the wearing of European Dress, recalling girls sent to Turkey for education, closing girls schools, and making the wearing of the veil once more compulsory. Other concessions removed the restrictions he had imposed on the Mullahs.

These concessions appear to have been made too late, for fighting continued, and by 13th January the rebels had cleared the Koh-i-Daman valley of opposition. That evening, General Muhammad Umar Khan, commanding the royal forces, with his H. Q., 400 men, and some guns, was surrounded in a village, called Deh-i-Kipak, situated 2 miles north-west of the British Legation. He surrendered to the rebels during the night 13th|14th January. Next morning, the regular troops made no reply to the artillery fire of the rebels, and were seen to be retiring on Kabul.

By evening 14th, Bacha-i-Saqao was in possession of all points of importance except the Arg. He had taken the aerodrome and had entered the city.

As a result of the successes gained by Bacha-i-Saqao, King Amanulla abdicated in favour of his elder brother Inayatulla on 14th January 1929, and left for Kandahar, where he arrived on the evening of the 15th, by road.

Amanulla obviously realised the dangers inherent in the situation, for on 21st December 1928 he had despatched the Queen, with her seven children, the Queen Mother, and Ghulam Sadiq, the Foreign Minister by air to Kandahar.

Ghulam Sadiq returned to Kabul by air on 2nd January 1929, while the Queen Mother at once commenced an energetic campaign to rally the Duranis to the King's cause.

During the operations which preceded his abdication, Amanulla made full use of his Air Force. All machines were said to be piloted by Russians with Afghan observers. Bombs were dropped on many occasions, but the results could never be ascertained. Two D. H. 9As. are known to have crashed, while several others must have been rendered at least temporarily unserviceable.

While these operations were in progress, the situation was complicated, from the point of view of the Indian Government, by the escape from surveillance at Allahabad on 20th December 1928 of Mohammed Umar Khan, son of the late Ayub Khan, and nephew of the ex Amir Yakub Khan. On the night of the 6/7th January 1929, two other Afghan refugees escaped from Meerut. These were Muhammad Ali Khan, and Ahmed Qasim Khan, grandsons of the late Amir Dost Mohammed. Both were subsequently apprehended.

Mohammed Umar Khan was subsequently traced to a village named Shamand, 2½ miles South of Jalalabad. He succeeded in crossing the frontier through Mohmand territory, in spite of a large reward having been offered for his capture. He appears to have remained in Chapriar where he was located up to 18th February.

At the end of January, an offer was made by Shinwari leaders to surrender Mohammed Umar under certain conditions, which were not altogether acceptable. As his return to India was considered to be of political value, the Chief Commissioner, N. W. F. P. was instructed to arrange for this on the most satisfactory terms that could be made. Negotiations proceeded, and Mohammed Umar was on the point of starting for the Khyber, when he changed his mind, owing, it is believed, to last minute support and encouragement offered him by certain of the Shinwaris. It is understood that he subsequently went to Kabul, at the end of March 1929, with Mohammed Alam, one of the two leaders of the original Shinwari outbreak, but took little part in subsequent events.

(c) *Inayatulla's abdication, and the accession of Bacha-i-Saqao.*

King Amanulla's abdication in favour of his elder brother, Inayatulla, on 14th January, however, did not put a stop to the fighting, for Bacha-i-Saqao's troops pushed on, and by the evening of the 14th, the British Legation was again isolated.

During the night 14th-15th, much rifle fire was heard in the vicinity of the city. But this was more in the nature of a "feu-de-joie" than of street fighting. On the 15th, Bacha-i-Saqao commenced negotiations to bring about the surrender of the Arg, in order to avoid the bloodshed and looting that would have taken place had he been compelled to capture it by assault.

Many generals went over to Bacha-i-Saqao on this day, also the Afghan personnel of the Air Force. Orders were issued that the sanctity of all Legations was to be strictly observed.

On January 16th 15,000 men comprising Bacha-i-Saqao's forces were said to be in the City. Negotiations for effecting the surrender of the Arg continued. Bacha-i-Saqao was proclaimed King in Kabul, and later, huge crowds, including Amanulla's two brothers Hayatulla and Kabir Jan, made obeisance to him. A few cases of looting occurred, offenders being summarily shot. On the 17th January, Inayatulla abdicated under promise from Bacha-i-Saqao of a safe conduct to Kandahar. He and certain members of his family were evacuated to Peshawar by air, under arrangements made by the British Minister.

Bacha-i-Saqao then proclaimed himself King of Afghanistan under the title of Habibulla Ghazi.

The gates of the Arg were opened, and the garrison laid down their arms and marched out. The remainder of Amanulla's army had melted away.

The news of Habibulla Khan's accession to the throne caused a remarkable outburst of feeling in favour of the Afghan Royal Family (rather than for Amanulla), amongst the tribesmen on the British side of the border, and amongst Mahommedans in Northern India. On 19th January, at a meeting in Peshawar, Afridis and Mohmands agreed by acclamation to take up arms in support of the Afghan Royal Family, and on 20th January, messengers were sent to Orakzais, Wazirs and Mahsuds, bidding them attend a jirga at Dakka on 25th January to plan a campaign of restoration. Only a few Afridis, however, left to attend this Jirga.

Khilafatists of Lahore and Peshawar held meetings in support of Amanulla. The former proposed to send a deputation to Kabul *via* Kandahar, and the latter agreed to send a medical mission to Kandahar. Mohammedan classes in Northern India generally were disgusted at the accession of Habibulla and expressed a desire to see the restoration of the Royal Family, in the person of some orthodox member.

Habibulla then set about consolidating his position as king. He appointed the following ministers :—

Syed Hussain, Minister for War.

Sher Jan of Khwaja Serai, Prime Minister.

Ata-ul-Haq Khan, brother of Sher Jan, Foreign Minister.

Of the above, Syed Hussain was Habibulla's right hand man during operations prior to his accession.



To restore order in Kabul, Habibulla announced that 4,000 soldiers would be voluntarily enlisted at Rs. 20 (A.) per month, *plus* a ration of flour. The rest of his following were ordered to return to their homes after depositing their arms in the Arg.

This was a necessary step, as some looting had been taking place in Kabul. Advantage was taken of the absence of authority to hunt down old enemies, and a certain amount of panic ensued.

The German and French schools were stripped of their contents, and made over to the military, the intention being to close them permanently. The houses of several Afghan notables were searched, and much valuable property discovered and removed. Amongst those who suffered thus were Sher Ahmad Khan, late President of the Council (who was also soundly beaten) and Abdul Aziz, late War Minister.

Habibulla's position was by no means secure, as he was only supported by the Kohistan tribes, and the Kabul and Tagao mullas. Tribesmen of the Eastern Province, the Southern Province, and of Kandahar were definitely in opposition to him. The Ahmadzai Ghilzais and Tagao tribesmen were said to view his accession with disfavour.

Syed Hussain, the War Minister, sent out troops to cover the approaches to Kabul from the East. On the 24th January, and again on 29th some skirmishing took place at Band-i-Ghazi near the Southern entrance to the Khurd Kabul defile, between Habibulla's men, and Kharo Khel Ghilzais from the Eastern Province. The latter had the best of the encounter. At this time Ali Ahmed Jan was collecting a force at Jagdalak, but a heavy fall of snow made any attack on Kabul unlikely. To meet this threat, Habibulla was compelled to place some 2,000 or 3,000 men in the vicinity of Butkhak, facing the Western end of the Khurd Kabul defile.

On 26th January, Habibulla issued a proclamation in Kabul in which he said he had ascended the throne in order to re-establish the national religion. The proclamation announced the abolition of conscription, cancellation of arrears of taxes and of new impositions, and the closing of schools started by Amanulla.

There is no doubt that he took the opportunity to feather his own nest. When the Arg fell into his hands, he took over the Treasury which was said to contain many thousands of rupees in silver, though the gold and notes had been removed by Amanulla.

Many *Sardars* and notables of the ex-reigning dynasty, including Amanulla's two brothers, Hayatulla and Kabir Jan, and all *ex-Cabinet* Ministers were arrested (with the exception of the Minister for education who could not be found). Their houses were systematically searched, and all valuables removed. Considerable panic prevailed in Kabul in consequence.

During February and March 1929, the story of events in Kabul itself is one of consolidation, combined with preparation to meet the attacks which Habibulla knew would be made upon him, when weather conditions were favourable. His authority was limited to the Kabul district and to the area North of Kabul known as Kohistan. He exercised considerable oppression, probably through necessity. His popularity therefore waned,

and he experienced difficulty in recruiting soldiers. He held, however, the central position and controlled the major portion of the country's resources. It is believed that he realised his limitations, and that he would have been prepared to make way for an universally elected king, but the failure of Ali Ahmed Jan in the Eastern Province [see under (e)] and his disappearance as a rival, stiffened Habibulla, and strengthened his determination to fight for what he had got.

It should be recorded that Habibulla's relations with the British Legation (while it remained in Kabul) were friendly and correct. He placed no obstacles in the way of aerial operations intended for the evacuation of British and Foreign personnel, and it must be remembered to his credit that on two occasions, as many as seven large passenger carrying machines landed on the Sherpur aerodrome, embarked their human freight, and took off again, without any form of molestation.

(d) *R. A. F. Operations culminating in the evacuation of the British Legation.*

It has already been stated that wireless communication with the British Legation in Kabul ceased on the morning of the 17th December 1928.

In order to establish touch with the Legation, an aeroplane left Peshawar for Kabul on the morning of the 18th December. When nearing Kabul it was fired at, and struck by bullets in the radiator and oil sump. The pilot (F/O Trusk) landed safely on the Sherpur aerodrome, and remained with the Afghan Air Force until December 22nd, when he made his way to the British Legation with his observer, where he remained assisting the British Minister until the final evacuation of the Legation on February 25th. A second machine was despatched on the same day, and returned safely, having read a message "All's well, fly high" sent from the Legation by ground strips. A Popham Panel was dropped in the Legation grounds.

Reconnaissances were made by aeroplane on 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd December. In all cases the machines returned safely, though they were fired at from the Koh-i-Lula forts and from the Asmai heights. In all cases the same message was read from the Legation, "All's well, fly high; do not land. Come again to-morrow". It was significant that no movement was observed in the Legation grounds, and that signals had been laid out under cover of darkness, the reason being that heavy fighting was going on between the rebels and Government troops in the immediate vicinity of the Legation. One of the machines dropped an Aldis lamp on the Legation with which it was hoped to establish better communication. The Afghan wireless was still silent and the land line through Kandahar only worked intermittently. Even if these had been functioning, it was not possible for the Legation Staff to send messages down to the telegraph offices owing to their isolation due to rebel action. At this stage the problem of the evacuation of the ladies and children from the Legation, numbering twenty in all, was causing the gravest anxiety.

During the evening of the 22nd December two high Afghan officials visited the Legation and gave permission for aeroplanes to land at Sherpur and evacuate the ladies and children. On December 23rd one

Victoria machine, one Wapiti and three D. H. 9 As. flew to Kabul, landed on the Sherpur aerodrome, embarked 20 ladies and children, and left again for Peshawar, when they arrived at 12-30 hours. The ladies and children were sent to the Sherpur aerodrome under cover of darkness, as the road to it from the British Legation was still under fire from the rebels. Embarkation was carried out in 10 minutes.

On the 24th December, the Victoria, Wapiti, and eleven D. H. 9 As. again landed at Sherpur and evacuated to Peshawar 28 ladies and children from the French and German Legations.

On this day a light short wave wireless set was taken to Kabul and installed in the British Legation by Captain F. W. Nicholls, M.B.E., General Staff, Army Headquarters, India, and Sergeant J. Peters, Royal Corps of Signals.

By means of this set direct communication between India and the British Legation was re-opened on 26th December.

On the 26th December, another flight was made which successfully evacuated 23 women and children from Kabul to Peshawar.

Snow fell in Kabul during the night 26th|27th December necessitating postponement of the evacuation until the Sherpur aerodrome should be fit to land on.

On the 29th and 30th December the evacuation of women and children from Foreign Legations was continued.

On the 29th December, Major C. E. T. Erskine, C.I.E., D.S.O., M.C., 12th Frontier Force Regiment (Q. V. O. Corps of Guides), Military Attaché to the British Legation, and a new engine, with fitters for F/O Trusk's machine (which had been shot down and forced to land on the Sherpur aerodrome on 18th December), were taken to Kabul by air.

On 30th December 1928, the evacuation of ladies and children from British and Foreign Legations (except Russians) was continued and a further 23 were evacuated. A few still remained, who from various causes, were unable to take this chance of getting away.

On December 31st, 21 Russian women and children were evacuated to Termez in 4 Junker machines.

On January 1st, the remaining women and children were evacuated to Peshawar.

In the meanwhile the British Minister in Kabul, Sir Francis Humphrys, G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., C.B.E., had been negotiating with the Afghan Government for permission to convey the mails by air from Peshawar to Kabul, as the Dakka-Kabul road was still closed to traffic. This request was granted, and on the 9th January, one Victoria machine flew to Kabul with mails, and evacuated 6 Indians from the British Legation and 1 Persian on the return journey.

On the 17th January, as already stated King Inayatulla abdicated, under promise from Habibulla Khan of a safe conduct to Kandahar. At the request of both sides, the British Minister arranged for the evacuation by air to Peshawar of Inayatulla and certain members of his family. Two

Victoria machines flew to Sherpur aerodrome on the 18th January and removed Inayatulla, Abdul Aziz, the War Minister, Ahmed Ali Jan, formerly Minister, Berlin, and two of Queen Souriya's brothers, named Abdul Tawab and Abdul Wahab. On the 19th another flight brought away the remaining members of his family.

On January 29th, one Hinaidi and one Victoria machine left Risalpur for Kabul to continue the evacuation of surplus Legation personnel and British Indian subjects. The Hinaidi reached the Sherpur aerodrome, but was unable to take off again, on account of a mechanical defect. The necessary spares were sent up by air and the machine returned on 3rd February. The Victoria failed to reach Kabul, and was located on 1st February at Sarobi, near the junction of the Tezin and Kabul rivers, apparently undamaged. The two Pilots, F|L Chapman and F|O Davis, were reported to be at Barikao Rest House, 50 miles by road from Kabul, in the hands of villagers friendly to the British. Arrangements were at once made to rescue them.

It appears that they were well cared for, and treated as guests by Ali Ahmed Jan, who was at that time in charge of affairs in the Eastern Province. Under a safe conduct given by him, they were taken down to Jalalabad, where they were looked after by the British Consul, who was himself sheltering in the fort of the Naqib Sahib of Charbagh.

On Sunday, 10th February, 3 machines flew up with the intention of evacuating the two airmen from a picked landing ground at Sultanpur, 10 miles west of Jalalabad. Soon after the first machine landed (a Bristol Fighter) some 4,000 tribesmen made their appearance and surrounded it. Consequently it was considered inadvisable for the second machine to land, so the landing signal was withdrawn. The two machines still in the air flew low over the landing ground, to ascertain that no harm was being done to our airmen on the ground. They were not fired at, and eventually flew back to Peshawar.

The machine which landed sustained some damage to the tail skid owing to the roughness of the ground. The damage was repaired, in spite of interference by local tribal fighting, and the machine returned to Peshawar on 12th February, bringing one of the two stranded airmen (F|O Davis). F|L Chapman was brought away by air on 18th February without incident.

Evacuations were continued during February on days when flying conditions were good, 6 more Victoria machines having been flown from Iraq to Risalpur for the purpose. The majority of those evacuated were British Indian subjects. By the 20th February the evacuation from Kabul by air to Peshawar of all the French Colony was completed. In addition, all those British Indian, Turkish and Persian subjects who wished to leave had been flown out. Some of the German Colony were too slow in applying for accommodation when it was available, consequently when Sir Francis Humphrys received his instructions from the London Foreign Office to withdraw his Legation, there was no longer room for them, and they had to be left behind.

On the 25th February 1929, the withdrawal by air of the French, Italian and British Legations was effected.

Sir Francis Humphrys in paying a tribute to the smoothness and efficiency with which the R. A. F. carried out this difficult undertaking said :—

“ The R. A. F. have performed an historic achievement. They have conveyed 586 persons in 82 aeroplanes without a single mishap to passengers since 23rd December 1928, over mountainous country, in the depths of winter, at an average height of 10,000 feet. Conditions have always been difficult, and for the last two days almost insuperable on account of the heavy fall of snow ”.

The total by Nationalities of persons evacuated from Kabul is as under :—

|              |    |    |    |       |        |
|--------------|----|----|----|-------|--------|
| British      | .. | .. | .. | ..    | 23     |
| Indian       | .. | .. | .. | ..    | 342    |
| French       | .. | .. | .. | ..    | 23     |
| Italian      | .. | .. | .. | ..    | 19     |
| Turkish      | .. | .. | .. | ..    | 49     |
| Persian      | .. | .. | .. | ..    | 25     |
| Austrian     | .. | .. | .. | ..    | 1      |
| German       | .. | .. | .. | ..    | 57     |
| Syrian       | .. | .. | .. | ..    | 5      |
| American     | .. | .. | .. | ..    | 1      |
| Swiss        | .. | .. | .. | ..    | 1      |
| Roumanian    | .. | .. | .. | ..    | 1      |
| Afghans      | .. | .. | .. | ..    | 36     |
| Palestinians | .. | .. | .. | ..    | 3      |
|              |    |    |    |       | 586    |
|              |    |    |    | Total | .. 586 |

It is of interest to record that throughout the course of the R. A. F. operations, 107 flights were made to Kabul, covering a total distance of 33,930 miles, at an average maximum height of 10,000 feet. The daily total of persons evacuated is shewn below :—

*Daily totals of personnel evacuated.*

| Date.         |    | Daily Evacuations. | Totals. |
|---------------|----|--------------------|---------|
| December 23rd | .. | .. 20              | 20      |
| 24th          | .. | .. 28              | 48      |
| 26th          | .. | .. 23              | 71      |
| 29th          | .. | .. 31              | 102     |
| 30th          | .. | .. 23              | 125     |

| Date.        | Daily Evacuations. | Totals. |
|--------------|--------------------|---------|
| January 1st  | 6                  | 131     |
| 9th          | 7                  | 138     |
| 18th         | 14                 | 152     |
| 19th         | 14                 | 166     |
| 31st         | 8                  | 174     |
| February 1st | 21                 | 195     |
| 3rd          | 21                 | 216     |
| 4th          | 27                 | 243     |
| 5th          | 28                 | 271     |
| 6th          | 37                 | 308     |
| 11th         | 58                 | 366     |
| 13th         | 44                 | 410     |
| 14th         | 20                 | 430     |
| 15th         | 16                 | 446     |
| 17th         | 18                 | 464     |
| 18th         | 16                 | 480     |
| 19th         | 20                 | 500     |
| 20th         | 20                 | 520     |
| 24th         | 27                 | 547     |
| 25th         | 39                 | 586     |

(e) *Shahghassi Ali Ahmad Jan in the Eastern Province.*

When the negotiations carried out by Ghulam Sadiq and Sher Ahmad with the Shinwaris in the Eastern Province were known to have been fruitless, Amanulla despatched Ali Ahmad Jan with full powers to make a settlement. He arrived in Jalalabad on 6th December. He bribed the Mohmands to keep out of the rising, but failed to win over the Khugianis, and so isolate the Shinwaris. By 15th December the lashkar around Jalalabad had increased to 10,000 men, and heavy fire was exchanged between them and the garrison. He continued his efforts, however, and after many jirgas, succeeded in putting a stop to the investment of Jalalabad, and in pacifying the tribes. The gates of Jalalabad city were opened, and Ali Ahmed Jan entered the town accompanied by a few rebel maliks and followers, both Khugiani and Shinwari. He ordered lists of stores to be made out in the presence of these leaders, and guards were placed over them. Afghan regular soldiers were allowed to retain their arms, but all tribal levies were dismissed. It appears that a paper was signed by influential men of the Jalalabad area, such as the Naqib Sahib of Charbagh, the Chaknaur Mulla, and the Hadda Mulla, declaring Amanulla to be a "Kafir" and Ali Ahmed Jan to be King, and the ceremony of tying a pagri round the head of Ali Ahmad Jan was actually carried out. At the same time the tribes were suspicious of his intentions, and did not altogether trust him. At no time was it clear whether he was working to restore order on Amanulla's behalf, or whether he was scheming to obtain power for himself in the Eastern Province.

A significant indication that he was playing a double game is to be found in the fact that Haji Mohammed Akbar, the official in charge of

the Frontier Tribes Department of the Afghan Foreign Office, who had taken part in the negotiations between Ali Ahmed Jan and the Shinwaris, left Jalalabad for Peshawar, expressing his dissatisfaction with the manner in which Ali Ahmed Jan conducted the negotiations, and desiring to dissociate himself from any responsibility regarding his actions. He subsequently joined Amanulla at Kandahar.

On the 11th January, regular Afghan troops at Jagdalak were attacked by Jabbar Khel Ghilzais, assisted by Shinwaris and Khugianis. Fighting continued until 17th January when the Afghan forces were disarmed, but allowed to retire towards Kabul. On the 14th January, the day of Amanulla's abdication, the regular garrison of Jalalabad consisted of 400 Infantry and 50 Shahi Risala. All others had deserted. Laghman, Dakka, and Kahi had no regular garrisons at all.

The abdication of Amanulla had no noticeable effect in the Eastern Province, and there was no immediate movement towards Kabul, as might have been expected. The reason for this may perhaps be found in the inter-tribal dissensions which exist in the Province. An old Mohmand-Khugiani dispute over women had been settled, but even so, the Shinwaris nursed much resentment against the Mohmands because they had been "bought off" by Ali Ahmad Jan, and because they took everything possible in the way of loot with them, when they dispersed to their homes. Shinwaris and Afridis were not on good terms, and some fighting took place between the two. Tribal satisfaction at Amanulla's downfall was tempered with annoyance at the accession of Habibulla, the Tajik. Yet they were unable to formulate a common plan of action and it is probable that Ali Ahmad Jan gave no assistance to this end, as he himself was uncertain how to act. The Sarhaddar of Dakka, Abdul Ghafur, was dismissed by Ali Ahmed Jan and replaced by Ghund Mishar Mohammad Jan. The reason for his dismissal is not clear, for he had at least kept the town intact, and beaten off one attack by Shinwaris in the opening stages of the revolt. On the 23rd January, during the absence of Mohammed Jan, the Mohmands who were holding Dakka went off to Lalpura. Some looting therefore took place and all Government buildings were burnt. The garrison of Torkham also deserted on the same day. Shinwaris are believed to have been responsible for this.

Ali Ahmed Jan summoned representatives of all the tribes of the Eastern Province to a Jirga at Jalalabad on 25th January, but the summons was not obeyed. He had failed to unite the tribes behind him. This failure may be attributed, indirectly, to the abdication of the Royal Family. On Amanulla's departure, the treasury was closed to Ali Ahmed Jan, and he received no funds from either Kabul or Peshawar. The Shinwaris had always been suspicious of him, and in order to force them to either join him or to remain neutral, he attempted to collect a large number of Afridis and Mohmands at Jalalabad. With this force behind him, he thought he could compel the Shinwaris to come under his orders, but the Mohmands and Afridis would not give the necessary assistance without payment in cash, and this was not forthcoming. Further, the remnants of Afghan regular troops had been defeated and dispersed at Jagdalak by Ghilzais, and so nothing remained wherewith to coerce the Shinwaris.

The Shinwaris themselves piquetted the routes leading into Jalalabad, and so prevented Mohmands and Afridis from reaching it. A party of Afridis *en route* to Tirah from Jalalabad were captured and robbed.

Ali Ahmed Jan moved from Jalalabad to Jagdalak between the 20th and 23rd January.

From there he sent messages to Kohistan, Laghman, Logar, Kabul and the Southern Province, saying that the Eastern Province had accepted him as King.

He also ordered the Afghan Trade Agent at Peshawar to send all stores, lorries and treasure to him at Jagdalak, and to inform all Afghans in Peshawar that he was now King, and should be accepted as such. This order was forwarded in original to Kandahar by the Trade Agent.

In the mosques in Jalalabad, the "address" at prayers was read in the name of Ali Ahmed Jan. At this period Ali Ahmed Jan was supported by the following :—

The Naqib Sahib of Charbagh.

The Hazrat Sahib of Charbagh.

Baba Jan of Islampur.

Mohamed Alam (one of the leaders of the original Shinwari outbreak) and some Shinwaris.

The Sherzad section of Khugianis.

Jabbar Khel and Kharo Khel Ghilzais.

His force at Jagdalak consisted of some 2,000 men with 12 guns and 17 machine guns, and was composed of Mangals, Zadrans, Jajis, Ghilzais, Laghmanis, with a few Shinwaris and Khugianis. His position was one of considerable difficulty, for the Shinwaris as a whole distrusted him, and feared the restoration of Amanulla. Their support was half hearted, and as the majority of them were in Ali Ahmed Jan's rear, there was a possibility of his being cut off from Jalalabad should they definitely turn against him. At the end of January they were threatening to loot Jalalabad, but were persuaded to desist by the Naqib Sahib of Charbagh. They were still taking steps to prevent Mohmands and Afridis from joining Ali Ahmed Jan.

On 31st January, Ali Ahmed Jan was reported to have received a letter from Habibulla's War Minister in which the latter informed him that if he wished to co-operate with the present Amir, he should come to Kabul, where a suitable post would be given to him. If, on the other hand, he was trying to take the throne, Habibulla was ready to oppose him. The Maliks of the Eastern Province also received a letter from Syed Hussain advising them not to trust Ali Ahmed Jan, who was an enemy of Islam.

On the 1st February, maliks representing the following tribes and districts collected at Jagdalak :—

Shinwaris,

Khugianis,

Ghilzais,

Laghman,

Tezin,

Sarobi,

Surkhrud.



A jirga was held at which Ali Ahmed Jan was present. The Malik told him that until he had definite support from the tribes of the Southern Province, and from those of the North, they would not provide lashkars for him in his projected attack on Kabul.

At this time caravans commenced coming through from Jalalabad to Landi Kotal under badragga escort, for which heavy fees had to be paid.

During the first week of February the situation at Jagdalak appears to have been thus :—

Shahghassi Ali Ahmed Jan had about 400 men of the Karo Khel at Khak-i-Jabbar, 400 of the old regulars, including about 40 Ahmadzai Ghilzais, at Barikab and 1,500 men at Jagdalak. The latter force consisted of some of the old regular army, Jabbar Khel Ghilzais and Sherzad Khugianis. The force at Jagdalak was in a well organized and well ordered camp. The Shahghassi was waiting for the Shinwaris and Khugianis to join his force and swear allegiance to him as King. His intention then was to advance on Kabul.

The Shinwaris and Khugianis had been holding a Jirga at Tutu, and on the 7th and 8th February these tribes arrived in Jagdalak in large numbers.

At the beginning of February, Malik Mohd. Shah Khan, Khugiani, and a party of his men went to Kabul to see Habibulla. At an interview Habibulla is said to have given the Khugianis a sum of Rs. 4,000 (A.) and asked them if they would agree to hand over the Shahghassi dead or alive. The party agreed to do this, and left Kabul on their return journey. On the 7th February at Farman Beg this party met Malik Mohd. Jan, Khugiani, with some of his men. Mohd. Jan accused Mohd. Shah Khan of treachery towards the Shahghassi, and a fight followed in which both Maliks and some men of both parties were killed. The remainder of Mohd. Shah Khan's party went on to Jagdalak on the same day. On arrival there they spread a report amongst the tribes that the killing of the men at Farman Beg was due to the Shahghassi. This so enraged the Shinwaris that they decided to kill him. The latter heard of the plot and, with his two sons, fled to Sarobi on the 8th morning. When his flight became known, the Shinwaris immediately attacked and looted the camp. They disarmed his force and captured large quantities of arms and ammunition, thereafter returning towards Jalalabad.

On 9th February, about 4,000 Shinwaris, Khugianis, and Surkhrudis had collected round Jalalabad with the intention of looting the place. They were prevented from doing so by the Naqib Sahib of Charbagh. During the night 9th-10th February, however, looting was started by Shinwaris and Khugianis who had been living inside the town. On the following morning, tribesmen from the neighbourhood joined in, and looting was general until 13th February.

On the 10th February the magazine was blown up by a few loyal officers remaining in the town. The explosion was very violent and is reported to have caused 600 casualties. The town was completely gutted both by the force of the explosion and by subsequent looting, and is now a mass of ruins. During the looting fighting occurred between Khugianis and Surkhrudis over the division of the spoils.

From Sarobi, Ali Ahmed Jan went to Kats, in Laghman, where he was with Malik Sher Ali Khan up to the 14th February. From Kats he sent a message to the Naqib Sahib of Charbagh asking for his protection. The Naqib is said to have replied that, as Ali Ahmad Jan's presence in Charbagh would prejudice his (Naqib Sahib's) position with regard to the tribes, he would prefer not to do this, but that if the Shahghassi could find his way, sanctuary would not be refused him. The Shahghassi, however, went on to Islampur on the 15th instant and was with Baba Jan, son of the late Mir Saiyed Jan Badshah of Islampur, till the 18th February. From there he made his way down to British India, travelling through Mohmand country, and arrived in Peshawar on 28th February 1929. Here he met Nadir Khan on his arrival from France. The two attended prayers together in Peshawar City on Friday 1st March when Ali Ahmed Jan expressed pro-Amanulla sentiments.

He appealed to the Government of India for assistance, but this was refused as being contrary to the declared policy of strict neutrality, and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

He remained in Peshawar till 26th March when he left for Kandahar, travelling by train to Chaman. It was reported that he was arrested on April 8th, after his arrival in Kandahar, but released again on 11th, through the good offices of the Queen Mother.

(f) *Events in Kandahar to 31st March 1929.*

Some time elapsed before news of the revolt in the Eastern Province filtered through to Kandahar. All the same, a state of tension was noticeable, due probably to exaggerated reports of Amanulla's projected reforms. Up to the middle of December the rebellion had not spread to the Kandahar area, but orders had been received for the re-enlistment of *ex*-soldiers who had served in the Khost rebellion of 1924, which caused some discontent. A shortage of petrol began to make itself felt, and in consequence many Indian lorry drivers returned to Chaman from Kandahar. But apart from this, things remained quiet, which may be attributed to lack of authentic information, and to skilful handling by the Governor.

On December 21st the Queen with her children, the Queen mother (*Ulya Hazrat*) and Ghulam Sadiq, the Foreign Minister arrived in Kandahar by air. It was said that the Foreign Minister brought a large quantity of gold with him. The Queen Mother at once busied herself delivering speeches, demanding service from time-expired soldiers, and rallying the Duranis to Amanulla's cause. She met with no marked response, and there was a distinct lack of enthusiasm on part of the local population to fight the insurgents. The impressment of transport for the movement of troops commenced, and was vigorously carried out. On the 22nd December the Kabul-Kandahar telegraph line was cut in the vicinity of Ghazni; it was repaired again on 27th, but thereafter worked only intermittently.

On 2nd January, Ghulam Sadiq returned to Kabul by air. The Queen Mother continued her efforts on Amanulla's behalf, and was most insistent on asserting that every thing he had done, had been in accordance with the "*Shariat*" (Islamic code of laws).

But her efforts did not meet with much success; the religious leaders withheld their assistance, and one of the leading *mullas*, Mohammed Umar Jan, definitely refused to intercede on Amanulla's behalf.

Although news of the situation in Kabul and in the Eastern Province had now reached Kandahar, its seriousness had been minimised to a large extent by official propaganda circulated through the medium of the Press, and posters displayed in Kandahar. Yet the Kandahar public was considerably agitated, for in the intensive recruitment of men, the haste with which troops were collected and despatched to Kabul, the impressment of animals for transportation purposes, and the utterances of the Queen Mother, the public saw a direct negation of the Government statements that Kabul was normal, and that the rebels in the Eastern Province had been subdued.

One Battalion of infantry left Kandahar for Kabul on 28th December, and during the first week of January 1929, approximately 1,000 men arrived in Kandahar from Herat.

Posters were exhibited in Kandahar on the 3rd January proclaiming the capture and killing of Bacha-i-Saqao and his lieutenant. Other posters displayed the news that peace had been declared in Kabul. This was hailed with delight by the troops. The Kandahar public, however, preferred to believe the news brought by travellers, that Bacha-i-Saqao was still fighting to the North of Kila Murad Beg. Another display of posters on January 9th indicated the complete abandonment of his reforms by the King.

On the 15th January, Amanulla, having abdicated the throne in favour of his elder brother Inayatulla, arrived in Kandahar by road. He was accompanied by Mahmud Tarzi, father of the *ex*-Queen, Ghulam Sadiq, Foreign Minister, Mohamed Yakub, Minister of Court, Abdul Ahad, formerly Governor of Jalalabad and A.-D.-C. to the *ex*-King. Of the nine motor cars with which he is said to have left Kabul, only two got through to Kandahar, the remainder being held up by snow. The Royal Standard was flown over the citadel on his arrival, but on the afternoon of the 16th January he ordered the Governor to haul it down, as he was no longer King.

At a Durbar held on January 16th Amanulla informed the gathering that he had left his brother Inayatulla as King in Kabul, in order to put an end to civil war. He appealed to all Kandaharis to help him, and reminded them that he had cancelled all his Reform schemes.

Troops that were marching towards Ghazni from Kandahar, were ordered to return forthwith. Some 2,000 of these arrived back in Kandahar on January 22nd.

Amanulla's appeals for help met with little response at first. Some accounts of the extent and success of the revolt were arriving, and there is no doubt that he was disliked and to some extent despised, both on account of his projected reforms, and because of his flight from Kabul. The news of Inayatulla's abdication and Habibulla's accession however, brought about a revulsion of feeling in his favour.

At a Durbar held on 17th January, animosity towards Amanulla was much in evidence and he appears to have been in some danger. It was reported that he had made secret preparations for flight, and was on the point of doing so when the Kandaharis informed him that it was now their desire to help him, as no King, other than one from the Barakzai clan could be permitted to reign in Afghanistan. In consequence, the Royal Standard was hoisted again.

Leading clerics, including Sahibzada Mahommed Umar Jan now came forward and said that they would help him, as he had seen the error of his ways, and had promised to rule in future, in accordance with the laws

of Islam. Many mullas, however, still doubted his sincerity, and assistance was only forthcoming from the Barakzais, Amanulla's own clan.

Inayatulla and party arrived in Kandahar on 22nd January 1929, and met with a poor reception. Inayatulla appears to have taken but a small part in Amanulla's efforts to regain his throne. On the 25th January, Amanulla rescinded his abdication, and publicly resumed the title of King of Afghanistan. A few days later, he assembled a Darbar in order to test the feelings of the local population. The Mullas stated that if Habibulla were fighting for the throne, they would pronounce him a rebel, but that they would not do so if he were fighting for Islam. There is no doubt that Amanulla, in his desire to modernise his country, had deeply wounded the religious susceptibilities of his people. He was distrusted, and he could raise but little enthusiasm for his cause.

Amanulla's difficulties were increasing. Some troops returning from Ghazni were attacked in the vicinity of Mashaki (30 miles South-West of Ghazni) by the Andar section of the Ghilzais. They fought their way through to Mukur, and eventually succeeded in making their escape, assisted by reinforcements sent out from Kandahar in motor lorries. Grain and foodstuffs began to run short. The response made to the appeals to enlist was not good, in spite of reproaches, exhortations, and even threats to call in the aid of a Foreign Power, on part of Ghulam Sadiq. The troops were disheartened, showing no inclination to fight, and desertions were frequent. A revival of the old Ghilzai-Durani dispute was feared.

Sahibzada Mohammed Umar Jan was sent to Kalat-i-Ghilzai in order to negotiate with the Ghilzais, but he returned unsuccessful. They are reported to have said that they were fighting with the sole object of expelling the "Kafir" Amanulla from Afghanistan.

Amanulla proclaimed Kandahar to be his capital for the time being, and appointed the following Ministers :—

|                    |    |                  |
|--------------------|----|------------------|
| Foreign Affairs .. | .. | Ghulam Sadiq.    |
| War ..             | .. | Abdul Aziz Khan. |
| Court ..           | .. | Mohammed Yakub.  |
| Interior ..        | .. | Abdul Ahad.      |

These appointments, except perhaps that for Foreign Affairs, can have had no real significance, for when Amanulla commenced his advance on Kabul, his troops were led by the Minister of Interior, while his War Minister remained behind as Civil and Military Governor of Kandahar. Ghulam Sadiq left Kandahar for Herat on or about 14th February. After a short stay there he went on to Moscow. It is believed that he was coldly received by the Soviet Authorities, who had as yet evinced no intention of taking sides in the struggle between Amanulla and Habibulla.

On 16th February, Mahmud Beg Tarzi, and Nur-us-Siraj, Amanulla's sister, left for Herat by air. (Nur-us-Siraj returned later to Kandahar, *via* Meshed and Duzdap). The machines carrying this party returned to Kandahar on 17th and left again on 18th conveying more members of Amanulla's family. The fact that all motor vehicles in Kandahar were being commandeered, created an impression that Amanulla himself intended flight.

This impression was close to the mark, because on Friday, the 22nd February, Amanulla delivered a speech in the Khirqa Sharif Mosque in

Kandahar in which he said that he was leaving Kandahar to obtain from Herat the help which the Kandaharis had withheld ; that Bacha-i-Saqao was gaining strength every day and was ruining Kabul. The Kandaharis seeing Amanulla weeping protested that they would not let him go, that they would stand firmly by him, and see him back on the throne of Afghanistan.

Amanulla thereupon postponed his departure and appointed the 24th February as a day on which fresh vows of mutual support, sworn on the Quran of Khirqa Sharif, would be taken in the Idgah Mosque.

The reason for this " volte face " appears to have been the fear of the Kandaharis that, if Amanulla did depart, their city would be laid open to pillage.

Accordingly on the 24th February the Sacred Cloak and the Quran were taken to the Idgah Mosque. Cows and sheep were also taken for sacrifice. Amanulla took an oath promising to observe the laws of the *Shariat*. After this the *Mullas* and others took oaths and promised that they would raise forces for Amanulla. A *Fatwa* was passed to the effect that as Amanulla had promised to obey the laws of the *Shariat* anyone opposing him would be liable to be stigmatised as a rebel and would be worthy of death.

These religious pledges failed to evoke enthusiasm for Amanulla's cause. There was no marked increase in the number of men presenting themselves for enlistment. But Amanulla affected to be encouraged by the outward change, and announced his intention of marching on Kabul as soon as possible. At this time it was estimated that he had only some 4,000 troops available. His real strength, of course, lay in the irregular tribesmen, but they appeared to be halfhearted, and the Duranis did not rally round him as a tribe, while the Ghilzais, as has been shewn above were hostile to him.

Amanulla set his troops in motion during the last few days of March 1929, and he himself left Kandahar on 30th March. He arrived at Kalat-i-Ghilzai on the 4th April. It was reported that he had given the principal commands to officers from Jalalabad, who fled before that town was sacked, and who travelled through India to join him. *Ghund Mishar* Abdul Karim became Commander-in-Chief and *Ghund Mishar* Mahommed Yunus Khan received command of the artillery.

The result of his efforts to recapture Kabul will be described under paragraph (j).

(g) *The arrival of Nadir Khan and his brothers, and their subsequent activities.*

Nadir Khan has taken an important part in Afghan affairs during recent years. He belongs to the Muhammadzai section of the Duranis and is related to Amanulla through his sister, second wife of the late *Amir* Habibulla. During the 3rd Afghan War (1919) he was in command of the troops in Khost, and invaded the Kurram, surrounding Thal. After the war of 1919, Amanulla appointed him Commander-in-Chief and War Minister. He is said to have much influence with the Mangals, Khostwals, and North West Frontier tribes. He was appointed Afghan Minister in Paris in January 1924, but fell ill early in 1926 and had to resign his appointment. He proceeded to Grasse where he was joined by his brothers

Shah Wali and Hashim Khan. They remained there till February 1929. After his accession, Habibulla sent messengers from Kabul to persuade Nadir Khan to return to Afghanistan, but the three brothers had started before the messengers arrived. Amanulla also sent messengers to him, urging the duty of returning to his country.

Another brother of Nadir Khan, Shah Mahmud, had remained in Afghanistan, and was Governor of the Eastern Province in 1926-27. On the 8th February 1929 Nadir Khan and his two brothers, Shah Wali and Hashim Khan, left Marseilles. They landed at Bombay on Friday 22nd February where a considerable number of interested persons assembled to meet them. Nadir Khan's attitude was guarded and studiously correct. He stated that it was only the call of duty that had brought him back to Afghanistan, and that his sole desire was to restore order in his country. Together with his brothers he left for Peshawar on Saturday 23rd. They stayed quietly in a bungalow which had been lent to them, making non-committal replies to the many deputations which visited them.

Amanulla expressed great anxiety that Nadir Khan should go direct to Kandahar. Habibulla also desired him to come to Kabul. There can be little doubt that Nadir Khan was uncertain how to act. His position was one of some difficulty, as he had no resources at his disposal. He remained in Peshawar till 6th March when he left for Khost accompanied by Shah Wali. Hashim Khan left Peshawar on the same day for Dakka and the Eastern Province.

Nadir Khan and Shah Wali reached Alizai from Peshawar on the evening of March 6th, and spent the night at Inzari, on the right bank of the Kurram. The next day they visited Parachinar, and that night were joined by Shah Mahmud, who came from Hariob. The three brothers spent the night at Parachinar, but separated the next morning (March 8th), Nadir Khan and Shah Wali proceeding *via* Alizai to Khost, and Shah Mahmud *via* Peiwar to Hariob.

Nadir Khan was met on the Khost-Kurram border by a number of *Maliks*, including the Mangals, Zalmai and Sanak. The night was spent at Arun Khel, and the next day (the 9th) the party arrived at Matun, where a salute of guns was fired. They remained in Matun until the 28th March, holding *jirgas*, and sounding the temper of the tribesmen. In spite of his popularity, and of the good reception given to him on his arrival, it soon became apparent that Nadir Khan was not making much headway. He made no declaration of policy. It was rumoured that he was an emissary of the British, and the Zadrans in particular appeared to be suspicious of his intentions. He found himself confronted with local domestic troubles, and was compelled to acquiesce in a wide spoken desire on part of the Khostwals, for the expulsion of all Wazirs from their midst. In fact he had to intervene, and put a stop to fighting which broke out between Alisher Khostwals and Wazirs, in an endeavour made by the former to recover lands from the Wazirs which had been given to them by the late Amir Habibulla. On the 28th March, the brothers continued their journey. Nadir Khan intended to go to Gardez, by the Southerly or direct route, where he was to be joined by Shah Wali who travelled through Mangal territory, while Shah Mahmud toured in Hariob and Chakmanni. The object of this tour has never been clear. No apparent attempt was made to raise a fighting force, and Nadir Khan made no declaration of policy, or of his intentions. His journey to Gardez was soon

interrupted, by domestic quarrels again. He was accompanied by *Mir* Ghaus-ud-Din, Ahmadzai Ghilzai, and an escort of Biba Khel Zadrans. The party were met on the road by Dara Khel Zadrans who refused to allow Nadir Khan to proceed until rifles had been distributed to them. Some firing occurred between the two sections, but the dispute was eventually settled by Ghaus-ud-Din, who promised to issue rifles on arrival at Gardez.

This interruption had the effect of turning Nadir Khan Southwards, however, and he went to Urgun where he arrived on April 4th. From Urgun he went Northwards and reached Gardez on April 12th, joining hands with Shah Wali two days later at Bala Deh, Ghaus-ud-Din's village, eight miles East of Gardez.

Shah Wali, whose progress was also impeded by local demands for rifles reached Bala Deh on 4th April. Gardez was surrounded by Ahmadzai Ghilzais, with the object of preventing the approach of a Mangal *lashkar* assembled by Shah Wali, and located in Koshin, 20 miles to the East.

Shah Mahmud was in Hariob until 7th April when he left for the Logar Valley taking with him 1,000 Jajis.

While Nadir Khan with two of his brothers was touring in the Southern Province, Hashim Khan was endeavouring to restore order in the Eastern Province. He went slowly to Hada, the Shinwari stronghold south of Jalalabad, where he assembled a *jirga* of representatives of all tribes of the Eastern Province on 17th March. He succeeded in settling inter-tribal differences, and in persuading the *jirga* to accept him as their spokesman in any discussions regarding the future of the country. The *jirga* agreed to observe a six months truce as regards inter-tribal affairs; certain mullas were appointed to take charge of the tribes, to deal with possible trouble, and to punish offenders. Arrangements were also made for the protection of caravans using the road between Torkham and Jagdalak.

Apart from the above, and the settlement of some local disputes of minor importance, Hashim Khan does not appear to have achieved very much.

By the 20th April, however, Nadir Khan was beginning to show his hand. He held a *jirga* at Spin Kila (8 miles North of Gardez) on 22nd April, which was attended by headmen representing every tribe in the Southern Province. Before any promise of help was given, it is said that Nadir Khan had to take an oath that he was not working on Amanulla's behalf. Nadir Khan then sent orders to Gardez for rifles to be issued to the Ahmedzai Ghilzais, Mangals and Zadrans, whose *lashkars* started concentrating at Spin Kila. On the 23rd April, Nadir Khan moved to Altimur, and the following day he went to Cherkh where he was joined by a tribal *lashkar* approximately 5,000 strong, and by one Infantry Battalion with some pack and machine guns from Gardez. On the 25th April he moved to Shamazar.

Meanwhile Shah Mahmud with some 3,000 Jajis had been located at Kushi on the 20th April. On the 26th April he advanced to Zarghun Shahr.

Nadir Khan had thus penetrated into the Logar Valley in some strength, and constituted a distinct threat to Kabul. Habibulla had posted troops in the Logar Valley in order to meet this threat. During

the last few days of April it was estimated that he had 1,000 men at Mohammed Agha, facing Shah Mahmud, and 2,400 at Pathkai Roghanai facing Nadir Khan. It is probable that his forces were in reality much larger.

On the 28th April Habibulla's men encountered Nadir Khan's force in the vicinity of Shamazar and defeated it. It is said that the Ahmedzai Ghilzais failed to give Nadir Khan wholehearted support, and that they even attacked Shah Mahmud in rear when he was engaged with Habibulla on the following day. Whatever the cause of the defeat may be, Nadir Khan and Shah Mahmud both withdrew from the Logar Valley, and their lashkars dispersed. Nadir Khan retired to Sheshnak, some 25 miles North East of Gardez, and Shah Mahmud returned to Hariob.

The reputation of Ghaus-ud-Din was not enhanced by this affair. It is said that he was bribed by Habibulla to withhold support from Nadir, that he accepted the bribe, and that he retained the lion's share for himself. As a result, friction ensued between him and his Ahmedzai following.

After driving Nadir Khan from the Logar Valley, Habibulla occupied Cherkh, but made no attempt to capture Gardez, where Shah Wali remained, having been appointed Governor of the Province by Nadir Khan.

Nadir Khan remained at Sheshnak for some time. He endeavoured at first to raise a fresh lashkar. The tribesmen promised to re-assemble after the Id (20th May) but they failed to put in an appearance, and excused themselves on the grounds of having to sow their crops.

Hashim Khan continued to spend his time in the Eastern Province, and appeared to be losing ground, in that the inter-tribal truce which he had arranged was shortlived. Lawlessness began to increase in the Province. Disputes arose between Khugianis and Surkhrudis, and amongst the Mohmands themselves, over the question of the Khanship of Lalpura, and between Mohmands and Shinwaris over the collection of tolls from caravans at Torkham, and the payment of "escort" fees. The Province as a whole remained aloof from the contest for the throne.

Indeed, it appeared to be immaterial to the tribesmen who ruled. Amanulla had gone, and the disappearance of any form of settled government provided an opportunity for self enrichment which was too good to be missed.

At about this time a factor which tended to complicate the situation, was the reappearance in Afghanistan of Sher Agha, Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazaar. Sher Agha is a brother of Gul Agha, who was the first to rise against Amanulla's projected reforms (see para. I) and was expelled from Afghanistan in 1924 for preaching against the King. When the rebellion started he was in Gondal, Kathiawar, having been removed from the N.-W. F. P., early in 1928 at the request of the Afghan authorities, on the grounds that he was intriguing against their Government. Towards the end of March 1922 Sher Agha (also known as Fazal-i-Umar) applied for permission to return. On this being granted, he made his way to Dera Ismail Khan, and travelled through the Gomal to Suleiman Khel (Ghilzai) territory, where he at once commenced spreading anti-Amanulla propaganda, and it is probable that he influenced the Suleiman Khel to assist Habibulla.



After Amanulla's departure some doubt arose as to the course which he would next pursue. He was reported to have been in communication both with Nadir Khan, and with Hamidulla (Habibulla's brother) at Ghazni. He made his way slowly towards Gardez, and eventually declared his intention of supporting Nadir Khan.

The next step was taken by Habibulla, who sent representatives to Nadir Khan, definitely requesting him to stop fighting, and offering him in return, either a high post in Kabul, or else a pension, should he consider the former proposal to be unacceptable, provided that he withdrew from Afghan limits. Both proposals were rejected. Nadir Khan and Sher Agha then met in Jirga near Sheshnak, where many representatives from the tribes of the Southern Province had assembled.

The jirga agreed to send messengers to Habibulla asking him to evacuate Kabul, and in event of non-compliance, to attack Kabul with a lashkar raised in the Southern Province. The despatch of the delegation was forestalled, however, by the appearance of one of Habibulla's Commanders, Muhammad Sadiq, with a force of about 3,000 men from Logar.

Muhammad Sadiq arrived at Spin Kila, 6 miles North East of Gardez, on the morning of 13th June 1929, and sent a message to Mir Ghaus-ud-Din, leader of the Ahmedzai Ghilzais, asking him to accept Habibulla as ruler on behalf of the tribe. In the event of refusal he threatened to attack. Ghaus-ud-Din replied by collecting all available supporters and attacking Muhammad Sadiq, and driving him into the hills West and South West of Gardez. Muhammad Sadiq, himself wounded, escaped in the direction of Ghazni leaving prisoners and guns in the hands of Ghaus-ud-Din, and losing some 300 men killed and wounded.

Hashim Khan then reappeared in the Eastern Province with a lashkar of 2,000 Khugianis and 1,000 Surkhrudis, with which he moved to Jagdalak. He appeared to be awaiting instructions from Nadir Khan to co-operate with him in an advance on Kabul, but Nadir made no move, and was slow to take advantage of the situation created by the defeat of Muhammad Sadiq. After a short stay at Jagdalak, Hashim Khan withdrew to Kaga, near Jalalabad, with his Khugianis, and the Surkhrudi portion of his lashkar dispersed to their homes. The reason for his withdrawal is probably to be found in the fact that Nadir Khan suffered a reverse at the hands of Muhammad Umar Khan, Commanding Habibulla's forces in the Logar Valley. After the defeat of Muhammad Sadiq, Nadir Khan's men commanded by Janbaz Khan, remained in possession of the Altimur Pass. In spite of this, Muhammad Umar Khan decided to make another attempt to capture Gardez. He sent a lashkar of 1,500 men *via* Khaoro and Khwaja Angur to Dara-i-Drang, some 6 miles West by South of Gardez, thus avoiding Janbaz Khan on the Altimur Pass. This lashkar was joined at Dara-i-Drang by Muhammad Sadiq (recovered from his wound) with a lashkar of Suleiman Khel and Sohak Ghilzais, and Dara Khel Zadrans. After heavy fighting the combined forces defeated Nadir Khan's lashkar of Ahmedzai Ghilzais and Mangals, and captured Gardez on 26th June. The defenders dispersed, many of them arriving in Parachinar as refugees. Nadir Khan, Shah Wali, Shah Mahmud and Sher Agha all withdrew to Hariob. Muhammad Sadiq remained in command of Gardez on Habibulla's behalf.

(h) *Events in Herat.*

News of the rebellion in the Eastern Province does not appear to have reached Herat till the end of December. When it did, steps were at once taken for the suppression of rumours, and troops both from Herat and the Chakansur area, were collected and despatched towards Kandahar. This caused some surprise, as the reason for the move was not understood. Early in January a disturbance broke out in Farah, caused by Nurzais, who murdered the Deputy Governor, looted the bazaar, and then made off. Order was restored by troops arriving from Chakansur.

Herat remained quiet until about the middle of March 1929, when the Governor, Muhammad Ibrahim, and the G. O. C., troops, Abdur Rahman, were both murdered. This double murder arose through a refusal on part of the troops still remaining in Herat, to march to Amanulla's assistance. The town of Herat was thrown into a panic, but order was quickly restored by Muhammad Ghaus, the Deputy Military Governor, who seems to have acted with energy and determination. He took upon himself the double duty of Civil and Military Governor, and proceeded to compel the *mullas* to acknowledge Amanulla as King. They acquiesced, but only half-heartedly, and there was considerable doubt concerning the loyalty of the population as a whole. As a result of the disturbance, all British subjects, with the exception of three medical men, were ordered to leave the town within 24 hours. This order was complied with, the majority of those concerned arriving in Meshed. Several had to leave all their belongings behind. The reason for the removal of British subjects may be ascribed to the many stories in circulation (said to emanate from Russian sources) to the effect that the British were responsible for the rebellion, and to the anti-British feeling engendered in consequence.

On 17th February, Mahmud Beg Tarzi, and Amanulla's sister Nur-us-Siraj, with some other members of the family, arrived in Herat by air. On March 8th, Mahmud Beg Tarzi left Herat and went to Meshed by air, arriving on the same day. From Meshed he flew to Tehran on 10th March. He endeavoured to persuade the pilot of the Junker machine in which he had travelled, to return to Herat to bring away the ladies, but the pilot refused owing to the unsettled conditions prevailing in Herat.

During April, Nur-us-Siraj decided to return to Kandahar, travelling *via* Meshed and Duzdap, as the direct route was considered dangerous. The necessary permission to travel through India was granted.

Shuja-ud-Dowlah, formerly Afghan Minister in London, arrived in Herat at the end of March having travelled through Moscow. He was closely followed by Ghulam Jilani Khan, the Afghan Minister from Angora, who joined Amanulla at Kandahar.

Shuja-ud-Dowlah took over the Governorship of the Province from Muhammad Ghaus, who departed soon after with a force of some 3,000 men, most of whom were hastily enlisted recruits, to march to the assistance of Amanulla at Kabul, *via* Mazar-i-Sharif, and the passes over the Hindu Kush from the North (a distance of 670 miles).

At the time of his departure there were reports of the approach towards Herat from Mazar-i-Sharif, of a force of Habibulla's men under Abdur Rahim.

These reports proved to be true, for Muhammad Ghaus had not gone far on his way to Mazar-i-Sharif when he encountered Abdur Rahim. Muhammad Ghaus' men refused to fight, the majority of them deserting to Abdur Rahim, Muhammad Ghaus himself took refuge in flight, and arrived at Panjdeh with a few followers, when he was reported to be trying to reorganise a force on Soviet territory with which to recapture Herat. He eventually joined Ghulam Nabi in Mazar (see para. i.) Abdur Rahim entered Herat without opposition on 4th May. He seems to have been in touch with certain emissaries sent out by the Mulla element in Herat, who invited him to come in and take over charge. Shuja-ud-Dowlah took refuge in mosque, but was allowed to go to Meshed from where he went to Askhabad, *en route*, it is believed, for Moscow.

Just prior to the entry of Abdur Rahim, some anti-Shiah disturbances took place in Herat, in which Haji Mukhtar, custodian of the Imam Reza shrine in Meshed, was killed. Abdur Rahim took steps to restore order. He was at once appointed Civil and Military Governor of Herat by Habibulla.

(i) *Events North of the Hindu Kush.*

The rebellion spread to the North of the Hindu Kush in due course. It was reported that the Khanabad area revolted on 20th December 1928 and that the town had been occupied by rebels. It appears that Martial Law was at once proclaimed in the Termez area, and reports of troop movements in the Central Asian Military District indicated that the Soviet authorities were taking steps to strengthen their frontier posts as a precautionary measure.

Soon after his accession to the throne in Kabul, Habibulla despatched one Mirza Muhammad Qasim, an influential man from Afghan Turkestan who happened to be in Kabul, to the Mazar-i-Sharif area in order to spread propaganda in his favour. The extension of the rebellion to Mazar-i-Sharif and Tashkurghan enabled Mirza Muhammad Qasim to enter the town in the name of Habibulla.

Abdul Aziz, the Governor appointed by Amanulla was taken prisoner and sent under escort to Kabul. Mirza Qasim then sent a small force towards Maimana and Andkhui demanding allegiance to Habibulla from those areas.

Owing to the length of time elapsing in the receipt of reports from this area, it is difficult to follow the exact course of events, but apparently during April, Ghulam Nabi, the Afghan Ambassador to Moscow appointed by Amanulla, crossed the Oxus at Khamiab with a force of 1,000 men, and recaptured Mazar-i-Sharif, eluding a force sent out by Mirza Muhammad Qasim to intercept him. Information from various sources proves that Ghulam Nabi's force was composed of Afghan subjects living in Soviet territory, and that they were supplied with arms and war material by the Soviet. If the Soviet Government did not directly assist Ghulam Nabi, it at least connived at such assistance being given him. At this time Ghulam Sadiq, Amanulla's former Foreign Minister, was in Moscow, and there can be little doubt that his influence was brought to bear on the Soviet Government.

It was not long before Habibulla in Kabul heard of this, and an issue of the "Habib-ul-Islam" (published in Kabul) contained a statement to the effect that Dehdadi, the cantonment just South of Mazar-i-Sharif, and

Khanabad had been bombed by Russian aeroplanes; that Russian soldiers were assisting Ghulam Nabi, and that the Soviet Government were assisting him with arms and ammunition. It was reported that Habibulla's Foreign Minister taxed the Soviet Charge d'Affaires with this, and demanded an explanation. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires categorically denied the accusation, and appears to have succeeded in laying the fears and suspicions of the Foreign Minister, because a contradiction appeared in a subsequent issue of the "Habib-ul-Islam". Further the Soviet Minister countered by laying a charge against the Kabul Government, of instigating raids into Soviet territory by Basmachis from South of the Oxus. There is no doubt such raids did take place, but the occasion provided the opportunity, and it is not considered likely that the Kabul Government was in any way responsible for them. Whatever the truth of the charge and counter charge may be, relations between Habibulla's government and the Soviet representative were strained.

Meanwhile Ghulam Nabi was holding on to Mazar-i-Sharif with his small force, surrounded on all sides and in imminent danger of being overwhelmed. The situation appeared so serious that the Soviet Consul in Mazar-i-Sharif removed himself and his staff back to Tashkent. In spite of this, Ghulam Nabi succeeded in establishing himself, possibly with the aid of reinforcements from North of Oxus, for reliable reports showed that he became master of the area Tashkurghan—Termez—Shibarghan.

Habibulla at once despatched two columns of troops from Kabul to restore the situation. His War Minister Syed Hussein was in command. One column was to march *via* Bamian and the Ak Robot Pass on Tashkurghan, and the other *via* the Khawak Pass on Khanabad. The Bamian Column appears to have met with considerable opposition from Hazaras, being compelled to turn back and follow the other column by the Khawak Pass. Syed Hussein reached Khanabad, and fighting took place between him and Ghulam Nabi with varying success. One result of their encounter was that Syed Hussein reported to Kabul that he had obtained definite proof of Russian assistance in finding Russian dead on the scene of the fighting, and also equipment bearing Russian stamps.

It is probable that Amanulla's flight to India caused Ghulam Nabi to give up the struggle, for he crossed the Oxus into Soviet territory with the remnants of his forces. A Moscow Press report stated that these were interned and disarmed. Consequently Mazar-i-Sharif passed once again into the hands of Habibulla.

The Hazaras in the vicinity of Ghorband and Bamian were very determined in their efforts to fight for Amanulla's cause. They dispersed to their homes after the *Ex-King* abandoned the contest, but it was not long before they reappeared, this time between Bamian and the Unai Pass, thus compelling Habibulla to detach troops to hold them off.

(j) *The contest between Amanulla and Habibulla.*

As has already been stated, Amanulla set his forces in motion at the end of March, 1929, and he arrived in Kalat-i-Ghilzai on 4th April. His force was estimated at about 10,000 men. Tribal lashkars had not gathered to his standard in any strength, and there was no marked enthusiasm for his cause. A small body of men which he despatched

under Abdul Ahad in order to gain touch with the Wardakis, met with opposition at Shahjui and fell back on Kalat-i-Ghilzai. In accordance with his reported wish to avoid further bloodshed, Amanulla despatched Agha Mohammad Hassan, and *Sahibzada* Mohd. Umar Jan, two leading clerics of Kandahar, towards Ghazni in order to negotiate with Habibullah's men through the *mullas*, but nothing came of this move.

Amanullah therefore advanced from Kalat-i-Ghilzai and reached the vicinity of Ghazni on or about the 16th April, unopposed. Certain Hazara elements who were loyal to him and anxious to fight on his behalf, had occupied Mukur and joined in his forward movement. It appears that on the evening of the 16th April, Amanulla's leading troops occupied two small forts in the vicinity of Ghazni. As the gates of Ghazni were closed, emissaries of Amanulla with a Qoran were sent forward with a request for admission, which was refused. At dawn next morning, a bombardment of the two forts mentioned above was commenced from Ghazni. This continued throughout the day. Amanulla, who was at Nani, twelve miles in rear, moved up, and on the 19th April, took up a position on a hill to the South East of Ghazni. The bombardment of the two forts ceased and an engagement ensued against Amanulla's position. The entry of some 4,000 Suleiman Khel Ghilzais decided the battle. They attacked Amanulla in flank and rear and captured his position, causing him to retire with such of his troops as were in the immediate vicinity. The forces in the two forts eventually withdrew into the Hazarajat from where they proceeded to Mukur, while Amanulla retired by the main road to Mashaki. Two of his guns were captured in the forts referred to, and some 60 motor vehicles, comprising the whole of his mechanical transport, fell into the hands of the Ghilzais. Weather conditions hampered Amanullah's forces, rain and hailstorms being of nightly occurrence.

Two Herati Battalions which were acting as advanced guard to Amanulla's forces were permitted to proceed past Ghazni without molestation to Shashgao. No news is available as to their fate, but it is considered that they either deserted to Habibulla or were surrounded and disarmed.

Amanulla with his force retreated from Mashaki to Oba Karez and from there to Mukur, where he was besieged by Ghilzais. Owing to superior numbers, Amanulla's forces were able to force their way through to Kalat-i-Ghilzai, where they arrived on the 14th May.

Although it is impossible to estimate the number of casualties, information points to heavy losses on both sides. The Hazaras seem to have suffered considerably. The battle of Ghazni is reported to have been a sanguinary affair and the bulk of the casualties occurred during the engagement.

Much unnecessary burning of Andar (Ghilzai) villages was carried out by Amanulla's forces during their retirement. There is no doubt that this action stiffened the Ghilzais in their determination to assist in the overthrow of Amanulla. They harassed him sorely in his retreat, and cut his line of communication with Kandahar.

Although Habibulla had succeeded in establishing himself at Ghazni before Amanulla came into contact with him he had had some difficulties to contend with. The Wardakis, inhabiting the Wardak Valley astride

the Kabul-Ghazni Road, proved to be a thorn in his side, constantly attacking his troops and raiding his communications. In this they were assisted by Hazaras, who also threatened Kabul from the direction of the Unai Pass to the West, thus forcing Habibulla to detach troops to drive them off. That he was able to do so, while at the same time meeting a threat from Nadir Khan in the South, without falling back in front of Amanulla, proves that he was securely established in Kabul and could reckon on a considerable measure of support. Throughout his operations against Amanulla, Habibulla received valuable assistance from the Ghilzais, notably the Andar, Tarakh and Tokhi sections, and later from the Suleiman Khel, who were chiefly responsible for harassing Amanulla's rear and line of communications. Without this assistance he would have been hard pressed, for his strength during the initial stages of the engagement at Ghazni was not more than 500. These were under the command of Abdul Qaiyum, a man who had been sentenced to four years' imprisonment by Amanulla in 1925 on a trumped up charge, and released by Habibulla. In the course of the battle, Habibulla's forces were reinforced by 2,000 infantry from Kabul, 700 cavalry and some French 105 mm. guns.

Once back at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, it appeared as though Amanullah intended to make a stand there, for preparations were made for the defence of the town. In Kandahar strict precautions were taken to prevent the true state of affairs from being known. Severe penalties were inflicted on any person found spreading rumours, or discussing the situation in a manner calculated to promote despondency for Amanulla's cause. In spite of this, however, the truth leaked out, and as it was diametrically opposed to the official version given to the Kandahar public, a state of nervous tension was soon discernible, and many of the well to do inhabitants commenced removing their valuables to the outlying districts.

Habibullah pushed on his troops in pursuit of Amanulla, who was given little respite. An encounter took place at Kalat-i-Ghilzai on 21st May, and though it appears that his forces were holding their own, Amanulla's courage deserted him and he abandoned the contest. He left Kalat-i-Ghilzai by car at 6 A.M., on 22nd May and went to Mohmand Robat, some ten miles from Kandahar, where he interviewed Ali Ahmed Jan and sent him off to command his troops at Kalat-i-Ghilzai. Amanulla left Mohmand Robat at midnight 22nd/23rd May, having telephoned to his family to meet him at Manzil Bagh, the junction of the Kandahar-Kabul and Kandahar-Chaman Roads. At 3 A.M., on the morning of the 23rd May, the whole party left Manzil Bagh and motored direct to Chaman without stopping. Amanulla took the precaution of cutting the telegraph and telephone lines between Kandahar and Spin Baldak in order to facilitate his escape. The party reached Chaman at 1 o'clock. No previous warning of their intended arrival had been received. Amanulla stated that he did not desire to return to Afghanistan for the present and asked for transit facilities through India to Bombay with a view to proceeding to Italy. A special train was placed at his disposal, which left Chaman for Bombay on 24th May.

Amanulla's party consisted of 27 men, 35 women and children and 30 followers, all of whom arrived in Chaman in a state of great dejection and without food. Included in the party were :—

Ex-Queen Souriya and seven children.

The Queen Mother.

**Sardar Inayatulla, wife and family.**

**Obeidulla Jan and Mohd. Ali Khan, brothers of the ex-King.**

**Abdul Aziz, former War Minister and Governor of Kandahar.**

**Ghulam Jilani, former Afghan Ambassador at Angora.**

**The family of Mahmud Beg Tarzi.**

**Abdul Ahad Khan, a former A.-D.-C. and Minister of the Interior.**

**Mohd. Yakub Khan, former Minister of Court.**

All possible arrangements were made for the comfort of the party during their journey to Bombay. Major E. T. R. Wickham, M.V.O., a former Counsellor to the British Legation at Kabul, travelled on the train.

On arriving at Bombay, the party were put up at the Taj Mahal Hotel, and arrangements were at once initiated for their onward journey, Queen Souriya's imminent confinement being an unavoidable factor of delay.

After Amanulla's departure, his troops retired from Kalat-i-Ghilzai to Kandahar, where Ali Ahmed Jan at once proclaimed himself King and did his best to organize the defence of the town. This was of no avail however, for Kandahar fell to Habibulla's troops on 31st May, after a very small show of resistance. Ali Ahmed Jan was captured and sent as a prisoner to Kabul, where he was subsequently released, though kept under observation.

#### *The reasons for Amanulla's failure.*

The reasons for Amanulla's failure can be grouped under four heads :—

- (i) Suspicion against Amanulla on the part of the Duranis.
- (ii) Treachery on the part of Amanulla's trusted advisers.
- (iii) Non-support of religious heads in Kandahar.
- (iv) Propaganda.

(i) *Suspicion against Amanulla on the part of the Duranis.*

Prior to the arrival of Amanulla in Kandahar from Kabul, active propaganda on his behalf had been started by his mother, the Ulya Hazrat, but it soon became evident that all her blandishments and coercions were of no avail. Amanulla was suspected by the Duranis whose aid he sought to enlist. Mistrust of his attitude towards religion, towards his self-proclaimed change of heart, and towards his ideas of Europeanization was deep-rooted, and the thought was paramount that his one desire was to revenge himself on his enemies who had brought him low. The Duranis held back and it was obvious that the degree of enthusiasm necessary to ensure success, which had to be spontaneous if whole-hearted support were to be forthcoming, had not been aroused. Suspicion against Amanullah was never eradicated and his enemies maintained it by propaganda.

(ii) *Treachery on the part of Amanulla's trusted advisers.*

It can be said without exaggeration that the number of advisers who were really sincere to Amanulla could be counted on the fingers of one hand. These too, were restricted to members of Amanulla's own household. The remainder of Amanulla's ministers and advisers can be stigmatised as traitors to his cause.

To instance a few such men :—

- (a) The Governor of Kandahar—Abdul Karim—and his brother—Civil Brigadier Abdul Ali Khan—were instrumental in delaying recruitment.
- (b) The Minister of War—Abdul Aziz—was likewise antagonistic and feathered his own nest.
- (c) Muhd. Yakub Khan—Minister of Court—was swayed by an agent of Sardar Hashim Khan's—Mohd. Salim—who was despatched for the purpose of undermining Amanulla's determination to make an attempt to regain his throne.
- (d) Abdul Hadi—who is hand in glove with Mohd. Wali in Kabul—was acting during his stay in Amanulla's camp on behalf of Habibulla.

(iii) *Non-support of religious leaders in Kandahar.*

The religious leaders at first, openly shunned the cause of Amanulla, but subsequently, through insistent coercion on the part of Amanulla, agreed to support him. When the opportunity came, however, they turned against him.

The Hazrat of Zakird and Sahibzada Muhd. Umar Jan and other prominent religious leaders were in secret negotiation with Amanulla's enemies, and when the time came, they invited the Kohistanis into their areas North and South of Kandahar.

(iv) *Propaganda.*

Propaganda on both sides played an important part in deciding the fate of Amanulla. A number of men left Kabul and the Eastern and Southern Provinces, ostensibly to show their attachment to Amanulla, but in reality to act as agents for the dissemination of propaganda on behalf of either Habibulla or Nadir Khan.

Amanulla's propaganda was crude and often without even a modicum of truth in it. After his arrival in Kandahar from Kabul, he frequently gave out that Habibulla had been killed or taken prisoner. This is a fair example of the puerile information that was spread in order to discredit his enemies and rally Kandaharis to his cause. Unfortunately for him, the people did not swallow it as easily as he hoped and continued to regard even the truth which was given out later, as "Amanulla lies".

Amanulla never gained the confidence of the Kandaharis, and his failure to do so was due largely to his mishandling of the weapon of propaganda. Great reliance was placed on the vernacular press of



India. Contributions were sent by Amanulla's agents to the "Zamin-dar" and other papers, which were outrageously incorrect, regarding the defeats of his enemies and the strength of his forces, and these were quoted in Kandahar as providing ample proofs of the correctness of propaganda statements made by Amanulla.


Even had Amanulla succeeded in defeating Habibulla at Ghazni, it is very doubtful if he would ever have succeeded in regaining his throne. He had lost the confidence of the nation, whose religious leaders regarded him as an infidel, and who were determined to have no more of him.

On 22nd June 1929, Amanulla sailed from Bombay for Marseilles on board the P. and O. S.S. "Mooltan". He was accompanied by Queen Souriya and her eight children, the Queen Mother (Ulya Hazrat), his brother Obeidulla, his sister Nur-us-Siraj, and some members of his personal staff.


His elder brother Inayatulla did not accompany him, but elected to go to Persia instead. He sailed from Bombay for Basra on 5th July 1929, accompanied by his wife and sister, thirteen children, his half brother Sardar Mohammed Ali Khan, and six members of his suite.

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**Sketch Map**  
**AFGHANISTAN and the N. W. FRONTIER**  
 Scale 1 inch = 48 miles.



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*Summary of*  
**Events in Afghanistan**

1st July 1929 to 30th June 1930

*Compiled by the General Staff*

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## SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN.

1ST JULY 1929 TO 30TH JUNE 1930.

### PART I.

#### *Up to downfall of Habibullah.*

#### I.—THE REBELLION IN AFGHANISTAN.

A short history of the rebellion in Afghanistan, which is covered by the period of this review, is given as an appendix, and is in continuation of that issued with the annual Summary, 1st July 1928 to 30th June 1929.

#### II.—INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

1. *Kabul*.—After the defeat and flight of Amanullah at the end of May, Habibullah was able to turn his attention to consolidating his position in Kabul, and in the Kandahar and Herat areas which acknowledged his rule.

One of his first acts was to supervise in person the organization and despatch of troops to the North to oppose Ghulam Nabi who crossing the Oxus from Soviet territory, had seized Mazar-i-Sharif on behalf of Amanullah. In order to arouse enthusiasm for his cause, Habibullah initiated a brisk propaganda that Russia was helping Ghulam Nabi with men and munitions and was thus attacking Afghanistan. He also announced in a speech at the Pul-i-Khisti mosque that he intended to fight for the throne as long as he lived.

His efforts, however, did not meet with a ready response. Although outwardly the situation in Kabul was quiet, there was a considerable undercurrent of discontent with the existing order engendered by the continued unrest and economic depression. Moreover, some of Habibullah's subordinates were resorting to oppressive measures to enforce law and order.

On 7th July a large meeting took place in Kabul attended by many of the leading *Maliks* and *Mullas* of Kabul, Koh-i-Daman and Kohistan. Habibullah was also present. The meeting advised Habibullah to come to an agreement with Nadir Khan as the people were tired of continual fighting and bloodshed and wanted some settled form of Government, even a Republic, if necessary.

Habibullah summarily rejected this advice. His refusal to contemplate any form of negotiations with Nadir Khan greatly incensed the *Maliks* and people, who up to now had been his main support and had provided the bulk of his fighting men.

Habibullah now instituted a virtual reign of terror. He trumped up evidence that certain leading men of Amanullah's régime who were incarcerated in the Arg were responsible for the attitude adopted by the *Maliks* at the meeting. On 6th July, therefore, he ordered the secret execution in the Arg of *Sardars* Hayatullah Khan, and Abdul Majid, brothers of Amanullah, and of Habibullah Khan and *Sardar* Usman Khan Muhammad. On 11th July *Qazi* Abdul Wasi, a very influential *mulla* was



executed, while on the same day he caused Ali Ahmad Jan, who had surrendered to Habibullah's forces at Kandahar, to be blown from a gun on Sherpur aerodrome. The barbarity of these murders, especially those of Ali Ahmad Jan and Qazi Abdul Wasi merely tended to increase Habibullah's unpopularity and a rising of the local inhabitants was only kept in check by fear.

On 6th August, Habibullah announced his intention of despatching a mission to visit certain European countries with a view to obtaining recognition and requested the Government of India to grant transit facilities. In reply the Government pointed out that their declared policy of neutrality and non-intervention precluded them from regarding the status of the party while on British territory as other than that of private individuals, and that no assurance could be given as regards their reception at the Foreign Office. The matter then dropped.

2. *Southern Province.*—In the Southern Province Sher Agha, the Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar, who about the middle of June 1929 had definitely thrown in his lot with Nadir Khan went off to Katawaz to work amongst his own clan the Suleiman Khel Ghilzais. The attitude of this tribe, who hitherto had supported Habibullah against Amanullah was somewhat doubtful. Sher Agha now set about inducing the Suleiman Khels to make peace with the Ahmadzai Ghilzais and winning the former over to Nadir Shah's side. Although he was so far successful in patching up a truce between the two clans, he failed to induce the Suleiman Khels to commit themselves to any action. Their sympathies still apparently remained with Habibullah as 150 of the *Maliks* visited him in Kabul and received rewards. Throughout the fighting which led up to the overthrow of Habibullah this tribe remained neutral and during October commenced their annual migration to Indian territory.

3. *Eastern Province.*—In the Eastern province Habibullah exercised little or no control over the powerful tribes who were thoroughly enjoying their freedom from taxation and conscription, and showed no desire for an early return to settled Government. Old inter-tribal feuds re-opened and fights resulting in casualties were of daily occurrence.

During July trouble arose between the Shinwaris and Mohmands over the division of tolls at Torkham. The Shinwaris had seized Torkham and were diverting all the caravan traffic through their own country, and not allowing any to go *via* Dakka with the result that the Mohmands were deprived of what they considered their legitimate share of the tolls. Connected with this dispute was also the question of the Khanship of Lalpura. Muhammad Ali Khan, a younger brother of Muhammad Siddiq Khan, who was at one time Khan of Lalpura, set himself up as Khan with the aid of the *Haji* of Turangzai and his son Badshah Gul. Muhammad Ali Khan, being a Tarakzai and by virtue of his position as Khan of Lalpura, invoked the aid of the Halimzai and Tarakzai Mohmands, both British assured clans, to recover the tolls from the Shinwaris whom he considered to have robbed him. It therefore, became necessary to warn the Mohmands on the British side of the border not to interfere in Afghan affairs. On 2nd September fighting broke out between the Mohmands and Shinwaris near Painsa Khak, between Landi Kotal and Dakka. After intermittent fighting which lasted two days a truce was arranged, and on 6th September an agreement was arrived at whereby in future all caravans were to go *via* Dakka and all tolls were to be divided equally between the two tribes.

*Malik* Muhammad Alam, Shinwari, who had been appointed Civil and Military Governor of the Province in June, on assuming his duties, announced that he had been authorised to grant allowances to all *maliks* who accepted Habibullah's rule and who provided recruits for the Army. Unfortunately the effect of this pronouncement was negatived by Muhammad Alam's failure to distribute the cash. He thus became discredited and his influence rapidly commenced to wane even amongst his own section, the Shinwaris. He suffered the ignominy of a virtual blockade in his own house with a view to extracting from him the money which he was reputed to have brought from Kabul.

An influential *Malik*, Nek Muhammad of Babar, now came into prominence. His attitude was anti-Habibullah, and he devoted much time and energy in collecting men and rifles to support Hashim Khan. On the capture of Jalalabad by Habibullah's forces in September, Nek Muhammad fled to Kama, in Mohmand territory, where he remained for a short time. Early in October he again reappeared and in conjunction with Muhasil (Mohmand) and Muhammad Afzal (Shinwari) organised the attack on Jalalabad which led to the withdrawal of Habibullah's troops.

4. *Kandahar*.—After Amanullah's departure, Ali Ahmad Jan at once proclaimed himself King in Kandahar and did his best to organise the defence of the town. This, however, was of no avail as on 31st May 1929 Habibullah's troops captured Kandahar, and Ali Ahmad Jan was sent as a prisoner to Kabul where he was subsequently barbarously executed on 11th July 1929.

Habibullah appointed Abdul Qadir, Taraki Ghilzai, as Governor of Kandahar. This official adopted a policy of repression which rapidly alienated the allegiance of the local inhabitants. Money was extorted from the wealthy and failure to contribute met with extreme cruelty.

Amongst the Kohistan troops forming the garrison there existed a complete lack of discipline, and looting and extortion were of common occurrence. Habibullah's authority did not extend beyond the precincts of Kandahar itself, and the communication with Kabul was subject to frequent interruptions due to the depredations of Wazirs and Wardakis in the Kalat-i-Ghilzai-Ghazni area.

On the 8th July 1929 the Governor held a darbar at which he announced the re-introduction of the "*Hasht Nafri*" system of recruitment and demanded the payment of all arrears of revenue and the return of all Government rifles. The enforcement of the "*Hasht Nafri*" provoked indignation, and protests against it were at once lodged.

By the end of August the condition of affairs in Kandahar had become more normal and the Governor was making every effort to bring about complete stability. "*Firman*s" were despatched to officials of the old regime advocating their return and assuring them of safety.

This step, however, met with little response as the forces of law and order had failed to make any impression in the outlying districts. The Ghilzais, who were divided into two camps, pro-Habibullah and pro-Nadir, were indulging in indiscriminate looting and plundering. Amongst the Achakzai Durrani a considerable undercurrent of hostility to Habibullah was in evidence. This was due to the effects of propaganda spread by two

of Nadir Khan's emissaries, and was so far successful that early in September this tribe broke into open revolt. Supported by the Nurzais, the Achakzais, having defeated a force of Kohistanis at Mel Karez on the Chaman-Kandahar Road on 11th September, advanced on Kandahar which they surrounded on 14th September. After a siege lasting one month the City fell on 12th October owing to the citizens rising against the Kohistani garrison and opening the gates.

The capture of Kandahar coincided with the fall of Kabul, the news of which created considerable enthusiasm. Although there were two factions amongst the Durranis supporting Amanullah and Nadir Khan, respectively, there was no indication of any challenge to Nadir's rule as the tribal mind was too fully occupied with delight at the overthrow of the Kohistani brigand.

5. *Northern Province*.—On the withdrawal of Ghulam Nabi from Mazar-i-Sharif across the Oxus as a result of Amanullah's flight, the province once more passed into the control of Habibullah. There appears to be little doubt that Ghulam Nabi's venture was reinforced by Soviet personnel. Saiyid Husain, the leader of Habibullah's forces, reported that he had found Soviet dead on the scene of the fighting and also equipment bearing Soviet markings. This information was confirmed later by travellers from North of the Hindu Kush.

Saiyid Husain assumed the duties of *Naib-ul-Sultanat* (Viceroy) while Mirza Muhammad Qasim was appointed Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif.

The district now settled down to comparative peace and quiet, and no further disturbances occurred during Habibullah's régime. Khanabad and Badakshan also accepted Habibullah's rule.

In spite, however, of the apparent peacefulness in the province a considerable feeling of discontent was present as the result of the harsh and autocratic behaviour of the Viceroy. Before the termination of Habibullah's rule he was re-called to Kabul and at the last suffered the extreme penalty with his master.

6. *Herat*.—In Herat, Abdur Rahim who had seized the reins of government on behalf of Amanullah at the beginning of May, formed a provincial government somewhat on the lines of the jirga system. A "*Mejliss*" was established composed of representatives of the *Mullas*, officials, and influential men whose duty was to deal with such questions as defence, religion, taxation, education, and agriculture. Abdur Rahim's governorship was generally acceptable to the people and no further disturbances occurred in the province.

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## PART II.

### From the Accession of Nadir Shah.

#### INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

#### KABUL.

Nadir Shah declared himself King of Afghanistan in Kabul, on 16th October 1930 at the express wish of the populace. Although not in the direct line of descent of the former rulers of Afghanistan, he can claim to be of royal blood. His great grandfather was Painda Khan the founder of the Barakzai, Durrani, dynasty and the ancestor of three important families, known as the Kabul, Kandahar and Peshawar sardars. Nadir Shah is the most notable living representative of the latter, and is thus a collateral of ex-King Amanullah who was the last of the Kabul Sardars to occupy the throne.

Generally speaking Nadir Shah's assumption of power proved acceptable to the Afghan people, and conditions in the country rapidly assumed a more normal state.

Certain sections of the Ghilzais, Dara Khel Zadrans, and Shinwaris however refused to acknowledge his rule while strong resentment was felt amongst the pro-Amanullah party in Peshawar, headed by Abdul Hakim Khan, Amanullah's trade agent. The latter concocted a scheme to establish *Sardar* Amin Jan, a half-brother of Amanullah, on the throne, assisted by the Shinwaris. On 6th February 1930 the plot was discovered, and at the request of the Afghan Government, Abdul Hakim was removed from Peshawar by the Civil Authorities. A considerable feeling in favour of Bacha-i-Saqao also survived in Kohistan and Koh-i-Daman which led to open rebellion.

Nadir Shah's first act was to summon representatives from all the provinces except the Eastern to a "*Loe Jirga*" to confirm the question of Kingship. In spite of the fact that many representatives arrived in Kabul the *jirga* was never held, and in December those who had arrived were dismissed to their homes.

As regards ministerial appointments (a list of which is given as an appendix), Nadir Shah adopted the principle of excluding the old influential families such as those of Abdul Qudus Khan, *Luinab* Khusdül Khan and other Barakzais and allotting posts to those whose sentiments were anti-Amanullah. The most noteworthy of the appointments were those of Nadir Shah's four brothers whom he astutely placed in "key" positions at home and abroad. *Sardar* Hashim Khan became Prime Minister and *Sardar* Shah Mahmud, War Minister, while *Sardars* Shah Wali and Muhammad Aziz Khan were appointed the representatives of their government in London and Moscow, respectively.

A general pardon was granted to all the tribes who assisted or favoured Bacha-i-Saqao. The majority of the Wazirs who assisted in the capture of Kabul returned to their homes during November 1929 somewhat dissatisfied with their rewards. Their place was taken by a party of Mahsuds under Musa Khan (Abdullah) and Shamsuddin, the son of the *Mulla* Powindah. Their reception was rather frigid and by the end of December most of them had returned home, having been recompensed with small rewards.

On 6th November the King issued a proclamation outlining the policy of his government the main points of which were—

- (1) The administration of the country was to be conducted on the principles of the Islamic (Hanfi) Law and equal rights.
- (2) Relations with foreign powers would continue as in the time of Amanullah.

The King, however, realised that he must proceed cautiously in order to avoid exciting the populace. His chief anxiety was to win over the *mullas* to his side—a difficult problem in view of their bigoted outlook and rooted objection to all forms of innovation. The most urgent items on his programme of reconstruction were the formation of an army and the collection of revenue, arms and ammunition from the provinces. The latter has proved a constant source of anxiety to the Government and has met with a considerable degree of opposition amongst the Ghilzais, particularly the Suleiman Khel, and in Khost and the Eastern Province.

As the result of a petition by many of the leading *maliks* of Kohistan, the King ordered the arrest of Muhammad Wali Khan and Mahmud Sami in January. The former had successfully acted as Regent during Amanullah's foreign tour. He was, however, believed to possess Republican tendencies and to be on good terms with the Russians. Mahmud Sami was formerly the principal of the Harbiyeh College. The charge now brought against them was that they instigated the rebellion against *ex*-King Amanullah and that they had assisted Bacha-i-Saqao to a considerable extent during his régime. The latter charge is undoubtedly true, but there can be little doubt that the trial was engineered in order to remove the influence of Muhammad Wali once and for all. They were found guilty by the special tribunal assembled to try them, and on 8th April the King confirmed the sentence of death in the case of Mahmud Sami who was duly shot, but commuted the sentence of Muhammad Wali to one of 8 years' imprisonment.

The King's attitude towards the disturbances in India has been studiously correct, and he has been at pains to impress upon the people the evil effects of revolution, and the friendship existing between the Afghan and British governments, and has throughout exhorted them to bear in mind that the policy of his government was one of strict non-interference. He issued instructions to the officials of the Eastern and Southern Provinces to prevent Afghan tribesmen from joining in anti-British movements. He even went so far as to remove the Chaknaur *mulla* from his home in Ningrahar to Kabul where he would be safe from the importunities of the *Haji* of Turangzai.

*The Insurrections in Koh-i-Daman.*—Since his accession to the throne, Nadir Shah has been faced with continual disturbances in Koh-i-Daman instigated by the former supporters of Bacha-i-Saqao.

The first occurred on 30th November when a *lashkar* under the leadership of Khan Muhammad and Dil Muhammad of Nijrao occupied and looted Charikar. A force of 3,000 regulars was hastily despatched from Kabul to restore the situation. The *lashkar* was dispersed, and many arrests were made, including Dil Muhammad who was subsequently executed with several others in Kabul. Khan Muhammad made good his escape and took to the hills.

On 7th March a number of Kohistan *Maliks* interviewed the Prime Minister regarding the settlement of the case of 200 of prisoners who were captured in the fighting. At the suggestion of the Premier a list of 55 names of those considered guilty was submitted by the *Maliks*. These names were put before the King, who with the approval of the *Majlis-i-Shora* ordered the men to be executed.

Even these drastic steps did not succeed in quelling the spirit of rebellion as fighting again broke out between the rebels and government troops at Kalakhan and Karabagh between 11th and 13th April. Reinforcements were despatched from Kabul whereupon the rebels withdrew towards the neighbouring hills whence they continued to send down large raiding gangs into the Koh-i-Daman Valley. Eight of the rebel leaders were captured and were blown from guns in Kabul on 15th April.

On 5th June a further recrudescence of fighting occurred. A gang of 300 rebels raided the vicinity of Kalakhan and Karabagh and succeeded in ambushing a patrol of 30 regulars, killing 26 of them. Shah Mahmud, the War Minister, accompanied by the Foreign Minister and two other officials with 33 lorries containing troops hastened to Jabal-us-Siraj. Again the trouble was quickly suppressed. Three of the rebels were executed and twelve taken prisoners to Kabul.

#### EASTERN PROVINCE.

The chief event of importance during the year in the Eastern Province was the Shinwari rebellion which broke out in February.

In November Saleh Muhammad Khan who had been appointed "Sarhaddar" of Dakka commenced the levy of tolls from caravans using the Khyber route. The Shinwaris, however, still retained control of Torkham and were loath to forego a profitable source of income extracted by them from passing caravans.

The *Sarhaddar* of Dakka opened negotiations with the Sangu Khel Shinwaris and was so far successful that by the end of December the latter agreed to surrender Torkham in exchange for the control of the road between Torkham and Painsa Khak. They undertook not to divert caravans *via* Darwe China, and not to extract payment of tolls.

In spite of this apparently satisfactory settlement the Shinwaris as a tribe refused to submit to Nadir's authority and refused to allow Government officials to enter their territory. Their attitude indicated hostility to any form of Central Government and a preference for independence.

The leader of the hostile faction was Muhammad Alam, one of the instigators of the previous Shinwari rebellion in November 1928. He was persuaded to go to Kabul and interview Nadir Shah, on 10th January. What happened at the interview never transpired, but its conclusions were apparently unsatisfactory as the insurrection which followed was largely due to Muhammad Alam's instigation.

On 8th February a *jirga* was held at the house of Hazrat Khan (Ali Sher Khel, Shinwari) at Deh Sarak and was attended by all sections of the Shinwaris. The *jirga* decided that a *lashkar* from Hazarnao, Ambar Khana, Basawal and Girdi should attack Dakka and that an Ali Sher Khel *lashkar* should seize Spina Kotka.

The attack on Dakka never materialised ; but on 9th and 10th February a *lashkar* of 300 Ali Sher Khel under Hazrat Khan seized Spina Kotha

post and disarmed the garrison. On 11th February the *Sarhaddar* of Dakka with a force of 300 regulars and some local Mohmands advanced on Spina Kotha, but was held up near Painda Khak and compelled finally to withdraw to Haft Chah. On 13th February the *Sarhaddar*, having been considerably reinforced, again attacked and was successful in capturing Spina Kotha post. The Shinwaris retired Southwards towards Darband.

On receipt of news in Kabul of the rising, strong reinforcements were despatched to Jalalabad and a cordon was drawn round the territory of the Alisher Khel Shinwaris. The Afghan authorities were determined to settle with the Shinwaris once and for all. Stringent terms were issued which the government intended should be executed in full and which were backed up by a strong display of force. The gist of these terms were that the Shinwaris should :—

- (a) Give hostages for their future good behaviour.
- (b) Return all Government arms and other looted government stores.
- (c) Return to Government all money collected as tolls at Torkham.

These energetic measures appeared to have the desired effect as the Shinwaris made a general acknowledgment of submission through Muhammad Afzal, Muhammad Alam and Muhammad Azim. Hazrat Khan, the insurgent leader, fled for safety to the Zakka Khel in the Bazar Valley. By the end of April the Sangu Khel Shinwaris had returned all the looted property acquired by them and practically all the Government rifles in possession of the people of Hazarnao, Basawa<sup>1</sup>, Girdi, Lalpura and Dakka had been collected. The Shinwaris also agreed to pay land revenue.

As was only to be expected the disturbances in India, particularly in the Peshawar area provoked a considerable amount of anti-British propaganda amongst the Shinwaris and Mohmands in Afghan territory. *Mullas* in several villages preached “*Ghaza*” against the British Government, with the result that considerable excitement existed.

On 15th May Muhammad Afzal went to Jalalabad to request the Governor's permission to raise *lashkars* to assist the Mohmands. Permission was refused.

The fact that no anti-British action has materialised is entirely due to the efforts of the Governor, Muhammad Gul Khan and his officials. Strict orders were issued forbidding anyone to join the *Haji* of Turangzai, while the Chaknaur *Mulla* who was a potential centre of hostile intrigue was removed out of harm's way to Kabul. Afridis who were stationed at Torkham and in other border posts were removed to Kahī to prevent them taking part in any anti-British propaganda.

#### SOUTHERN PROVINCE.

During November, Gardez which still remained in the hands of Habibullah's supporters, was taken over by Nadir Shah's representative, the remnants of Habibullah's garrison having made their submission.

At about the same time the Governor of Khost invited 500 men from each of the Madda Khel and Kabul Khel to Khost to assist in the collection of arms and revenue. This provoked some apprehension amongst the Khostwals that land in Khost might be granted to the Wazirs. A

party of Wazirs returning to Birmal from Kabul were attacked in the vicinity of Sarafsar (35 miles S. of Gardez) by Suleiman Khel and Ahmadzai Ghilzais. The incident assumed serious proportions and the Government were compelled to intervene. Sher Agha, *Hazrat* of Shor Bazar who was sent from Kabul, succeeded in settling the dispute.

The collection of Government arms and revenue proved a difficult matter, for in addition to the Suleiman Khel Ghilzais, the Dari Khel Zadrans, and certain sections of the Chakmannis and Mangals also refused to acknowledge Nadir Shah or to comply with his demands. On 22nd April the *Hakim-i-Ala* interviewed a Dari Khel Zadran *jirga* with a view to settlement; but they flatly refused to surrender the government arms in their possession. On the other hand the Chakmannis proved more amenable and during April handed over one large gun and two Machine guns to the government.

The recalcitrant attitude of these tribes was largely due to the instigation of the Suleiman Khels of Katawaz who advised them not to submit to the Government.

During April relations between the Mangals and Zadrans became strained. There were also domestic disputes between two factions of the Mangals led by *Maliks* Sanak and Zalmai. In spite of the fact that *lashkars* collected, no actual fighting took place and the disputes were settled in *jirga*.

In connections with the disturbances in India during April, May and June a certain number of agitators from British territory visited the Province exhibiting bloodstained clothes reputed to have belonged to those killed in the Peshawar riots. The Mangals, Jajis and Ahmadzais were reported to have been affected by this propaganda and to have asked the King to declare a "*Jihad*".

Generally speaking however, anti-British agitation made little or no headway in the Province.

#### HERAT PROVINCE.

On the downfall of Habibullah, Abdur Rahim, the Governor of Herat tendered his allegiance to King Nadir Shah. As a result of Abdur Rahim's energetic administration there has been a general air of peace and contentment amongst the populace. The administration has been carried on partly under those laws which were introduced during the régime of Habibullah and partly under those which existed in the time of Amanullah.

In spite of his apparent popularity with the middle and lower classes of society, Abdur Rahim was not altogether popular with the majority of the Herat officials and notables, who believed him to be anti-Nadir. Although there has been no direct indication that this is true, on one or two occasions Abdur Rahim has undoubtedly shown resentment at the interference of the Kabul government in the administration of the province. Whatever his attitude may be Nadir Shah owes him a debt of gratitude as the governor of the only province in the country which has been free from disturbances.



### THE NORTHERN PROVINCES.

Throughout Nadir Shah's régime the situation in the Northern Provinces has been unsettled. After the overthrow of Habibullah a considerable following in sympathy with his cause remained in the North, consisting chiefly of Sunni Hazaras. In addition to this faction are the indigenous population of Turcomans, Usbegs and Tajiks whose ignorance makes them particularly susceptible to propaganda, and the Basmachis, who are brigands of no settled abode and whose hands are eternally against the forces of law and order.

The existence of these unruly elements have constituted a serious source of embarrassment to the Central Government. Owing to lack of information it is difficult to form a clear picture of what has occurred, but there have been outbreaks resulting in serious fighting both in Mazar-i-Sharif and Maimana.

The revolt in Mazar-i-Sharif appears to have originated with the Sunni Hazaras who seized the cantonment of Dehdadi and were only dislodged with considerable difficulty.

During the second week of March Ghulam Nabi Khan arrived in Maimana to take over the governorship of the district. In spite of two *firmans* from Kabul the local authorities refused to recognise him as the representative of the Kabul Government. This led to serious friction and Ghulam Nabi was only able to instal himself as Governor by resorting to force and thus compelling the local notables and elders to acknowledge his authority.

Meanwhile Ibrahim Beg and his Basmachis were not slow to avail themselves of the opportunity afforded by this unrest to carry on their trade of brigandage. They have proved a thorn in the side not only of the Afghan Government, but also of the Soviet, who have repeatedly pressed for Ibrahim Beg's arrest owing to his forays across the border.

Realising that this unsatisfactory state of affairs could not be allowed to continue, Nadir Shah despatched a special mission of reconstruction and reform to Mazar-i-Sharif in March, with full powers to bring about a settlement of outstanding differences. The president of the Commission was Muhammad Yakub Khan, while amongst its members were Abdul Wakil Khan who was appointed G. O. C. and Ata Muhammad Khan a former Governor and influential native of Mazar-i-Sharif.

Towards the end of May, Muhammad Yakub Khan announced that law and order had been re-established in Mazar-i-Sharif and Maimana and that a *jirga* had been held consisting of *vakils*, elders, *ulemas* and sheikhs of the Afghan, Hazara, Turcoman, Uzbek and Tajik tribes numbering about 1,000 in all. The *jirga* agreed to the return of all arms, arrears of money and goods to Government and also to the tracing and surrender of mischievous persons.

### ARMY.

On the outbreak of the rebellion in November 1928 the Afghan Army, as then constituted, rapidly disintegrated and ceased to exist. Many of the troops deserted to Habibullah while others went off to their homes.

Nadir Shah on his accession realised that the reconstruction of the Army was an urgent necessity to enable him to maintain law and order in the country and thus retain his seat on the throne.

The King's first step was to abolish the unpopular "*Hasht Nafri*", a compulsory system of enlistment of one male in every eight, and to introduce voluntary enlistment. In actual fact, however, an element of compulsion still exists, as areas are detailed to produce so many recruits. The pay was fixed at Rs. 25 (A) for Infantry and Rs. 40 (A) for Cavalry per month *plus* a small grain ration. *Sardar* Shah Mahmud, the King's brother was appointed War Minister.

Complete details regarding the measures taken to reorganize the Army are, as yet, not available ; but it is known that the organisation when completed will include two Army Corps to be stationed in the Kabul district. Each of these corps is to consist of one Cavalry Division of two brigades and three Infantry Divisions of three brigades each. By the middle of February it was reported that the organisation of I Corps had been completed, but units were very under strength. The organisation of the II Corps has not yet been completed and no information regarding the establishment of units and formations is available.

In addition to the two Army Corps in the Kabul province certain formations have been organised or are in the process of organisation in the other provinces.

The following statement gives such details of these formations as are available up to 30th June 1930 :—

| Province.     | Formation.         | Composition.   |
|---------------|--------------------|--|
| Herat .. .. . | 1 Division .. .. . | 3 Infy. Ghunds.<br>2 Cav. Ghunds.<br>1 Arty. Ghunds.<br>1 Pioneer Coy. |

NOTE—1 Infy. Ghund=3 khanda's=360 men each.

1 Cav. Ghund=5 squadrons=100 men each.

1 Arty. Ghund=3 batteries=4 guns each.

One battery consists of Field guns, one of Mountain guns, and one of Machine guns.

1 Pioneer Coy. — 100 men.

|                  |                        |  |
|------------------|------------------------|--|
| Kandahar .. .. . | 1 Division (?) .. .. . | 2 Infy. Ghunds.<br>2 Tps. Cavalry.<br>1 Arty. Ghund. |
| Farah .. .. .    | 1 Division (?) .. .. . | 2 Infy. Ghunds.<br>2 Sqns. Cavalry.                  |
| Eastern .. .. .  | (?) .. .. .            | 13 Infy. Ghunds.                                     |

As regards recruiting in the Kabul District recruits are enlisted between the ages of 18 and 35 years. There is no medical examination laid down, and the physical standard is left to the discretion of the medical officer. There is no limit to the length of service which is not pensionable. No difficulty is experienced in obtaining recruits who are drawn mainly from Hazaras, Wardaks, Shinwaris, Tajiks and Ahmadzais. There are also a certain number of Wazirs.

The Government is finding great difficulty in arming the troops owing to the loss of rifles during the rebellion. Recruits are armed with Martinis and Sniders, while trained men are armed with a variety of modern rifles including the L.E. .303 short and long and also some of French and Italian makes.

At present the Army, as such, is of little or no value against well trained troops. Its merits as a fighting force lie in the backing which it provides to tribal levies. Generally speaking the morale of the army is good.

#### AVIATION.

##### (a) *Military.*

During the rebellion, the Afghan Air Force to all intents and purposes ceased to exist and by August 1929 there were only four aeroplanes (D. H. 9A's) in a serviceable condition.

During the latter half of 1929, twenty-three students who had been sent to Italy for training returned to Kabul and fifteen returned from France.

When Nadir Shah became King, the number of serviceable planes had been reduced to three D. H. 9's. Muhammad Ihsan reassumed his post as Commandant of the Air Force which appointment he had held under Amanullah. In January 1930 the number of serviceable planes had been increased by one. The Air Force personnel consisted of a total of 55 Afghans all of whom had been trained in Europe as air mechanics. A certain number of these were qualified as pilots. No Russians were employed in the Air Force, but it was reported that Nadir Shah had asked for fifteen pilots and mechanics and that Russia had agreed to supply these. They had not arrived up to the end of June 1930 and it is improbable that they ever will.

Little or no progress has been made in repairing unserviceable machines. At the beginning of June, there were only five aeroplanes (all D. H. 9A's) fit to take the air. This number was again reduced to four by the end of the month owing to one plane crashing on the Sherpur aerodrome on 17th June. In addition to the four D. H. 9A's, there were also one large Junker, presented to Amanullah in July 1928 and four small Junkers. The former was in a slightly damaged condition and not fit to be flown; two of the latter had broken wings. A Junker's representative, Herr Christian Taumann, arrived in Kabul at the end of May stating he had come to repair the damaged Junkers. Even if the Junker machines are repaired it is stated that there are no Afghan pilots capable of flying them.

On 27th June Shah Muhammad Khan, pilot, and Saif-ud-din, mechanic, left Kabul for Chaman *via* Peshawar to remove the Afghan aeroplane

[D. H. 9 (A)] which has been lying in its crate at Chaman railway station since May 1929. Owing to exposure it was found to be impossible to make this machine serviceable.

There were also two unserviceable planes at Kandahar, which have proved, on examination to be beyond repair, and have been dismantled.

The position therefore at the end of June 1930 was :—

|   |    |    |               |    |   |
|---|----|----|---------------|----|---|
| Serviceable planes                      | .. | .. | D. H. 9-A.    | .. | 4 |
|   |    |    | Junkers small | .. | 2 |
| Unserviceable planes capable of repair. |    |    | Junkers large | .. | 1 |
|   |    |    | Junkers small | .. | 2 |

Since the crash at the Sherpur aerodrome on 17th June orders have been issued that no flying is to take place except for a specific purpose.

In January 1930 the aerodrome at Kandahar was opened up for service purposes and placed in charge of Khair Muhammad, an Italian trained air mechanic. As far as is known little or no use has yet been made of the aerodrome.

The landing ground at Jalalabad has been cleared and marked with white lines.

#### (b) *Civil.*

The Kabul-Termez-Tashkent air line has been in operation throughout the year and is operated by Russian Pilots. It is not a regular service and owing to weather conditions over the Hindu Kush is liable to serious delays. On an average, the arrivals and departures at Kabul amount to about three machines a month since January. The machines are single engined Junkers carrying four passengers. It is stated that it is not possible for the big three engined Junkers to operate on this line as their "ceiling" is too low to cross the Hindu Kush.

The Junker representative, Herr Christian Taumann, who arrived in Kabul at the end of May has been enquiring into the possibility of establishing an air route connecting Kabul with Teheran *via* Kandahar and Herat. The line is to be operated by Junkers and is considered by Herr Taumann to be a sufficiently attractive commercial proposition to justify its opening.

#### COMMUNICATIONS.

##### (a) *Telegraph and Telephone.*

The Kabul-Kandahar line has been working satisfactorily, but has been subjected to frequent and prolonged interruptions, due to the depredations of raiders and the Ghilzai disturbances in the area Ghazni-Mukur-Shahjui.

Between Kandahar and Herat there is still a gap between Turah Shah (5 miles W of Girishk) and Farah. The lines between Kandahar and Girishk and Farah and Herat are in working order. Work was held up at the end of April at Turah Shah owing to lack of wire, a further supply of which had to be ordered from Karachi.

The Herat-Kushk, and Herat-Islam Kila lines are in working order.

A considerable amount of work has been done and is still in progress on the Kabul-Torkham line. By the end of June the line had been completed with the exception of two gaps, one between Fatehabad and Jalalabad

(18 miles) and the other between Basawal and Dakka (13 miles). The completed portion of the line between Kabul and Fatehabad is reported to be working unsatisfactorily.

A line connecting Jalalabad and Kahi in Ningrahar has been completed.

Efforts are being made to establish a line between Kabul and Asmar.

The line between Kabul and Altimur is complete and in working order. Through communication with Gardez, however, is not yet available.

No further work appears to have been done on the Kabul-Termez line. A gap still exists between the Zemistan Pass (on the Hindu Kush) and Haibak.

(b) *Roads.*

*Dakka Jalalabad-Kabul.*—In May 1930 it was reported that, on the whole, the condition of the road was good and provided no obstacles to the passage of occasional cars or lorries. Most of the bridges between Landi-Khana and Jalalabad were broken, but from there on to Kabul, the majority were in a useable condition. Gangs of twenty men every ten miles were employed on repairs and maintenance.

*Mushkab (4 m. W. of Basawal)-Kahi (Ningrahar).*—As a result of the Shinwari disturbances in February 1930 this road has been repaired and made fit for light motor traffic, thereby giving direct communication by car between Jalalabad and Ningrahar.

*Basawal-Morchal.*—The existing road between Basawal and Ghani Khel (4 m.) has been repaired and an extension made to Morchal in the Nazian Valley.

*Altimur-Gardez-Urgun.*—The road between Altimur and Gardez has been made fit for heavy motor traffic thus establishing through communication by car with Kabul. Repairs to the road between Gardez and Urgun are in progress and by the end of June 1930 had been completed as far as Sarozai. (38 m. S. of Gardez).

*Kabul-Kandahar.*—This road became clear of snow at the beginning of April when the passenger lorry service was resumed. The road has been picquetted throughout and has been continuously used by motor traffic except for some days in June when it was blocked on account of the disturbances at Shahjui.

*Kandahar-Herat.*—Owing to floods in the Helmand, this road became impassable for cars at the beginning of February. Repairs were effected and the road reopened for through motor traffic on 19th June.

*Herat-Maimana-Mozar-i-Sharif.*—Repairs to this road were put in hand at the beginning of June by orders of Abdur Rahim, the Governor of Herat. By the end of the month it was reported to be fit for motor traffic as far as Dehistan (65 miles from Herat).

Repairs have also been effected on the Herat-Meshed and Herat-Kushk roads.

Mails from Herat for Kabul were despatched for the first time *via* the Daulat Yar route on 20th February 1930. By the middle of June a regular bi-weekly service was in operation.

(c) *Railways.*

No further developments have resulted from the French and German railway surveys which were carried out in 1928. King Nadir Shah appears to be far more interested in the development of air lines than in the construction of railways for which sufficient funds are not available.

## DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

On 15th November 1929 the Governments of the United Kingdom, India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Irish Free State officially recognised King Nadir Shah and the government of Afghanistan. Relations between the Home and Indian governments and the Government of King Nadir Shah have been of a cordial and friendly nature. This attitude was most apparent during the disturbances in India and on the North West Frontier in April, May and June, during which the Afghan government maintained an attitude of strict non-intervention and did everything in their power to prevent participation by tribesmen in Afghanistan.

On 10th January 1930 *Sardar* Shah Wali Khan, the King's brother, arrived in London and assumed the duties of Afghan Minister at the Court of St. James's.

On 20th December 1929 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, announced in a despatch to the Afghan Government that it was desired to re-establish the British Mission at Kabul at the earliest possible date, and that Mr. R. R. Maconachie, C.I.E., had been selected Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Afghan Court at Kabul. It was not however, until 11th May 1930 that Mr. Maconachie and the members of the British Legation arrived in Kabul where they were accorded a friendly reception. The delay between the date of appointment and of arrival in Kabul was occasioned by the necessity for the arrival at a satisfactory conclusion of negotiations between the Home Government and the Afghan Minister in London regarding the ratification of the Treaty of 1921.

On 5th November 1929 the Government of U. S. S. R. officially recognised King Nadir Shah and on 7th December M. Stark returned to Kabul and resumed his duties as Soviet Ambassador.

Other countries, namely France, Germany, Persia Turkey and Italy who formerly had representatives of their respective governments at Kabul have also recognised Nadir Shah. So far the French and Italian Legations which were withdrawn from Kabul on the outbreak of the rebellion, have not been replaced, although French interests are represented by a *Charge d'Affaires*, M. Charles Gaire.

At the orders of the German Government, Baron Von Plessen, the Minister, left Afghanistan in August 1929 and the German Legation was closed down. German interests are believed to be in the charge of the Russian Embassy.

On 19th February 1930 the new Persian Ambassador, Aqai Nasrullah Khalat Bary, arrived in Kabul.

As regards the Turkish Embassy, the Ambassador, Hikmet Bey presented his credentials on 24th June 1930. The reason for the delay in doing so is said to have been the refusal of the Afghan Government to accept a Turkish Military Mission.

## THE GHILZAI SITUATION.

Probably the most intricate of all the problems with which Nadir Shah has been faced is that of the Ghilzais, the great majority of whom have displayed throughout a definitely hostile attitude towards the authority of the established government. This hostility, although it has so far not taken any concerted active form, is fraught with dangerous possibilities owing to the widely spread localities in which the influence of this tribe is felt. Practically all the events of importance which have occurred since the accession of Nadir Shah in the Southern and Kandahar Provinces and in the southern districts of the Kabul province can be attributed in one way or another to Ghilzai machinations.

On the accession of Nadir Shah the Ghilzais, generally, showed little inclination to give him their allegiance. This hesitation was not so much due to any personal dislike of Nadir Shah, but to a combination of causes which were :---

- (a) The disinclination to recognise any government which would expect them to return the rifles acquired by them during the rebellion.
- (b) The absence of many important sections in India, due to the annual migration. These were too scattered to decide, with any unanimity as to their future action.
- (c) Jealousy of the favours shown to their old enemies the Wazirs who helped Nadir to capture Kabul.
- (d) The influence of Ghaus-ud-Din, the Ahmadzai Ghilzai leader, who although he was in India under surveillance, was intriguing with Suleiman Khel and Ahmadzai *Maliks* advising them not to give allegiance to Nadir Shah.
- (e) Antagonism to the Durranis at whose hands they had been subjected to many acts of aggression.
- (f) Propaganda that Bacha-i-Saqao was still alive and that with the advent of the warm weather would take the field against Nadir Shah.

Little or no change occurred in the situation until the *Powindahs* returned to Afghanistan in March and April. At the beginning of January some two hundred Suleiman Khel elders from Khorasan were summoned to Kabul by Nadir Shah who accorded them an honourable and friendly reception thereby raising their hopes of conciliatory treatment when the migratory clans returned in the spring.

A joint jirga consisting of some Wazir and Suleiman Khel representatives was held under the presidentship of Muhammad Hashim Khan. On 13th January a decision was arrived at whereby both tribes agreed to live at peace with each other in future and *Hazrat*, Sher Agha of Shor Bazar was appointed arbitrator to settle outstanding questions.

Their favourable reception and the persuasive powers of Nadir Shah undoubtedly had a good effect upon the leading Suleiman Khel *Maliks* in Kabul who adopted a distinctly pro-Nadir attitude and exerted their influence to prevent a Ghilzai rising. They wrote to several of the leading Suleiman Khel *Khons* in India asking them to come to Kabul on their

return and also advised them to hand over all looted arms and property. This advice, however, was not accepted.

The first clash between the Government and the Ghilzais occurred towards the end of February in the Kalat-i-Ghilzai area. One, Qadir Khan, Hotak, who since the beginning of the year had been raiding Durrani villages in the Arghastan District with a view to acquiring the requisite funds to carry on operations against the Government, marched his *lashkar* of Andar and Hotak Ghilzais on Kalat-i-Ghilzai where he took up a position on the surrounding hills commanding the town. The Government troops who formed the garrison, having been reinforced by 200 Wazirs from Shahjui, attacked Qadir Khan's *lashkar* on 25th February. The attack was successful, owing largely to the efforts of the Wazirs, and the *lashkar* dispersed. On the conclusion of hostilities a *jirga* was assembled at the instigation of *Sahibzada* Muhammad Ali and Khair Gul, Tokhi, with a view to arriving at a satisfactory settlement between the Durrani and the recalcitrant Ghilzais. An agreement was come to, and the Hotaks who were present agreed to surrender Qadir Khan to Government. Before this could be accomplished, however, Qadir Khan was assassinated by one of his relations on 3rd March. On receipt of this news the Governor of Kandahar advised the Durrani *maliks* to forget the misdeeds of the outlaw and exert their influence for peace and goodwill between themselves and the Ghilzais.

As the time for the return of the *powindahs* drew nearer, it was evident that the anxiety of the Government was increasing. Although enquiries made amongst the *powindahs* failed to elicit any decided views as to the attitude the tribe, as a whole, proposed to adopt towards the Government, there was no doubt that the powerful and influential Suleiman Khel division, were particularly hostile. The reasons for this hostility were :—

- (a) They considered that Nadir Shah had treated Ghaus-ud-Din, Ahmadzai, in a treacherous manner.
- (b) They were adverse to parting with looted government arms and stores.
- (c) Many of them considered Bacha-i-Saqao to be still alive.
- (d) They held Sher Agha and Gul Agha, the *Hazrats* of Shor Bazar, responsible for the plight of Afghanistan. Both were considered to be turn-coats, at first they were anti-Amanullah, then anti-Bacha-i-Saqao, and then in high esteem of the Nadir's Government.
- (e) That while in India they came under the influence of Indian agitators who spread anti-Nadir propaganda.

The crux of the Suleiman Khel situation, however, lay in the return of their rifles which they did not propose to surrender without a fight.

As regards the Kharots and Taraks their attitude was influenced by that of the Suleiman Khel. The former flatly refused to surrender their arms while the attitude of the latter was somewhat doubtful. They were not definitely hostile to Nadir Shah, but on the other hand were bitterly opposed to the Durrani. They also had been influenced by anti-Nadir propaganda while in India.

Meanwhile Abdul Ghani, the Governor of Kandahar had been doing everything in his power to find a solution to the impasse. At the beginning of May he assembled a Hotak-Tarak-Tokhi *jirga* in order to gauge the



depth of the Ghilzai ill-feeling. His efforts met with considerable success as he persuaded the *jirga* to agree to the following terms.

- (a) All future acts of lawlessness to be dealt with by the united action of the various sub-sections of the Ghilzais.
- (b) Efforts to be made to recover rifles in the possession of unauthorised persons.
- (c) Durrani and Ghilzais should mutually agree to write off all individual and collective losses suffered at the hands of each other.

Hardly had this satisfactory agreement been reached than its effects were neutralised to a great extent by an unprovoked raid carried out by Achakzais on the Taraks in the neighbourhood of Jaldak. The raid was successful in spite of the fact that a detachment from Spin Baldak was sent out to intercept the raiders.

A factor which contributed largely to the Ghilzai unrest was the insidious propaganda spread by the renegade *Sahibzada* of Zakird, Muhammad Ali Khan, amongst the Taraks and Andars. After evading arrest for a period of four months he was finally brought to heel on 31st May through the efforts of Khair Gul, Tokhi, who persuaded the Taraks to hand him over to Government.

The removal of the *Sahibzada* was a big step in the right direction, as there was every prospect that the Taraks who are really more anti-Durrani than anti-Nadir and, except for the Suleiman Khels, the most recalcitrant of all the Ghilzais would now keep the peace. If they did so, then the Kharots could be expected to do likewise. As regards other sections, the Hotaks and Tokhis, were already settled as a result of the agreement come to at the *jirga* held at the beginning of May, while the Andars and Nasirs were mostly concerned with the question of grazing rights in the Hazarajat. At the end of May, therefore, the situation had greatly improved for the Government, and it appeared that, if the Suleiman Khel could only be won over, there was every prospect of more settled conditions. The Suleiman Khel, however, remained adamant and still flatly refused to return any rifles. In the Southern Province, however there were indications of a better feeling as some of the Suleiman Khel of Zurnat paid in some of the revenue owing by them and there were signs that they were preparing to give their allegiance to Nadir.

During June, the situation again deteriorated, the centre of unrest being now transferred to the Kabul Province. Ill feeling arose between the Hazaras and Ghilzais owing to the former refusing to allow the *Kuchis* to enter the Hazarajat for grazing their flocks. Efforts were made to settle the matter by negotiation in Kabul, but in the meanwhile disturbances had broken out in the Ghazni area necessitating the despatch of troops from Kabul. As a result of the negotiations, the Hazaras allowed "Kuchi" traders to enter their territory, but by the end of June were still holding out against the entry of flocks.

Meanwhile on 7th June a serious disturbance broke out at Shahjui between the Tokhis and Wazirs over the settlement of an old blood feud. The Tokhis numbering 3,000 surrounded the Wazirs in Shahjui determined to wipe them out or procure their removal. This placed the Government in a dilemma. If they acceded to the Ghilzais request they

would merely be postponing the issue, and at the same time exposing their own weakness. If on the other hand they refused, they would have the whole of the Ghilzais united against them.

The Shahjui incident had the effect of arousing considerable support from other Ghilzais sections and by the end of June it was apparent that efforts towards establishing some form of unity were in progress. Aurang, a Suleiman Khel Malik, sent to the Tokhis at Shahjui offering to support them if necessary with a *lashkar* of 1,500 while a reconciliation took place between Aurang and Abdur Rahman representing the Taraks. It is noteworthy that the Taraks, hitherto, have always been the bitterest enemies of the Suleiman Khels. At a *jirga* held at a Robat near Shahjui on 7th June it was agreed by the representatives of the Tokhis, Andars and Taraks that they were all anti-Nadir, but at the moment could do nothing if he brought his full strength to bear against them. The Shahjui incident, however presented a good opportunity for a trial of strength with the power of the Government.

At the end of June therefore, the situation which had deteriorated rapidly was fraught with considerable danger for the Government. The King and the Government, however, have throughout been fully alive to the seriousness of the situation. The former has been endeavouring to settle the matter by diplomacy rather than by force. The subject of the return of rifles has been studiously avoided, while officials have been instructed to use great care and tact in their dealings with the Ghilzais. Sher Agha, *Hazrat Sahib* of Shor Bazar, who is generally regarded as wielding influence amongst the Suleiman Khel was ordered to the disaffected area armed with full powers to settle all differences. The Government, however, were a little doubtful of Sher Agha's attitude and disinclined to trust him too far. Allah Niwaz, the King's Equerry, was also sent, probably to act as a restraining influence.

## APPENDIX.

## LIST OF APPOINTMENTS.

*Central Administration.*

- Prime Minister—Muhd. Hashim Khan. (337).  
 President of the Shura—Abdul Ahad Khan. (4).  
 Ministry of Education—Ali Muhd. Khan. (179).  
 Foreign Minister—Faiz Muhd. Khan. (243).  
 Ministry of Health—Muhd. Akbar Khan.  
 Home Minister—Muhd. Gul Khan.  
 Ministry of Justice—*Hazrat* Fazl-i-Umar. (256).  
 Ministry of Revenue—Muhd. Ayub Khan. (211).  
 Ministry of Trade—Muhd. Akbar Khan. (153).  
 War Minister—Shah Mahmud Khan. (414).  
 Minister of Court—Ahmad Shah Khan. (149).  
 Equerry—Allah Nawaz. (182).  
 State Factories—Qurban Husain. (512).

*Provincial Administration.*

- Afghan Turkestan—Muhammad Yakub Khan. (675).  
 Maimana Province—Ghulam Nabi. (229).  
 Farah Province—Ali Gauhar Khan.  
 Badakshan and Kataghan—Ahmad Ali Khan. (141).  
 Eastern Province—Muhammad Gul Khan.  
 Southern Province—Sher Ahmad Khan.  
 Kandahar Province—Abdul Ghani Khan. (34).  
 Herat Province—Abdur Rahim Khan. (89).

NOTE.—The numbers in brackets refer to "Who's Who in Afghanistan (1930 edition)".

THE REBELLION IN AFGHANISTAN FROM 1ST JULY 1929 TO THE ACCESSION OF  
NADIR SHAH, 16TH NOVEMBER 1929.

*General Situation at the end of June 1929.*

With the opening of the year under review, Habibullah's fortunes had reached a more favourable stage than at any time since his seizure of the reins of government. The flight of Amanullah and the consequent collapse of opposition in the Kandahar area, had enabled Habibullah to establish himself as the paramount power in Afghanistan, except in the Southern and Eastern provinces. Even in this area the threat to Kabul inherent in Nadir Khan's presence had, for the time, been averted by the capture of Gardez and by the withdrawal to Hariob of Nadir Khan and his brothers. In the Eastern province, Hashim Khan had made but little headway. The tribes did not display any marked enthusiasm for Nadir's cause, and were too much taken up with profiting from the situation that had arisen.

North of the Hindu Kush, Ghulam Nabi had withdrawn to Soviet territory leaving Mazar Province in the hands of Saiyid Husain, Habibullah's Minister for War. Herat was controlled by Abdur Rahim, ostensibly on Habibullah's behalf, while, in Kandahar Habibullah's officials were busy obtaining the allegiance of the people. Nearer Kabul, the Hazaras who were determined to support Amanullah's cause had withdrawn from the vicinity of Ghorband and Bamian and had dispersed to their homes, disheartened by the abandonment of the contest by the *ex-King*.

Habibullah, therefore, was in a strong position and there appeared to be every likelihood of his being accepted as the acknowledged occupant of the throne. Events which followed each other with startling rapidity, however, proved otherwise. In the short space of four months, Habibullah had not only lost everything but had paid the penalty of his usurpation at the hands of the executioner.

*Events in the Southern and Eastern Provinces.*

As the result of the defeat of Nadir-Khan's *lashkar* of Ahmadzai Ghilzais and Mangals and the capture of Gardez on 26th June 1929 by Muhummad Umar Khan, Habibullah's G. O. C. in the Logar Valley, Nadir Khan, Shah Wali, Shah Mahmud and Sher Agha withdrew to Hariob, leaving a force of about 1,000 Amadzais and Tota Khel under Jan Baz Khan in position at Bala Deh and on the Altimur Pass. Sher Agha who had definitely thrown in his lot with Nadir Khan now left for Suleiman Khel country with a view to persuading the tribe, with whom he is generally regarded as having influence, to throw in their lot with Nadir Khan.

Meanwhile, by 5th July, Shah Mahmud had succeeded in raising a *lashkar* of 2,000 Jajis and had concentrated at Kasim Khel, just East of the Shutargardan Pass. By 15th July this force had increased in strength to about 5,000 and had reached Sarkha in the Logar Valley, compelling Habibullah to evacuate his advanced post at Kushi which was at once occupied by Ahmadzais, and to reinforce Zargunshahr. On 16th July, Shah Mahmud's force attacked Zargunshahr, while the Ahmadzais at Kushi moved West and attacked Pathai Roghanai. The attack was driven off and Shah Mahmud was compelled to withdraw altogether from the Logar Valley. His *lashkars* dispersed, and he with his brothers again returned

to Ali Khel where they commenced preparations for another offensive. Shah Mahmud's offensive was completely abortive and failed to influence the situation against Habibullah who still continued to hold Gardez. Bala Deh and the Altimur were still held by Nadir's force under Jan Baz Khan. Gardez held out until after the capture of Kabul by Nadir Khan when Habibullah's forces made their submission and the place was taken over by Nadir's representative.

#### *Eastern Province.*

In the Eastern province Hashim Khan fared no better than his brother had done. On 8th July he commenced to assemble his *lashkar* and by 15th July had concentrated a force of 2,000 Khugianis and 1,000 Surkhrudis commanded by Muhammad Gul Khan in the area between the Khurd Kabul defile and the Haft Kotal. This *lashkar* was attacked by Habibullah on 19th July. Fighting continued until 21st July when Hashim Khan's force ran short of food and ammunition and withdrew to Khugiani limits. On their way they were molested by Hisarak Ghilzais and Sherzai Khugianis who relieved them of some rifles. Hashim Khan at once set about preparing another *lashkar* in order to renew the attack and on 7th August, 2,000 Khugianis under Muhammad Gul Khan left for Tezin where they remained for a few days and then dispersed once more without having accomplished anything.

#### *Kabul Area.*

At the beginning of July the Hazaras who had dispersed to their homes on the flight of Amanullah, again reassembled under the command of Abdul Kerim, a former Governor of Kandahar in Amanullah's reign. On 3rd July they attacked Habibullah's force under Pur Dil Khan at Jalrez, 30 miles West of Kabul, and driving him back, occupied the town. On 9th and 10th July they renewed the attack during which they lost 150 casualties while Pur Dil's losses amounted to 33. After this both sides retired, the Hazaras to Jalrez and Pur Dil to Arghandeh, 16 miles West of Kabul. Fighting, however, still continued intermittently until towards the end of July during which time Jalrez changed hands twice finally remaining in the occupation of the Hazaras.

Further North another Hazara *lashkar* commanded by Muhammad Rasul attacked Habibullah's troops, numbering about 2,000 in the Ghorband valley on 5th July, and drove them back to the vicinity of Jabal-us-Siraj, 40 miles North of Kabul. The Hazaras, however, for some unknown reason, instead of following up their success, withdrew from the Ghorband Valley to the Saigan area. By the end of July Habibullah was again in occupation of the Ghorband Valley as far as Bamian.

Meanwhile Habibullah had been negotiating with the Hazaras representatives at Kabul with a view to arrange a truce between the contesting parties. These negotiations proved successful and an agreement was come to whereby the Hazara force at Jalrez withdrew and dispersed to their homes in return for a promise, *inter alia*, of exemption from all land revenue until the whole of Afghanistan had accepted the Kabul government, permission to retain arms, and complete autonomy within their own limits.

#### *Situation at beginning of August 1929.*

As a result of the fighting during July, Habibullah had maintained his position. In the Southern province Nadir Khan and his brothers were

back in Hariob, their *lashkars* having dispersed. A small force under Jan Baz Khan, however, still held Bala Deh and the Altimur Pass. Habibullah held Gardez and had firmly established himself in the Logar Valley. In the Eastern province, Hashim Khan's *lashkars*, after two abortive efforts had dispersed to their homes while North and West of Kabul the Hazaras had ceased, anyhow for the time being, to be a serious threat to Habibullah.

*Renewal of fighting in Southern Province.*

On their return to Ali Khel, after the defeat of Shah Mahmud's *lashkar* in the Logar Valley in the middle of July, Nadir Khan and his brothers at once commenced preparations for another offensive. By 20th August a *lashkar* composed of 3,000 Jajis, 1,000 Ahmadzai Ghilzais and 800 Tota Khel and Mangals had collected at Sheshnak in Koshin where Shah Mahmud joined them. On 22nd August he moved South to Khand Khel, 14 miles N.-E. of Gardez. Hearing of his approach, Muhammad Siddiq who was holding Gardez, sent a force of some 2,000 Kohistanis and mixed tribesmen under Yawar Muhammad Amin to oppose him. During the night of 22nd/23rd August this force opened a heavy fire on Khand Khel, but next morning was attacked by Shah Mahmud who succeeded in making slight progress in the direction of Gardez. The advance, however, was soon brought to a standstill. Muhammad Siddiq concentrated his fire upon the Jaji contingent of Shah Mahmud's force who at once suspecting treachery, retired. This caused the Mangals and Ahmadzais to fall back also and Gardez for the time being was saved.

Desultory fighting now ensued for a time. On the 6th September Muhammad Siddiq captured the Altimur Pass, thus ensuring direct communication with the Logar Valley. On 11th September he attacked Shah Mahmud at Khand Khel, but without result. Further indecisive fighting took place on 15th and 16th September. By 20th September Muhammad Siddiq was in possession of Bala Deh while Shah Mahmud had been compelled to withdraw to Sheshnak and Mirzakai, 25 miles to the North-East.

*Hashim Khan's defeat in the Eastern Province.*

While the events enumerated above had been taking place in the Southern Province, Hashim Khan had been actively engaged in collecting together another *lashkar*, with a view to co-operating with Nadir Khan. By the beginning of September, assisted by *Malik* Nek Muhammad of Babar, he had collected a force of Khugianis and Surkhrudis and despatched it once more to Tezin.

On receipt of news of this threat, Habibullah at once reinforced his garrison at Butkhak and, advancing Eastwards into the Eastern Province, came in contact with Hashim's force in the neighbourhood of Jagdalak on 13th September. Heavy fighting ensued and by 14th September Hashim Khan appeared to have gained the upper hand as he gradually forced the enemy to retire. On the next day, however, the latter were strongly reinforced by a large number of Jabbar Khel and Khairo Khel Ghilzais, and on 16th September a force of some 3,000 strong with guns arrived from Kabul. The majority of these troops were transferred from the

Jalrez front as a result of the settlement with the Hazaras. These reinforcements turned the scale, and the Khugianis, in spite of the arrival of reinforcements from Tezin, fled and took to the hills.

All opposition to Habibullah's advance now collapsed. Hashim Khan himself abandoned his headquarters at Kaga on 15th September and fled to Parachinar where he arrived on 18th September. In compliance with their observance of strict neutrality, the Government of India at once directed that he should either re-enter Afghanistan by the shortest route or submit to removal to Quetta pending transfer to some foreign country. As he refused to comply with the former alternative, he was removed to Quetta where he remained under surveillance until the change of events permitted his return to Kandhar on 21st October.

On the dispersal of Hashim Khan's *lashkar*, Habibullah's forces, commanded by his brother Hamidullah, advanced into the Eastern Province and by 18th September had reached Gandamak and Kaga. On 22nd September his advanced guard of 400 Kohistanis and 2 pack guns entered Jalalabad and by 1st October he had firmly established himself, the garrison of the town consisting of about 800 Kohistanis and some Shinwaris under Mubammad Alam, Shinwari.

Hamidullah now busied himself collecting all government rifles in possession of the tribes between Kabul and Jalalabad. He also opened negotiations with the Khugianis with a view to bringing about a settlement. He was not successful, in entirely crushing all opposition to Habibullah in the Eastern Province, but before describing the events which resulted in his evacuation of Jalalabad it is necessary to return once more to Nadir Khan.

#### *The arrival of the Wazirs in Nadir Khan's Camp.*

As a result of the defeat of Shah Mahmud in the vicinity of Gardez and the collapse of Hashim Khan in the Eastern Province Nadir Khan's fortunes were now at a very low ebb. He, therefore, decided to renew his efforts to enlist the sympathies of the tribesmen on our side of the border with a view to their fighting for his cause. He had already been in touch with the Afridis who were formerly in receipt of Afghan allowances as early as the previous June, but in spite of the efforts of his recruiting agents, had not met with any marked success.\* He now turned his attention to the Wazirs and Mahsuds and requested the Government of India to permit these tribesmen to join him. In pursuance of the declared policy of neutrality and non-intervention in Afghan affairs, this request was met by Government with a firm but courteous refusal.

In spite of this, however, a Wazir *lashkar* composed of some 800 Saifalis and Paipalis from Shawal and Birmal, 200 Daurs and approximately 1,000 Madda Khel Wazirs, the majority being armed, left tribal territory at the end of August with the intention of joining Nadir Khan in Hariob, travelling through Khost. Slight opposition to the passage of this *lashkar* was offered by the Khostwals near Matun, but in spite of this it pursued its way, and arrived at Ali Khel, Nadir Khan's Headquarters, between 18th and 20th September. This accretion considerably revived the

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\*Vide Annual Summary of Events in N.-W. F. Tribal Territory, published with Monthly Intelligence Summary No. 3, dated 1st March 1930.

drooping spirits of Nadir Khan and his brothers and went far towards allaying the intense depression which had set in amongst the tribesmen of the Southern Province consequent upon the flight of Hashim Khan to Parachinar.

Nadir Khan, now set about concentrating his *lashkar* and by 26th September the following force had been assembled at Dobandi under the command of Shah Wali Khan preparatory to an advance into the Logar Valley :—

|                     |    |    |       |    |       |
|---------------------|----|----|-------|----|-------|
| Almadzai Ghilzais   | .. | .. | ..    | .. | 2,500 |
| Jajis               | .. | .. | ..    | .. | 1,700 |
| Wazirs              | .. | .. | ..    | .. | 2,000 |
| Dauris              | .. | .. | ..    | .. | 100   |
| Chakmannis          | .. | .. | ..    | .. | 300   |
| Mangals and Zadrans | .. | .. | ..    | .. | 200   |
|                     |    |    |       |    | <hr/> |
|                     |    |    | Total | .. | 6,800 |
|                     |    |    |       |    | <hr/> |

On 2nd October a second Wazir *lashkar* composed of 400 Tori Khel and Mohmit Khel arrived at Matun on their way to Hariob. This force reached Ali Khel on 6th October and left for the Logar Valley next day.

#### *The Last Phase.*

The arrival of the Wazirs in Hariob had changed the situation considerably in Nadir's favour. With the *lashkar* at his disposal he now felt justified in trying conclusions once more with Habibullah, and decided to march direct on Kabul *via* the Logar Valley. On 27th September, therefore, Shah Wali who was in command of the *lashkar* concentrated at Dobandi commenced his advance, and on 2nd October he had reached Kushi without encountering any opposition.

Meanwhile, on the night of 1st|2nd October 100 Wazirs and some 300 Musa Khel Ghilzais attacked and captured a piquet of Habibullah's at Tangi Waghjan on the Kabul-Logar road West of Zarghun Shahr and so blocked the Kabul-Darwesh Road. On 4th October a force of Habibullah's men from Darwesh, about 400 strong, attacked the Wazirs at Tangi Waghjan, but was driven off. Habibullah was now reported to be holding positions at Patkai Roghanai, Muhammad Agha, Sum-i-Duldul and Charasia.

On 5th October Shah Wali's main force advanced from Zargun Shahr and Tangi Waghjan astride the Logar River, and rapidly overrunning the hostile positions at Deh-i-Nau and Muhammad Agha, reached the vicinity of Zahidabad where the advance was checked by strong opposition. After heavy fighting Habibullah's forces were again compelled to withdraw, and by the early morning of 6th October Shah Wali had reached in front of the position of Charasia where Habibullah again attempted to make a stand. His men, however, had now become demoralised and failed to withstand Shah Wali's victorious advance. By the same evening Shah Wali had reached the line Bin-i-Hissar Indaki Dar-ul-Aman, about 4,000 yards South of the City of Kabul, where he faced Habibullah's troops who were holding a strong position along the Siah Sang and Sher Darwaza



heights. A lull now occurred in the fighting, Shah Wali having decided to await the arrival of reinforcements before making an assault on the City. The Wazirs, however, carried out a night raid on Kabul in which they are stated to have lost heavily.

Meanwhile affairs had been progressing for Habibullah almost as badly in the Eastern Province as they had in the Southern. In spite of Hamidullah's successful occupation of Jalalabad he had not been able to eradicate entirely all opposition to Habibullah's rule. Towards the end of September Muhasil (Mohmand), Muhammad Afzal (Shinwari) and Nek Muhammad of Babar decided in *jirga* that Habibullah's rule could not be accepted and they determined to attack Jalalabad with a combined force of Mohmands and Shinwaris. The attack commenced on 3rd October and indecisive fighting occurred up to 5th. On the night of 10th|11th October the Kohistanis withdrew towards Kabul taking their guns and ammunition, but leaving their tents behind them. When this force reached Butkhak, 16 miles East of Kabul, news of Shah Wali's success reached them, whereupon they immediately dispersed to their homes. Jalalabad was occupied by Mohmands and Shinwaris of Muhammad Afzal's faction.

#### *The Capture of Kabul.*

Up to 10th October, the situation in front of Kabul remained stationary, but on that date Shah Wali's troops delivered an attack which gained possession of Kabul City. Shah Wali surrounded the Arg, in which Habibullah with his family and some 300 men had taken refuge. Nadir Khan's family, who throughout the rebellion had been in Habibullah's hands were also removed to the Arg by the latter with the intention of holding them as hostages for his own subsequent safety. On 11th and 12th October Shah Wali's troops looted all the Government buildings, including the Treasury, Museum, Dilkhusha Palace, Foreign Office, Shor Bazar and State Workshops. The French and Turkish Legations were also partially looted. On 12th October Habibullah having refused to surrender, Shah Wali commenced a bombardment of the Arg and the Magazine was set on fire. On the same day a force of Kohistanis under Pur Dil which was hurrying to the relief of Habibullah was defeated at Bemaru and Pur Dil was killed. Habibullah now sued for peace, but during the night of 12|13th while negotiations were still in progress, he seized the opportunity of the darkness to escape through a breach in the wall of the Arg and fled to Jabul-us-Siraj accompanied by a few men and women. On 13th October Shah Wali's force entered and looted the Arg inside which Habibullah's father and family were captured. The dead bodies of *Sardar* Hayatullah, Abdul Majid (both brothers of Amanullah), Habibullah Khan (Amanullah's under Secretary for War) and *Sardar* Muhammad Usman Khan (a former president of the Council), all of whom were put to death by Habibullah, were also discovered. During their retirement towards Koh-i-Daman, Habibullah's men threatened the British Legation, but, except for the theft of some property from two houses, were persuaded to leave it alone.

On 16th October and succeeding days, Shah Wali's forces advanced northwards in pursuit of Habibullah, indulging in wholesale looting *en route*. Kala Khan, Habibullah's village, was burnt to the ground. Habibullah himself was discovered to be holding out in Jabal-us-Siraj

fort. As the result of negotiations, however, he agreed to capitulate and make his submission to Nadir Khan. Accompanied by his brother, Hamidullah, Saiyid Husain, his War Minister, and few men he arrived in Kabul on 22nd October, when he was immediately put under arrest. On 1st November Habibullah, Hamidullah and ten of his chief supporters were executed by order of Nadir Khan at the express desire of the tribal representatives, assembled in Kabul. On the evening 14th October Nadir Khan entered Kabul and on 16th he proclaimed himself King of Afghanistan at the special request of the populace of the City.

*Reasons for Habibullah's downfall.*

Habibullah's rapid decline and collapse may be attributed to three causes :—

- (1) His increasing unpopularity, as a result of his cruelty and oppression.
- (2) Increasing difficulty in obtaining recruits for his Army.
- (3) Arrival of the Wazirs.

(i) With the departure of Amanullah and the virtual consolidation of Habibullah as ruler of the country, the leading *Maliks* and *Khans* naturally looked forward to the establishment of a settled government and a period of peace in which to recover from the recent upheaval. Early in July 1929 a large meeting took place in Kabul which was attended by many of the leading *Maliks* and *Khans* of Kabul, Koh-i-Daman and Kohistan. The meeting pointed out to Habibullah, who was present that the people were tired of continual fighting and bloodshed and recommended him to come to terms with Nadir Khan. This advice, Habibullah peremptorily rejected with the result that he immediately alienated the sympathies of the *Maliks* and people of the districts which up to now had been his main support.

There appears to be little doubt that his rapid rise to power culminating in the overthrow of Amanullah turned Habibullah's head. Devoid of all education and finding himself suddenly thrust into the position of a ruler for which he possessed few qualifications, he thought that he could assume the rôle of dictator and dispense with the restraining influence of saner counsels. He imagined, however, that the rule of a dictator was synonymous with a rule of terror. The executions of *Shughassi* Ali Ahmad Jan, *Sardar* Hayatullah Khan and *Qazi* Abdul Wasi on trumped up charges merely tended to weaken his position and to increase the strong under-current of feeling against him in Kabul which was merely kept in check by the harsh measures which Habibullah adopted to suppress the growing animus to his rule.

(ii) The falling off in the flow of recruits can be directly attributed to the feelings of animosity engendered by Habibullah's stupid dictatorial policy in the minds of the leading men and people of the Kabul, Koh-i-Daman and Kohistan areas. Since the outbreak of the rebellion these areas had been the chief sources for the supply of man power for Habibullah's forces. As Habibullah's commitments on the various fronts grew, so did his demands for manpower become more incessant. The economic situation which was already in a bad way, thus grew rapidly worse. Tilling of the fields and sowing of crops reached a standstill owing to lack of labour, and the alienation of the support of the leading *Maliks* and

*Khans* at this time only tended to enhance the already prevalent feeling of discontent and weariness. In addition to this, Habibullah's treasury was unequal to the severe strain imposed upon it and for the months of July and August the troops received no pay. Their morale was thus so lowered that they were unable to withstand any determined effort which might be made against them.

(iii) The arrival of the Wazirs in Nadir Khan's camp proved the final turning point in Habibullah's career. Not only did they infuse new ardour into Nadir Khan's force which was somewhat disheartened by the reversals they had suffered in the vicinity of Gardez, but the vigour of their attack completely shattered Habibullah's opposition in the Logar Valley. The latter's troops whose morale was already at a low ebb rapidly deteriorated into a panic stricken rabble and fled before the rapid advance of Nadir's forces.

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Serial No. 476



*Summary of*  
**Events in Afghanistan**

1st July 1930 to 30th June 1931

*Compiled by the General Staff*

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MAP B.—Afghanistan communications.





**NOTE.**

Previous issues of the " Summary of Events in Afghanistan " **may** be destroyed, if no longer required.



# CONFIDENTIAL.

## SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN.

1ST JULY 1930—30TH JUNE 1931.

### I.

#### *The situation in June 1930.*

At the end of June 1930, Nadir Shah, King only for 8 months, was still far from secure upon his throne. In the Kabul, Eastern and Southern Provinces serious revolts had just been put down. In the Southern Province particularly the tribes were still recalcitrant. The Ghilzais were in almost open revolt. In the Northern Provinces a special commission had just been appointed to restore law and order which had ceased to exist. Throughout Eastern and Southern Afghanistan large numbers of rifles, looted during the 1928-29 rebellion, were in the hands of tribes, who, loath to submit again to any form of control, were determined not to restore their arms to Government. The Army was disorganized, badly armed and inefficient. In the Herat Province alone were conditions peaceful, and there the Governor, Abdur Rahim, ruled in virtual independence.

The task of consolidation and reorganization which faced the Afghan Government was formidable in the extreme.

### II.

#### KABUL.

On the night of July 20th|21st a serious revolt broke out in Koh-i-daman. The rebels murdered the Governor and captured his escort. A body of troops sent next day to restore order were ambushed. Further reinforcements of troops and tribesmen were rushed to the scene and by August 1st the rebels were driven into the hills. The revolt was sternly put down. Although said to have been due to the tyranny of the local Governor, it was made the occasion for action against the Republican and Amanullah parties in Kabul. For their alleged complicity in the rebellion a number of notables were arrested and ordered to leave the country, but were finally kept under supervision in Kabul.

A feature of the revolt was the ready response of the Pathan tribes to the Government's call for help.

Independence day was celebrated on August 20th. In September Nadir Shah held his first National Assembly. It reintroduced the titles and decorations abolished by Amanullah, restored the old emblems to the national flag, and rejected Amanullah's claims to his property in Afghanistan.

In the autumn there was a notable increase in anti-Nadir propaganda. Efforts were made to counter this, including attempts to conciliate leaders of the Amanullah party. In March 1931, however, a great impetus was given to this anti-Nadir propaganda by the publication in India of a letter from Amanullah, in which he defended his own actions when King, and accused Nadir of disloyalty and bad faith. This subject is dealt with more fully in para. XII.

The policy of employing Europeans as teachers and technical advisers has been revived, and there are a number now in Kabul.

On the whole, since the suppression of the Koh-i-Daman rebellion Kabul has remained remarkably quiet, and, apart from a temporary excitement caused by pro-Amanullah propaganda, interest has centred chiefly in the affairs of the Northern Provinces and the Ghilzai problem.

### III.

#### EASTERN PROVINCE.

This province remained remarkably quiet throughout the year. Respect for law and order increased. Revenue was paid. Considerable improvements were made to communications.

Owing to its proximity to the Afridi and Mohmand country the province was naturally affected by the disturbances in the N.-W. F. P. Throughout the year parties of Afridis and Mohmands visited the province with the object of enlisting Afghan assistance. Notably efforts were made to secure the support of the Chaknaur Mullah, a Mohmand priest, who had at one time been actively anti-British. Numerous jirgahs were held to discuss the question; but, apart from a few Afridi families being allowed to immigrate into Ningrahar and a number of ne'er-do-wells going into Mohmand territory, no active assistance was given. The Chaknaur Mullah, pleading old age, steadfastly refused to do anything. He died at his home on 4th June, 1931.

There were a number of minor raids but these were successfully dealt with by the local authorities.

The only direction in which the authorities appear to have failed is in securing recruits for the army. The tribesmen in this province have apparently no liking for military service.

The province is at present governed by Ghulam Faruq (W. W. 273) who relieved Firqa Mishar Abdul Qayum (W. W. 82) in January; but the foundations of successful government were laid by Muhammad Gul Khan (W. W. 315-A.) who was Rais-i-Tanzimieh from January to June 1930.

### IV.

#### SOUTHERN PROVINCE.

In June 1930 the situation in this province was far from satisfactory. The collection of arms and revenue was making practically no progress. Agitators from British Territory were making strenuous efforts to enlist the support of the tribesmen on behalf of the Afridis. The attitude of the more important tribes towards the Afghan Government was defiant.

During the greater part of the past year this unhappy state of affairs continued. Throughout July and August the anti-British agitators maintained their efforts. In August a party of Ahmadzais tried to enlist the support of the Jajis in a combined attack on the Kurram. The Jajis refused to join them and, after building some sangars astride the Peiwar Kotal, the Ahmadzais withdrew.

From the 22nd August to 7th September a lashkar of Mangals, Maqbils and Chamkannis made a series of attacks on Kurram Militia piquets in the Karlachi area. The lashkar finally dispersed on 12th September on receipt of a firman from Nadir Shah.

Throughout this period the Afghan Government made every effort to restrain their tribes. In October, mainly on account of these efforts, anti-Nadir propaganda became more marked. Attempts to collect arms and to obtain recruits were alike unsuccessful. In November two generals were sent to tour the country in order to stimulate recruiting and to spread pro-Nadir propaganda. Still there was no improvement. Repeated Jirgahs were held with the object of raising lashkars to attack British Territory, and the tribesmen were undoubtedly out of hand. The advent of the cold weather and the reopening of the Kurram to trade, however, damped their ardour, and by December 15th, they dispersed to their homes.

In January and February there was considerable inter-tribal fighting and it was evident that to restore order Government would have to take drastic measures ; but Government was apparently not ready to do so.

A proposal to revive the Wazir Militias of Urghun and Khost was made early in 1931. This met with no enthusiasm from the inhabitants of Khost, as an essential feature of the scheme was the settlement of the Wazirs on the land in Khost, a measure to which the Zadrans and Mangals objected. Barracks were however completed in Matun in May, and enlistment is expected to start shortly.

In March and April there was a slight improvement, the smaller tribes handing in arms and paying revenue. There was no improvement, however, in the attitude of the Zadrans, Mangals and Jajis.

In May the authorities determined to act. It was decided to deal first of all with the Dare Khel section of the Zadrans. An ultimatum was issued and forces assembled on the borders of Dare Khel country to enforce government orders, should the Dare Khels not comply with the ultimatum.

Either their courage failed them at the last moment or negotiation was deemed preferable to force, for, shortly after the delivery of the ultimatum, the Government issued orders to the Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Viceroy) to tone down his commands and to undertake no operations without the King's permission. Negotiation however succeeded. The Dare Khel accepted the Government's terms, which included the payment of revenue and the restoration of arms. Although it remains to be seen how far they will honour their agreement, the affair was a definite triumph for the Government, and resulted in an improvement of the situation throughout the province.

Sher Ahmad held the appointment of Rais-i-Tanzimieh throughout the year.

## V.

### KANDAHAR.

The main pre-occupation of the Kandahar authorities has been the Ghilzai question. This is dealt with in para. (viii).

From August to December raids in the area Kandahar-Chaman were frequent and at one time necessitated the closing of the road between these two places for several days. The Governor of Spin Baldak was recalled on account of his inability to control his area. His relief and the arrest, in December, of Zakkum (W. W. 691-A.), a leading Malik who was responsible for much of the raiding, led to a marked improvement.

In February, Gul Muhd. Khan, (W. W. 315-A.) who is one of the outstanding personalities of the Nadir regime, was appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh, Kandahar. Since October 1929 Gul Muhd. Khan has held

successively the posts of Minister of Interior, Assistant to the Prime Minister, and Rais-i-Tanzimieh of the Eastern, Koh-i-Daman and Kandahar provinces.

He at once set to work to reform the administration. Bribery and corruption were sternly put down. The re-organization of the police and military was taken in hand. The collection of arms and revenue was energetically carried out ; not always however with success. The question of the Shahjui Wazirs, which had been left undecided since the previous year, was settled. The Wazirs were paid 2 lakhs (Afghan) as compensation and informed that their lands in Shahjui would not be restored to them. Instead they were allotted land near Kandahar. Many of the Wazirs are still however dissatisfied and may give trouble on this account.

Interviews and conferences were held with a view to settling various disputes and many regulations for the improvement of local conditions were issued.

The energy and ability of the new Rais-i-Tanzimieh has led to a great improvement, and, although raids still occur, the members of the Haardt expedition, who passed through Kandahar early in June, expressed their admiration of the peaceful conditions prevailing in this province.

## VI.

### HERAT.

This province has again remained peaceful throughout the year. Until June (1931) the Governor, Abdur Rahim (W. W. 89) was virtually independent : he paid no regard to the orders of the Central Government nor was any revenue ever remitted to Kabul. Rumours were at one time rife that Shah Mahmud, the Minister for War, as soon as he had pacified the Northern Provinces, was to be sent to Herat to bring Abdur Rahim to book. Later, rumour said that Gul Muhd. Khan R. I. T., Kandahar, was to be sent with this object.

In June 1931, however, it was reported that Abdur Rahim, had, on the occasion of the Id (May) made, at public gatherings, strongly pro-Nadir speeches, and remitted revenue to Kabul. These facts denote a change in his attitude which, if maintained, will be all to the country's good. It now seems possible therefore that he may be allowed to retain his position.

In January trade with Russia, which had been suspended on account of customs disputes, was resumed. The Herat bazaar is reported to be full of Russian goods.

In the same month a number of Baluchis and Hazaras under the notorious raider Kerim, Khan of Merv, arrived in Herat from Russian territory. The activities of Kerim and his followers have been the source of some friction between Abdur Rahim, Russia and the Afghan Government. The Russians have complained of Rahim's failure to check the depredations of the Baluchis, and Kabul of his failure to comply with their instructions to remove Kerim and his men from Herat, and to prevent them raiding Russian Territory.

A considerable number of refugees from Soviet Territory arrived in Herat during the year. Arrangements to grant them land in Afghanistan are in progress.

## VII.

## NORTHERN PROVINCES.

The year opened with reports that all was well and that law and order were being rapidly restored.

In May (1930) Ibrahim Beg, the Basmachi leader, crossed the Oxus and raided in Soviet Territory. He was driven back by Russian troops who, in the pursuit crossed the Oxus on 20th June and penetrated as far as Khanabad. Ibrahim escaped and the Russians withdrew. Very little was said about the incident.

It soon became clear that conditions in the North were not so satisfactory as local reports indicated. Reinforcements were continually sent from Kabul, and it transpired that Ibrahim Beg and his followers were causing the Government considerable anxiety. Extremely mobile, he carried out raids in all directions and eluded every effort to capture him. Trade was brought to a stand still. The roads became unsafe for travel.

The authorities now concentrated all their energies on stamping out his activities. Regular troops of all arms were sent from Kabul; tribal levies were increased and a campaign which lasted from November to April was begun. In December the War Minister himself left Kabul to take charge of the operations.

In March, Ibrahim Beg, after many vicissitudes, was driven across the Oxus. He was apparently joined by discontented elements in Soviet Turkestan and attacked the Russians in the Dushambe area. The Soviet was compelled to move reinforcements to deal with him. It was not till June that Ibrahim Beg was finally defeated and captured. It is not known what the Russians propose to do with him, but it is to be hoped that this menace to the peace of Northern Afghanistan will be removed, if not for ever, at least for a considerable period.

The disappearance of Ibrahim Beg from Afghan territory was followed by a brisk revival in trade and by a rapid improvement in the general situation in the North.

Throughout the year the Russians have continued their policy of peaceful penetration and there is reason to believe their influence in this part of Afghanistan is paramount.

## VIII.

## GHILZAIS.

In June 1930 the Ghilzai situation was fraught with considerable danger to the Government. There was ill-feeling between the Ghilzais and Hazaras. A serious dispute existed between the Shahjui Wazirs and the Tokhis, whom the remaining Ghilzai clans seemed ready to support. The Suleiman Khel, whose lead the majority of Ghilzais are inclined to follow, were definitely anti-Government. All clans were well armed and reluctant to return their rifles. To deal with this thorny problem Sher Agha (W. W. 256) and Allah Niwaz (W. W. 182) had been especially deputed by the King.

In July the Shahjui Wazirs were removed from their lands there to Kandahar. This however did little to improve the general situation. During July and August Government representatives held frequent jirgahs with Ghilzai leaders; but, beyond collecting signed offers of allegiance these jirgahs accomplished nothing. Raids and inter-tribal

fightings were frequent and troops had to be sent from Kandahar to the affected area.

In October a body of infantry, moving in relief, quarrelled with a party of Taraks on the Kandahar-Kabul road. A Tarak lashkar immediately collected, seized the road at Pul-i-Sang (5 miles S. W. of Kalat-i-Ghilzai) and cut all communications. Troops were at once sent from Kandahar, drove the lashkar into the hills and restored the situation. Still further reinforcements from Kabul and Kandahar were brought into the area. For the time Government was in complete control of the Kabul-Kandahar road and the Kandahar province. The beginning of the annual Ghilzai migration to India removed the danger of any serious trouble before the spring.

In November, Abdur Rahman, Tarak, of Loralai, the self-constituted leader of the Ghilzais, met Allah Niwaz at Kalat-i-Ghilzai. He said the Taraks were prepared to pay revenue but wanted a free pardon for their past offences and were unwilling to give up their arms until the Duranis had done so.

Allah Niwaz agreed, in principal, to these demands. He now apparently decided that the Ghilzais could not be coerced. He determined to try a policy of conciliation. To give effect to this he decided to take representatives of each clan to Kabul to air their grievances there. He realised that it was essential that Abdur Rahman should be one of the party. Accordingly, he sent a deputation to Aoband to persuade Abdur Rahman to come. The deputation was seized by Abdur Rahman's followers and disarmed. Thereupon Allah Niwaz advanced on Aoband with two brigades and burnt it on December 12th. Abdur Rahman however escaped.

From January to March there was a lull, due partly to the absence of many Ghilzais in India and partly to the winter weather. Early in February Allah Niwaz was appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh of the Ghilzai area, but at the intervention of the Governor of Khandahar, who was related to the King and disliked any encroachment on his own powers, the appointment was cancelled. Allah Niwaz retired to Jalalabad. (Sher Agha had returned to Kabul in November.) Shortly afterwards Gul Muhammad Khan was appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh, Kandahar. One of his first acts was to dismiss the Governor.

During this period Abdur Rahman remained in hiding near the Baluchistan border, whence he sent appeals to the Ghilzais to unite and assert their rights.

In March Government began to prepare for the return of the Ghilzais from India. The troops in Ghilzai country were increased. Orders were issued to the Rais-i-Tanzimiehs of the Kandahar and Southern Provinces that every effort was to be made to settle this problem and that they were to avoid giving offence to the Ghilzais. Gul Muhammad Khan announced his intention of collecting arms from the Duranis before doing so from the Ghilzais. The Kalat-i-Ghilzai and Urazgan districts were removed from the Kandahar administration and placed under that of Ghazni, thus making a complete Ghilzai district. (This had been one of the Ghilzai demands in October.)

In May, Abdur Rahman moved into Katawaz where alone Government was not completely master of the situation. Efforts to induce him to come to terms failed. Officials and notables were sent to various centres to persuade the Ghilzais to submit to Government. Some fighting took



place between Hazaras and nomad Ghilzais, whereon Government called representatives of both tribes to Kabul and ordered the Hazaras to give the Ghilzais free passage through their country and promised military assistance to the Ghilzais should they be molested. In June however further fighting took place between the two tribes, and troops were sent to the Hazarajat to deal with the trouble, which is not yet scotched.

Abdur Rahman now took refuge in Wazi Khwa with one Abdul Kerim who is bitterly anti-Nadir.

So far then there has been no serious outbreak and Government has kept the situation in hand. Efforts to collect arms have however met with little success and have indeed been practically abandoned. Revenue has been paid by only a few sections. With only three months before the migration to India begins again it is to be hoped the year will pass without any serious disturbance. But it would be unwise to count on this. The Ghilzai problem is not yet solved.

## IX.

### ARMY.

(a) *General.*—Throughout the year continual demands have been made upon the army to deal with internal disorder. The campaign against Ibrahim Beg and the Ghilzai troubles necessitated the employment of large numbers of troops. By March it is estimated that the forces in the North alone totalled 12,000.

In spite of these interruptions considerable improvement has been effected in organization, equipment and morale. The army is now said to be better paid and better looked after than it has been for a long time.

(b) *Organization.*—The King aims at having a standing army of 50,000. Of these, two Corps, (I and II), each about 13,000 strong, will be in Kabul. I Corps will be the striking force, II Corps for garrison duties. This organization exists only on paper. Both Corps are at only one-third of their strength.

In addition to these Corps are the Guards Division (Shahi Firqa) and the forces in the Eastern, Southern, Kandahar, Farah, Herat and Northern Provinces.

The Shahi Firqa, about 3,000 strong, is a picked body, up to strength and superior to the rest of the army in physique, turn-out, discipline and efficiency.

In the Eastern and Southern Provinces no real organization exists. In Kandahar the Rais-i-Tanzimieh has paid considerable attention to improving the army. In Herat the troops are said to be up to strength and at a higher standard of efficiency. No information is available regarding troops in the Northern Provinces, but many of the units now there were sent from Kabul to which they will, presumably in time, return.

The standard formation is the Ghund (Brigade) which is composed as follows :—

Cavalry 5 squadrons, each of 100 sabres.

Artillery 3 battalions, each of 4 guns.

Infantry 3 battalions, each of 350 rifles.

There are 3 tanks and 3 armoured cars in Kabul.

A signal battalion exists in Kabul and a signal company is being raised in Kandahar.

The strengths and locations of formations so far as they are known are as follows :—

| Location and Formations.            | Men.   | Sabres. | Guns.                      |           |
|-------------------------------------|--------|---------|----------------------------|-----------|
|                                     |        |         | Field.                     | Mountain. |
| (a) <i>Kabul</i> —                  |        |         |                            |           |
| Guards Division .. ..               | 10,000 | 100     | 12<br>and<br>12<br>Medium. | 16        |
| 1st Army Corps .. ..                |        |         |                            |           |
| 2nd Army Corps .. ..                |        |         |                            |           |
| (b) <i>Kandahar Province</i> —      |        |         |                            |           |
| One Infantry Division .. ..         | ..     | ..      | ..                         | ..        |
| One Cavalry Regiment .. ..          | ..     | 250     | ..                         | ..        |
| One Artillery Brigade .. ..         | 600    | ..      | 6                          | 12        |
| Three Infantry Brigades .. ..       | 2,700  | ..      | ..                         | ..        |
| One Pioneer Company .. ..           | 130    | ..      | ..                         | ..        |
| Total .. ..                         | 3,430  | 250     | 6                          | 12        |
| (c) <i>Ghazni</i> —                 |        |         |                            |           |
| One Infantry Division .. ..         | ..     | ..      | ..                         | ..        |
| Three Infantry Brigades .. ..       | 2,700  | ..      | ..                         | ..        |
| (d) <i>Eastern Province</i> —       |        |         |                            |           |
| One Squadron Cavalry .. ..          | ..     | 110     | ..                         | ..        |
| One Artillery Brigade .. ..         | 600    | ..      | 2                          | 13        |
| Three Infantry Brigades .. ..       | 2,700  | ..      | ..                         | ..        |
| Total .. ..                         | 3,300  | 110     | 2                          | 13        |
| (e) <i>Herat</i> —                  |        |         |                            |           |
| Two Cavalry Brigades .. ..          | ..     | 800     | ..                         | ..        |
| One Artillery Brigade .. ..         | 600    | ..      | 6                          | 12        |
| Three Infantry Brigades .. ..       | 3,000  | ..      | ..                         | ..        |
| Pioneer Battalion .. ..             | 250    | ..      | ..                         | ..        |
| Total .. ..                         | 3,850  | 800     | 6                          | 12        |
| (f) <i>Farah</i> —                  |        |         |                            |           |
| Two Cavalry Brigades .. ..          | ..     | 800     | ..                         | ..        |
| One Artillery Brigade .. ..         | 600    | ..      | 6                          | 12        |
| Total .. ..                         | 600    | 800     | 6                          | 12        |
| (g) <i>Southern Province</i> —      |        |         |                            |           |
| Nine Batteries— .. ..               | 1,800  | ..      | 7                          | 49        |
| Four Battalions .. ..               | 1,200  | ..      | ..                         | ..        |
| Total .. ..                         | 3,000  | ..      | 7                          | 49        |
| (h) <i>Northern Provinces</i> .. .. | 5,000* | ..      | 8?                         | 20?       |
| Approximate Grand Total .. ..       | 30,000 | 2,000   | 60                         | 150       |

\*This figure is a rough estimate only and probably about half of this total consists of reinforcements from Kabul, which have already been included in that area.

(c) *Training*.—While, presumably on account of the constant employment of troops on internal security duty, little field training was carried out during the year, signs are not lacking that considerable interest was taken in training matters. In November (1930) the Harbiyeh (Military) College was re-opened, with the object of training students selected from Schools in Kabul as army officers. The Army Magazine, published monthly and designed to stimulate the interest of officers in military affairs, was revived. Negotiations for the supply of cinema films of military interest were opened with the British. Four foreign instructors (three Italian, one German) were engaged ; two of the Italians have arrived in Kabul. Young officers are said to be keen, smart and intelligent.

(d) *Militias*.—Arrangements were made to revive the Wazir Militias in Khost and Urghun. Barracks for the former in Matun were completed in May, but up to 30th June no enlistments had been made. Wazir and Mahsud contingents took part in the operations against Ibrahim Beg.

(e) *Recruiting*.—Although conscription has been abolished there has been a marked disinclination in some parts of the country to enlist, and forceful persuasion has had to be resorted to to obtain recruits. There has, however, been a fairly steady supply, mostly of Hazaras and Wardakis.

(f) *Arms and Ammunition*.—A large number of rifles and quantities of S. A. A. were imported during the year from Europe. Rifles are of various patterns : British, French, Russian and Italian.

Negotiations are in progress with the Italians for the supply of the equipment for 8 batteries of artillery—all field.

(g) *Summary*.—While therefore much has been done to improve the efficiency of the army, which is now believed to have attained a higher standard than in the reign of King Amanullah, much has yet to be done before it becomes a formidable opponent to well trained troops. Afghanistan will still, in war, have to rely mainly upon her frontier tribes.

## X.

### AVIATION.

(a) *Military*.—Little, if any, progress has been made in the Afghan Air Force.

The number of serviceable aircraft is still believed to be only 5 and these of old pattern. They are worked entirely by Afghan personnel.

Flights have been carried out regularly throughout the year, except when weather conditions were too bad. In August an aeroplane flew from Kabul to Herat *via* Kandahar, returning by the same route in September.

Considerable use was made of aeroplanes in the Northern Provinces during the campaign against Ibrahim Beg. They appear to have been especially useful for inter-communication. On two occasions machines were compelled to make forced landings on the Russian border, but on neither was any serious damage done.

Proposals for a party of the Royal Air Force from India to visit Kabul early in 1931 to assist the Afghans in repairing damaged aircraft fell through.

A certain amount of work is said to have been carried out in improving landing grounds, and a report was received in June that orders had been issued for the construction of a landing ground at Faizabad.

Landing grounds exist at the following places :—

Kabul.  
Jalalabad.  
Kandahar.  
Herat.  
Mazar-i-Sharif.  
Tashkurgan.  
Khanabad.  
Haibak.

Landing grounds formerly existed at Matun, Gardez, Ghazni, Urghun and Mukur, and emergency landing grounds are believed to have been laid out near Girishk, at Farah and Sabzawar. It is not known whether these have been kept in repair.

(b) *Civil*.—In spite of the fact that their agreement had expired, the Russians operated the Tashkent-Termez-Kabul service throughout the year, aeroplanes arriving and leaving Kabul, pretty regularly, every ten days.

The Afghans were not apparently anxious to renew the Russian agreement. This is hardly surprising as they have no control at all over the service. They have been negotiating with Junkers, Ltd., for a service from Meshed to Kabul *via* Herat and Kandahar. A proposal for a British line between Rawalpindi and Kabul was also discussed, but it is unlikely, on account of the financial situation in India, that anything will come of this.

In April it was reported that authority had been given to the Afghan Ambassador in Teheran to conclude the agreement with Junkers, but this was cancelled. Negotiations are still in progress.

In the meantime the Russian service continues and it is probable that, should the Junker negotiations fall through, a new agreement will be made with Russia. That Russia does not contemplate the termination of her service is indicated by a report, received in April, that the present single-engined, four-seater machines are soon to be replaced by 3 engined ten-seater aeroplanes.

## XI.

### COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) *Roads*.—Considerable attention has been paid to the improvement of roads. A number of roads have been made fit for motor traffic ; more are being made so, and efforts have been made to keep existing roads in repair. A list of roads made fit for M. T. during the year and roads under construction is given in Appendix B.

Map B. shows all roads which are believed to be fit for M. T. or which are being made fit for M. T. It is not to be imagined that any of these roads would stand up to continuous M. T., and they are all liable to interruption by snow and heavy rain. For example, the Kandahar-Chaman road was closed to motor traffic for 3 weeks in February on account of

floods on the rivers Arghastan and Tarnak ; and the roads Kabul-Gardez, Kabul-Ghazni, Kabul to the North were closed on account of snow for weeks between January and March.

The condition of the Kabul-Torkham road is reported to be bad.

It has been reported that a contract for bridges over the rivers Arghandab and Arghastan have been given to an Indian contractor in Afghan employ.

Considerable use has been made of M. T. for the movement of troops in connection with internal disturbances.

(b) *Telephones*.—Telephonic communications have been extended and restored. In the Kandahar and Southern Provinces lines were frequently cut by raiders and repair personnel was kept busy.

(c) *Telegraphs*.—A number of telegraph lines have been completed during the year, notably the line between Kabul and Torkham. The Afghans however appear to rely more on telephones and wireless. Map B. shows all telephone and telegraph lines known to be working.

(d) *Wireless*.—There is a 5 Kw. set in Kabul which communicates with Kushk, Tashkent, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat and Peshawar. There is a small set in Mazar-i-Sharif which communicates with Kabul, Meshed, Dushambe and Bokhara. There is also a receiving set in Herat, where the Russians, too, have a receiving and sending set.

## XII.

### THE *ex*-KING AMANULLAH.

In February Amanullah left Rome and visited Constantinople and Angora. He returned to Rome at the end of the month. The objects of the visit are not known but he apparently wished to raise money and considered residing in Turkey.

On 5th March 1931 there appeared in "The Zemindar", an Indian paper published in Lahore, a long letter from the *ex*-King, in which he defended his own actions when in power, and accused Nadir Shah of disloyalty, bad faith and selling the independence of Afghanistan to the British.

The letter let loose a flood of pro-Amanullah and anti-Nadir propaganda both in India and Afghanistan. Copies of the letter were circulated in Kabul and other towns. Efforts were made to smuggle into Afghanistan copies of the "Zemindar", the import of which was at once prohibited by the Afghan authorities, who were extremely annoyed and perturbed by the publication of the letter. In India H. E. the Viceroy issued a special Ordinance prohibiting the publication of matter likely adversely to affect relations with foreign Governments. Counter-propaganda was instituted by the Afghan authorities.

Nevertheless pro-Amanullah propaganda increased rapidly, and was given still greater impetus by the receipt of news, in April, that Amanullah had left Rome for Mecca. There was much talk of Amanullah's return to Afghanistan.

Actually the King performed the pilgrimage to Mecca and returned to Rome in May.

What his object was is not definitely known. It may have been to reinstate himself in the eyes of the Moslem world as a good Muhammadan ; to sound Afghan opinion as to his prospects of success should he endeavour to regain his throne ; or actually to concert measures for such an attempt. He was accompanied by a number of well-known Afghans and met many others in Arabia. He is reported to have done all he could to ingratiate himself with all he met.

It seems that he must have decided that the time was not ripe for his return. It is believed that he arranged for some of his well wishers to return to Afghanistan to spread propaganda on his behalf in the Southern Province, but that he will make no attempt to return this year. There is no doubt that there are many people on both sides of the frontier who would be glad to see him back.

With Amanullah's return to Rome and the excitement died down.

In June Amanullah went to Montreux to purchase property near that place.

### XIII.

#### FOREIGN RELATIONS.

(a) *Britain*.—Afghan British relations have remained on a very friendly footing. The two main features have been :—

- (i) The British gift of money and arms to Afghanistan.
- (ii) Afghan relations with the British frontier tribes.

In October Great Britain presented the Afghan Government with a gift of £175,000 and 10,000 rifles.

The publication of this fact in the press in February caused the Afghan authorities great consternation. It led to much anti-Nadir propaganda on the score of Nadir having sold his country. There is every reason to believe that the tribes on both sides of the border consider Nadir Shah the bought man of the Government of India.

Every effort was made to explain to the Afghan people that nothing was given in exchange for the gift ; but, while the first agitation of the authorities has passed, there is no doubt that the King's enemies have been presented with a useful weapon, and that British relations with Afghanistan, owing to the Afghan authorities fear of accepting, or appearing to accept, help of any description from us, have suffered. It was owing to this that the proposed visit of R. A. F. personnel fell through.

As regards our frontier tribes the King's attitude has been praiseworthy. His task was no easy one. Constant efforts were made to persuade the Afghan tribes to help their co-religionists on the British side of the frontier, but the King persistently forbade any attempts at interference, although thereby he gave further cause for propaganda against himself.

During April, May and June Afridi delegates visited Kabul to ask for the King's intervention on their behalf in arriving at settlement with the Government of India, but were dismissed with non-committal answers.

The Afghan authorities have also taken measures to check the activities of a branch of the Ghadr Party in Afghanistan. This party had its headquarters in Kabul and during the first four months of 1931 was displaying unusual activity. Some of the leaders were arrested and a number of members were placed under surveillance. The party is, therefore, likely to be quiescent for some time.

The Afghan Government has complained on more than one occasion of alleged violations of the frontier by R. A. F. aeroplanes.

(b) *Russia*.—Relations with Russia throughout the greater part of the year while outwardly correct cannot be described as friendly. The violation of Afghan territory by Russian troops in June 1930 and the murder in Tashkent, in November 1930, of the Afghan Consul-General caused considerable resentment in Kabul. In April Colonel Rijs, Counsellor of the Russian embassy, visited Jalalabad and Dakka without the permission of the Afghan Government.

Russia has shown a disposition to disregard Afghan prejudices. She has refused to pay the subsidy arranged in the Russo-Afghan Treaty. Her influence in the North is great and it was doubtless due to this that the permission given to the Haardt expedition to travel through Northern Afghanistan was cancelled. She has complained of the failure of the Herat authorities to prevent brigands from Afghanistan raiding into Soviet Territory. She has been pressing for a renewal of the agreement for the Termez-Kabul air service and for the conclusion of a trade agreement.

Afghanistan has not yet shown any disposition to sign either of these agreements, but however much she may dislike and fear her powerful neighbour she is not in a position to defy her.

The 1926 Treaty was renewed in Kabul on June 24th, 1931. It is not yet known whether there are any alterations in the text, but it is fair to assume that the signing of the treaty indicates an improvement in the relations between the two countries.

(c) *Other Countries*.—The French trans-Asia Expedition organized by Citroen Motors, under the leadership of M. Haardt, arrived in Herat in May. It travelled *via* Kandahar to Kabul, which it reached on 9th June. Every facility was given by the Afghan authorities and the expedition met with friendly treatment everywhere. It crossed the frontier into India on 19th June.

Arrangements are being made for the appointment of a French Minister in Kabul.

The German Legation in Kabul was re-opened in May, when Dr. Schwoerbel the new Minister arrived. One German army instructor is reported to have been engaged.

The Italian Legation was re-opened in March. The new Minister is Signor V. Galanti. Three Italian instructors have been engaged, two of whom have already arrived in Kabul.

Proposals for a Turkish Military Mission to come to Afghanistan came to nothing. The King decided he did not wish to have the training of his army undertaken by any one foreign power.

Treaties of friendship were signed with Japan, in November, and Estonia in December, 1930.

#### XIV.

##### CONCLUSION.

The year under review has been one of steady progress towards stabilization. Law and order have been established in most parts of the country. The number of tribes who have paid revenue has steadily increased. Communications have been improved. Considerable progress has been made in the re-organization of the Army, and Foreign relations have, on the whole, been cordial. Afghanistan appears to be more peaceful than at any time since 1927. It seems not unreasonable, therefore, to expect that 1931-32 will see still further progress towards consolidation. But prophecies are apt to be confounded, especially in a country, where, as history shows, dynasties change with cataclysmic suddenness.



## APPENDIX A.

## LIST OF MAJOR APPOINTMENTS.

Numbers in brackets refer to W. W. in Afghanistan.

- Prime Minister—Muhammad Hasham Khan. (337).  
 Foreign Minister—Faiz Muhd. Khan. (243).  
 War Minister—Shah Mahmud. (414).  
 Home Minister—General Muhammad Gul Khan. (315A).  
 Education Minister—Ali Muhammad Khan. (179).  
 Justice Minister—Hazrat Fazal-i-Umar. (256).  
 Trade Minister—Mirza Muhd. Khan. (450).  
 Revenue Minister—Muhd. Ayub Khan. (211).  
 Court Minister—Ahmad Shah Khan. (149).  
 Health Minister—Muhd. Akbar Khan.  
 President National Assembly—Abdul Ahad Khan. (4).

## PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS.

- Eastern Province—Ghulam Faruq Khan. (273).  
 Southern Province—Sher Ahmad Khan.  
 Kandahar—Muhd. Gul Khan. (315A).  
 Herat—Abdul Rahim. (89).  
 Farah and Chakansur—Sher Ahmad Khan. (601).  
 Hazarajat—Muhd. Akbar Khan. (160).  
 Maimana—Sher Muhd. Khan. (608).  
 Mazar—Muhd. Yakub Khan. (676).  
 Kataghan and Badakshan—Shah Mahmud. (414).

## ABROAD.

- Ambassador, Moscow—Muhd. Aziz Khan. (216).  
 Ambassador, Persia—Sher Ahmad Khan. (598).  
 Ambassador, Turkey—Sultan Muhd. Khan. (624).  
 Minister, London—Ahmad Ali Khan. (140).  
 Minister, Paris—Shah Wali Khan. (585).  
 Minister, Egypt—Gul Agha. (613).  
 Minister, Rome—Abdul Hussain Khan. (47).  
 Minister, Berlin—Ghulam Siddiq Khan. (309).

## FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES IN AFGHANISTAN.

- Ambassador, Russia—M. Stark.  
 Ambassador, Turkey—Hickmet Bey.  
 Ambassador, Persia—Mirza Nasrullah Khan, Khalat Bari.  
 Minister, Britain—Sir R. Maconochie, K.C.I.E.  
 Minister, Italy—S. Vincenzo Galanti.  
 Minister, Germany—Dr. Schwoerbel.  
 Chargé d'Affaire, France—Mons. C. Gaire.

## APPENDIX B.

*List of Communications completed or put under construction, 1930-31.*

## (a) ROADS.

## (i) Completed.

*Afghanistan, N.-E.*

1. Kila Murad Beg-Hussain Kot-Shakardara.
2. Sufian-Dakka-Gul Dara.
3. Serai Khwaja-Farza.
4. Jalalabad-Chigha Serai-Asmar.

*Afghanistan, S.-E.*

5. Mukur-Bara Khel-Zarin Khel.
6. Kaga-Nimla.
7. Kaga-Wazir Kila-Zawa.
8. Hashim Khel-Marki Khel.
9. Ghani Khel-Naziam.
10. Kahi-Achin.
11. Hada-Zakhel-Deh Bala.
12. Shahr Shahi-Kahi-Deh Bala-Oghaz.
13. Deh Bala-Pachir.

## (ii) Under construction.

1. Bamian-Jalmish-Barfaq.
2. Ghazni-Jani Khel (Katawaz).
3. Ghazni-Mursala-Urghun.
4. Ghazni-Daulat Khan Band-Gardez.
5. Altimur-Khaora.

## (b) TELEGRAPHS.

1. Kabul-Torkham restored.
2. Kabul-Jalalabad doubled.

## (c) TELEPHONE.

## (i) Constructed.

1. Kabul-Torkham.
2. Pesh Bolak-Naziam.
3. Kabul-Bamian.
4. Husain Kot-Shakardara.
5. Serai Khwaja-Farza.

6. Charikar-Bagh Arq.
7. Jabal-us-Siraj-Gul Babar.
8. Gul Bahar-Rakh Panjshir.
9. Jabal-us-Siraj-Jamal Agha.
10. Jabal-us-Siraj-Narin.

(ii) *Under construction.*

1. Jamal Agha-Nijrao.
2. Jamal Agha-Durnama.
3. Narin-Khanabad.
4. Farah-Girishk.

5F-9

SECURITY.

Serial No. 451

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*Review of*  
**Events in Afghanistan**

**1st July 1931 to 30th June 1932**

*Compiled by the General Staff*

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APPENDIX A.—List of Principal Appointments.

APPENDIX B.—Summary of the strength and the distribution of the Army.

MAP No. 1.—Afghanistan—general.

MAP No. 2.—Sketch map of principal motor roads and telephone communications.



NOTE.

Previous issues of the "Summary of Events in Afghanistan" may be destroyed, if no longer required.





# CONFIDENTIAL.

## REVIEW OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN.

1ST JULY 1931—30TH JUNE 1932.

### I

#### *The situation in June 1931.*

At the end of June 1931 King Nadir Shah and his government had just come successfully through a difficult year. A wide spread revolt in the provinces North of the Hindu Kush had been suppressed. The Kabul, Eastern and Kandahar provinces were quiet and the administration in them was making good progress. In Herat the Governor, who at one time was suspected of aiming at establishing an independent province, had apparently acknowledged the Central Government. In the Southern Province where Government control was definitely weak the situation was beginning to improve, and in Ghilzai country, although it could not be regarded as satisfactory, the situation was in hand.

But although the King had thus good reason for satisfaction and optimism as regards the future, he was still faced with certain difficulties. The work of reconstruction in the provinces in the North had only just begun ; the Government still had but little control in the Southern Province ; the Ghilzais were restless and had refused to surrender arms, to pay revenue or in any way to obey orders ; and last, but by no means least, pro-Amanullah propaganda was rife in most parts of the country.

### II

#### GENERAL.

The year now under review has been one of steady progress towards the establishment of law and order in all parts of the country and in the consolidation of King Nadir's position.

In Kabul, Kandahar and Herat Provinces the year on the whole passed quietly. In the last named province the Governor Abdur Rahim has fully acknowledged the control of the central government.

In the Eastern Province events in British tribal territory, and in the administered districts also, caused some excitement and anti-British feeling, but the Governor was successful in preventing any hostile action.

The situation in the Southern Province has improved but is not yet satisfactory. Abdur Rahman, the Ghilzai leader was induced to surrender in November, after which no serious trouble occurred in Ghilzai country. From September to March the Governor toured the Northern districts of his province ; although he succeeded in collecting revenue and securing the surrender of some rifles, his conduct made him unpopular and aroused considerable feeling against the Government. Much remains to be done before this province is as fully under Government's control as the others.

North of the Hindu Kush progress in the work of reconstruction, necessitated by the chaos into which the province had been plunged by the activities of Ibrahim Beg in 1930-31, was satisfactory; conditions are now reported to be peaceful and the people contented.

Considerable improvements were made in the army. There was a steady flow of recruits, and the Army must by now have very nearly reached its establishment of 50,000. Cavalry, Artillery and Infantry schools were opened. Field training, field firing and artillery practice were all carried out for the first time since King Nadir's accession. Much however remains to be done to make the Army an efficient instrument of war against a civilized power.

No change took place in the Afghan Air Force.

The financial position of the Government improved. Customs receipts were reported to be higher than at any period in Amanullah's time. Trade though dull was better than might be expected.

Considerable interest was taken in education. Schools were opened and primary education made compulsory. A branch of the Boy Scout movement was opened in Kabul.

Relations with the British Government and Government of India remained friendly, although the King remained fearful of being considered too pro-British. Certain difficulties arose over the question of Afghan official relations with British tribesmen but, although not all have yet been satisfactorily settled, they did not adversely affect relations.

Indications are not lacking that Nadir Shah and his Government would welcome closer relations with H. B. M.'s Government.

#### RUSSIA.

Russia has been pressing for the conclusion of a Trade Convention involving the establishment of trade agencies enjoying extra-territorial rights in important centres, and for the renewal of the agreement for the Kabul-Termez air service. The terms she proposed for the former would give her a virtual monopoly of certain trades and allow a considerable increase of Russian officials. So far the Afghan Government has refused to agree to these terms. It has informed the Soviet that on the completion of the new road to the North the Kabul-Termez air service will be closed.

Russia is without doubt feeling the world economic depression as much, if not more than other countries and it is probable that the activities of the Comintern have been temporarily curtailed financially. Russia is deeply committed to her five year plans for economic expansion and at present is unlikely to undertake any major external enterprise. Her attitude towards Japanese activities in Manchuria would seem to support this view. On the other hand there are no indications to show that the Soviet has any intention of relaxing her efforts to work against the interests of India in particular and the British Empire in general by undermining Nadir Khan's authority in Afghanistan and by a gradual penetration of Soviet influence in that country.

A united Afghanistan is contrary to Soviet interests, and Nadir Khan's increasing strength and power of control is probably viewed with disfavour

in Moscow. Evidence goes to show that the aim of the Soviet at the moment is in all probability to bring about the downfall of Nadir and to replace him by Amanullah, or by one of his following, to establish an economic control of the country and thereby provide themselves with an efficient propaganda and intelligence system, to promote dissatisfaction and unrest amongst the tribes on the frontier, and to support the activities of anti-British and anti-Nadir organisations. By these means, it is to be expected that the Soviet will endeavour to make progress until a time when the internal situation in Russia may permit more active methods.

The dispute with Persia over the waters of the Helmand in Sistan was revived and at one time relations appeared to be somewhat strained, but although the question has not yet been settled there seems now little prospect of its leading to a breach of diplomatic relations.

Pro-Amanullah propaganda has been rife throughout the year but there are indications that the *ex*-King's adherents are losing heart.

King Nadir's Government thus appears to be firmly established. Provided no unexpected change, such as the King's death, takes place there seems to be no reason why in the coming year still further progress should not be made. Russian relations may present difficulties, but for the reasons already mentioned it is unlikely that the Soviet will risk a rupture.

### III.

#### FOREIGN RELATIONS.

(a) *Great Britain*.—Relations with His Majesty's Government have remained friendly. King Nadir has done his best to restrain any anti-British activities on the part of Afghan tribes living on the India frontier. Zari, the murderer of Lieutenant Syngé and Pte. Whawell in Waziristan in October 1931, was apprehended in June (1932) and sent to Mazar-i-Sharif Province.

There have been certain difficulties. The grant of land in Logar to Bostan, the Mahsud murderer of Lieutenant Stevens in 1928; the presence of Shahzada, the murderer of Mrs. Ellis in Kohat in 1923, at the Independence celebrations in August (1931); the employment as Khassadars of tribesmen from the Indian side of the frontier, the payment of allowances to British tribesmen, the correspondence between Afghan officials and these tribes, the summoning of jirgas from them and the grant of civil and military ranks to them have all been the subject of discussion between H. B. M.'s Minister and the Afghan Government. The Afghans acknowledge that they are wrong in theory but plead that until the King is more firmly established they have no alternative to the present practice.

The British Consulates at Jalalabad and Kandahar were re-opened in June 1931.

As reported in paragraph VI a number of British officers have been to Kabul during the year and amongst other British visitors Mr. Peterson, Special Correspondent of "The Times" in India, visited the capital in August (1931).

In October Mr. Hodgson, an Australian, travelled from Meshed to Peshawar *via* Herat, Kandahar and Kabul. He was much struck by the friendliness of the Afghans, including several officials, whom he met.

Messrs. Mukherji and Brokenshaw of the Indian Posts and Telegraphs Department visited Kabul in May in connection with the working of posts and telegraphs between Afghanistan and India under the International Conventions. Their visit was very successful and they made an excellent impression on the Afghan officials with whom they conferred.

Major Farwell, the British Military Attaché, was permitted to carry out three tours during the year—

(i) From Kabul to the Ghorband and Andarab valleys in September (1931).

(ii) From Kabul to Quetta in September (1931).

(iii) To Khanabad and Mazar-i-Sharif in May and June 1932.

Protracted negotiations regarding the long-standing dispute between Afghanistan and Chitral over the ownership of Dokalim continued throughout the year, ending finally in the appointment of a commission which was to meet at Dokalim early in July 1932.

The Afghan Government has naturally taken a keen interest in Indian affairs. The measures taken by the Government of India to deal with Congress and the Red Shirts met with general approval. It is however apprehensive of the future and its fears were not decreased by Britain's abandonment of the gold standard.

(b) *Russia*.—Although there have been no serious incidents there is no doubt that the Afghan Government is apprehensive of its Northern neighbour and while anxious to conciliate the Soviet as far as possible it is determined to safeguard Afghan interests.

Russia has been pressing for the conclusion of a Trade Convention and for the renewal of the agreement for the Kabul-Termez air service. The terms proposed by them for the former would mean a virtual Russian monopoly of certain trades and a considerable increase of Russian officials. This the Afghans will not have, and they are stipulating for an agreement which will be entirely reciprocal.

As regards the air agreement they have informed the Soviet that on the completion of the Darra-i-Shikari road (see paragraph XV) the service will be terminated.

The personnel of the Soviet Embassy have caused some annoyance. In July (1931) M. Stark visited Ghazni, travelling by night, without permission. In the autumn M. Wassilieff, the Soviet Military Attaché, went to Gardez, without permission. In February M. Stark with several members of the embassy insisted on visiting Jalalabad where he stayed till 13th March. M. Rixe, Counsellor, and M. Wassilieff also visited Jalalabad in May.

As stated in paragraph XII there have been some minor incidents on the Northern frontier.

The Russian proposal for an air service across Afghanistan to India has been dropped.

A Posts and Telegraph agreement legislating for the exchange of land mails and for telegraph charges was concluded in April.

Negotiations were begun for the appointment by both countries of Commissars on the frontier whose duty it will be to settle local minor disputes. The question is still under discussion.

The influx of refugees from Soviet Turkestan into Northern Afghanistan is causing the Afghan Government some anxiety, the accounts given by these refugees of Soviet brutality arousing considerable feeling against Russians.

In March six Russians escaped from the Kabul Jail. Four were recaptured and two made their way to the Khyber Pass where they were arrested by the British authorities.

There is good reason to believe that the Soviet Embassy in Kabul is in touch with anti-British individuals such as Maulvi Bashir and Badshah Gul, and with the Ghadr Party. A report was also received of a secret interview between a member of the Soviet Legation and an Afridi.

Soviet agents have been reported to have been sent to India *via* Chitral and a number of agents to be making their way South from Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif.

(c) *Turkey*.—Hickmet Bey, the Turkish Ambassador, left Afghanistan for good in March. It is believed that in future Turkish affairs will be in the hands of a charge d'affaires, a change which is said to have been a blow to Afghan pride. It is reported that negotiations for the despatch to Kabul of a Turkish Military mission are again afoot.

(d) *France*.—Mons. Bodard presented his credentials as French Minister in December. The Afghan Government is understood to be pressing for the delivery of the wireless sets for provincial Headquarters arranged for in the reign of Amanullah Khan.

(e) *Germany*.—The German colony has increased considerably, now numbering 15, of whom three are engineers.

The Deutsche Afghanische Company closed down during the year. The company had sustained heavy losses as a result of the revolution.

(f) *Persia*.—Mirza Nasrullah Khalat Bary, the Persian Ambassador, left Kabul in April and was relieved by Mirza Muhammad Taqi Isfandiari who arrived in June (1932).

The most important question at issue between the two countries has been that of the Helmand waters in Sistan. In November relations over this became decidedly strained. The Persians complained that the Afghans by cleaning out an old canal were endangering the supply of water for Persian irrigation. Both sides are believed to have moved troops towards the scene of trouble, but finally a joint commission was appointed. In spite of prolonged investigations no decision was reached and the matter is still under discussion. It seems unlikely however that it will lead to any breach of diplomatic relations.

An arrangement by both countries was made for the appointment of commissars on the Frontier whose duty it will be to settle minor disputes.

(g) *Other countries.*—The Afghan-Japanese Treaty of 1930 was ratified in July (1931).

A Treaty of friendship was concluded with Hejaz by S. Ahmed Shah during his visit to Mecca in April (1932).

An Afghan delegation under Abdul Hussain Khan (W. W. 47), the Afghan Ambassador at Rome, attended the Disarmanent Conference at Geneva.

#### IV

##### PRO-AMANULLAH PROPAGANDA.

The Government was not slow to realise the dangers of the flood of pro-Amanullah propaganda which followed on the *ex-King's* pilgrimage to Mecca in April 1931. In July pilgrims began to return to Afghanistan. Amanullah had undoubtedly done his best to create a good impression and it was said that he had arranged for propaganda in his favour to be spread in Afghanistan. The Government acted energetically: in Kabul the houses of those suspected of being pro-Amanullah were searched and a number of arrests were made. An anti-Amanullah pamphlet was produced and circulated in various parts of the country. Pro-Amanullah pamphlets discovered in Kandahar were burnt. Emis-saries were sent to spread pro-Nadir propaganda amongst the Afridis and the Mohmands.

For a little the Government campaign was successful and there was a lull in pro-Amanullah activities, or at least they were driven underground.

In December (1931) however Amanullah propaganda came again to the fore. Rumours of the impending arrival of Ghulam Nabi (W. W. 298), said to be the *ex-King's* chief propaganda agent, and even of Amanullah himself, were rife. A plot to murder Allah Niwaz (W. W. 182) and Shahji (W. W. 512), two of King Nadir's most loyal adherents, was reported, as well as a plot for a Ghilzai rising. In Kandahar one Duran was working actively in the *ex-King's* interests.

By February there was no signs of any improvement. Pro-Amanullah pamphlets were circulated in various parts of the country, pro-Amanullah propaganda was reported in the Southern Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif provinces as well as in Kabul, where the leaders of the Amanullah party were said to be in touch with and, to some extent, financed by, the Soviet Legation. Students returning from Turkey were reported to be affected and several were arrested. Some of the more prominent Amanullahites of Kabul were also arrested and Ghulam Jilani (W. W. 282), brother of Ghulam Nabi, was advised officially to leave the country.

In the spring a notable improvement set in. One Abdul Karim (W. W. 52-A), who had been organizing pro-Amanullah propaganda in India, returned to Kabul having apparently made his peace with King Nadir. Amanullah did not repeat his pilgrimage to Mecca. On the other hand King Nadir sent to Mecca Sirdar Ahmad Shah (W. W. 149) especially to safeguard the interests of Afghan Pilgrims. This had a good effect and pilgrims returning from Mecca were loud in their praises of the arrangements made.

In May yet another prominent member of the Amanullah party—Abdul Hadi Khan (W. W. 38)—returned to Kabul. This man had been Afghan Minister, Berlin, under Nadir's Government, but resigned, without giving any reasons for so doing, in March 1931. He then accompanied Amanullah to Mecca and was generally believed to be one of his staunch adherents.

The fact that Abdul Hadi and Abdul Karim have returned to Kabul appears to indicate that Amanullah's followers are losing heart. A recent report states that Ghulam Nabi himself has sought permission to return. Should that be true the *ex*-King's party will suffer a severe blow, and it seems probable that, provided no unforeseen change occurs in the internal situation in Afghanistan, pro-Amanullah activities will dwindle to un-important dimensions. It is of course not impossible that these moves are intended to deceive Nadir Shah and to place the Amanullah leaders in a better position to take advantage of any trouble in Afghanistan. But the risks to which, as they must know, any pro-Amanullah activities would expose them makes it seem improbable that they have adopted so bold a course.

Amanullah himself, except for occasional visits to Switzerland and one to Naples, where he bade good-bye to his brother Inayatullah who left in December to live in Persia, has remained in Rome. He is believed to be in want of money. An Indian newspaper has stated that he has made arrangements with the Soviet for the publication of his autobiography. He has also been reported to be in touch with the Ghadr Party.

## V

### THE GHADR PARTY.

As a result of the measures taken by the Afghan Government in the spring of 1931 the activities of the Ghadr party in Afghanistan practically ceased for several months.

In January 1932 however it became evident that Gurmukh Singh (W. W. 318) was trying to revive the movement. Secret meetings were held, at which Gurmukh Singh talked of having collected sufficient money for sending arms to India. Indian motor drivers were reported to be carrying revolvers and money hidden in their lorries from Kabul to Peshawar. One member of the party was Himmat Singh, a driver in the Soviet Legation.

The Afghan authorities however kept a close watch on the members of the party, and it appears that its leaders have decided that in the present circumstances there is little hope of achieving anything against the British and they intend to turn their attention to spreading anti-Nadir propaganda.

The party has remained in communication with the Ghadr Headquarters in California and there is little doubt that its leaders are in touch with the Soviet Legation and with such anti-British individuals as Maulvi Bashir (W. W. 85).

## VI

### KABUL.

In the Kabul province the year passed quietly. The Shorah (National Council) met in July, and in November an Upper House, of 27 members, was



created with the title of *Majlis-i-Aiyan* (assembly of Nobles). Rules of procedure for both houses were published. From these it appears that deputies to the National Council are to be elected every three years, that the approval of the council is required for the annual budget, the raising of Government loans, the extensions of roads, and the grant of concessions either to Afghans or foreigners. Its decisions are subject to confirmation by the King. Legislation may be introduced in either Chamber but the decisions of either body must be referred to the other for approval before submission to the King. A measure approved by one house but rejected by the other is referred to a joint committee of both houses.

These rules, which were entitled "The Fundamental Rules of the Afghan Government," further laid down that the succession to the Afghan throne was to be confined to the family of Nadir Shah.

In August the annual commemoration of the Independence of Afghanistan was duly celebrated. The occasion was marked by a review of the Kabul garrison, some 9,000 troops of all arms taking part. A feature of the review was the presence on parade of Sardar Shah Mahmud (the War Minister and a brother of the King) and a body of 500 tribesmen who had just returned from the successful operations against the rebel Ibrahim Beg North of the Hindu Kush.

In November the King's only son, Prince Zahir Jan, was married to a daughter of Sirdar Ahmad Shah (W. W. 149).

In April orders were issued for the withdrawal of all Persian coins, which had hitherto been widely used in Afghanistan. It has been suggested that this was done with the object of lessening the risk of pro-Amanullah propaganda from Persia, but it is considered that the measure was more probably due to a natural desire on the part of the Afghan Government to see its own currency in general use.

At intervals throughout the year a number of notorious individuals from British tribal territory, such as Musa Khan and Ramzan Khan, Mahsuds, Badshah Gul, Mohmand, and Said Almar, Afridi, have visited the capital. They received little or no encouragement and often unpalatable advice from the Afghan authorities. The object of these visits was probably to obtain money and acquire 'izzat' (prestige). In the former respect the travellers are believed to have frequently been disappointed.

Several British officers have also visited Kabul during the year, among them the Brigade Majors of the Risalpur (cavalry), the Landi Kotal, Peshawar and Abbottabad Infantry Brigades.

## VII

### THE EASTERN PROVINCE.

Ghulam Faruq (W. W. 273) continued to hold the post of Governor throughout the year. His administration has been eminently successful. In July (1931) one Mag, a Shinwari malik who had been giving trouble, was persuaded to surrender and go to Kabul, where he was pardoned by the King. His submission marked the end of serious trouble in the area South of the Kabul River. The Governor now turned his attention to the Kunar Valley,

a district which had not been visited by an important official for a considerable time. Accompanied by a military escort of artillery and infantry the Governor toured the Kunar Valley throughout October. His visit had a good effect and he succeeded in collecting arms and revenue.

Affairs in the North West Frontier of India naturally affected the Eastern Province. In July a party of Shinwaris from Mohmand territory attempted to open a branch of the Red Shirt organisation in Nazan (20 miles South of Dakka). They were promptly expelled.

Agitation by the Afridis against King Nadir was met by counter propaganda.

In January the measures taken to deal with the Red Shirt movement in the North-West Frontier Province led to wild rumours of the oppression of Muslims in India and of the arrests of Afghan tribesmen in Peshawar. The Governor however dealt tactfully with the situation ; he was greatly helped by Prince Zahir Jan who, as a student at the Infantry school, was then at Jalalabad.

In mid-February Mons. Stark, the Soviet Ambassador, with several members of the Soviet Embassy, Kabul, visited Jalalabad where he stayed until 13th March.

In March the bombing by the British of the hostile sections of the Mohmands and Bajauris again led to considerable excitement, the Afghan tribesmen of the Eastern province demanding from the Governor permission to go to the help of their co-religionists. Again the Governor, supported by Prince Zahir Jan, succeeded in restraining his people. The situation was however sufficiently serious to cause the Afghan Government to close the Torkham-Kabul road to British officials for 12 days.

In May M. Rixe, Counsellor, Soviet Legation, and M. Wassiliev, Russian Military Attaché, Kabul, came to Jalalabad for a few days. The motives for these visits by members of the Russian Embassy to Jalalabad is not known, but it has been said that the Russians in Kabul suspected the Afghans of sending troops to Wakhan by the Kunar Valley, and believed that Indian troops were being sent too ! On the other hand it is not impossible that these visits were unconnected with anti-British activities in Bajaur and Mohmand territory.

In the same month two unknown Russians were reported to be in the Kunar Valley. Efforts to apprehend these men failed and they disappeared.

## VIII

### THE SOUTHERN PROVINCE.

At the beginning of the year the situation in this province was far from satisfactory. The Zadrans and Mangals in particular were in a truculent mood ; few tribes were paying revenue and the collection of Government arms was almost impossible ; inter-tribal fighting was frequent and attacks by Afghan tribesmen on those of the Kurram (in British India) not uncommon. The Afghan Government's control was weak.

It was significant that no Zadran or Mangal maliks (headmen) attended the National Independence Day celebrations in Kabul in August, a sure indication of the anti-Nadir sentiments of these two tribes.

The Afghan Government, however, favouring a policy of conciliation rather than one of coercion, now began to take steps to win over the recalcitrants. Zalmai, a leading Mangal Malik, was seen by the King and one Ismail, a Zadran leader, made his submission.

In September it looked as if Government intended to support its policy with a show of force. The armed forces in the province were reinforced and transport was collected. It was said that Shah Mahmud, the War Minister, fresh from his triumphs in the North, would himself tour the Province.

Meanwhile attacks on British tribesmen in the Kurram continued, and an influx of Red Shirt, Congress and pro-Amanullah agitators from India helped to fan the prevailing discontent. A 'firman' (decree) forbidding participation in anti-British intrigues was issued by the King and was not without effect.

In the middle of September the Governor, escorted by a mixed force of over 500 men, set out on a prolonged tour of the Northern districts of the province. He abandoned the idea of visiting Ghilzai country at the request of the Suleman Khel elders who warned him that his presence might precipitate a conflict.

In some respects the Governor's tour was a success. He persuaded some of the tribes to hand in rifles and to pay revenue; he restored to the Wazirs of Khost the land which they had lost in the revolution (1928-29); in December he met the Political Agent of the Kurram at Karlachi and a truce was arranged between the inhabitants of the Kurram and the neighbouring Afghan tribes; he visited all the principal tribes—Mangals, Zadrans, Jajis, Khostwals and Chamkannis—and as a result the Province became quieter. On the other hand the Governor's conduct gave rise to numerous complaints. He was accused of accepting bribes and of being unduly harsh. He became increasingly unpopular. In February an attempt was made upon his life. As a measure of conciliation the King ordered the Governor to relinquish his attempts to secure the surrender of arms.

In April the Governor returned to his headquarters at Gardez. Rumours have been rife that he is to be replaced. During the next three months little of note occurred but the situation, though improved, is still unsatisfactory and much remains to be done before the province can be said to be fully under control.

## IX

### Ghilzais.

At the close of the year 1930-31 the Ghilzai situation was causing the Afghan Government considerable anxiety. The tribes were truculent. Revenue had been paid by only a few sections and efforts to collect arms had been practically abandoned. Abdur Rahman, Tarak, of Loralai, an inveterate hostile and the self-constituted leader of the Ghilzais, was still at large.

A considerable number of troops had been sent to the borders of the Ghilzai country to deal with trouble should it arise and Government was striving to effect a settlement.

On the night of July 2/3rd a lashkar of about 1,000 Suleman Khels and Kharots attacked the Zhob Militia post of Ashewat in Baluchistan. The attack was beaten off but the lashkar remained near the British border for several days and only dispersed on receipt of orders from Kabul to desist from their anti-British activities. The leaders of the attack were Khalifa Kamran and Sher Jan, both Kharots. The reasons for the attack were a personal grievance of Sher Jan's at not being paid certain monies by the British, the depreciation of the Kabul rupee, for which these individuals apparently believed the Government of India responsible, and, it was said, the building of the Gul Kach—Fort Sandeman road.

In the same month one Abdul Ghaffur Khan, Andar Ghilzai, an influential malik, returned from Mecca where he had met *ex*-King Amanullah. He at once began urging the Ghilzais to unite against King Nadir, and persuaded Abdur Rahman to collect his followers. Abdur Rahman proceeded to get into touch with Bang and Barat, two Ghilzai outlaws who had taken to the hills with their followers. Bang's party came into contact with the Afghan troops on two occasions and drove them off.

In August more troops were moved into Katawaz and Bang fled to Baluchistan where he was arrested by the British authorities. Some fighting took place between the Ghilzais and Hazaras in Hazarajat and the Government were compelled to send troops to that area also.

In October the annual migration to India began. Sher Agha (W. W. 256) was now sent by the King to persuade the Suleman Khel to accept the Government's terms which included the surrender of Abdur Rahman and the right of Government to enter Katawaz. The negotiations failed and Abdur Rahman took refuge with one Sardar Fateh Khan, a Khoedad Khel Malik of some influence near Wazi Khwa.

That the reports of raiding and fighting were somewhat exaggerated was shown by the fact that in September the British Minister and Military Attaché visited the Ab-i-Istada Lake and found the country quiet and peaceful.

By November migration to India was in full swing. The Afghan Government apparently determined to seize the opportunity of dealing once and for all with Abdur Rahman. Abdul Ghaffur Khan was conciliated by the appointment of his son to a minor official post. More troops were moved into Ghilzai country, the total number of battalions in the area now numbering 20 or 21. A small skirmish took place but finally, thanks to the efforts of one Pir Ali Haidar Shah, Abdur Rahman was induced to surrender on a promise of safe conduct. He arrived in Kabul on 29th November, was pardoned and given a house in Kabul where he now lives.

Since Abdur Rahman's surrender there has been no serious trouble with the Ghilzais. The remainder of the winter, when the majority of them were away in India, passed quietly. The bulk of the troops who had been sent into Ghilzai country returned to peace stations.

It appears that the Ghilzais who went to India found their trade adversely affected by the economic depression. For this they were disposed to blame Congress, a fact which should have the advantage of making Congress propaganda amongst Ghilzais unprofitable in future.

The return migration began in April. It is believed that many of the Ghilzais have now become, if not enamoured with, at least reconciled to the present regime.

In May Sher Jan and Khalifa once again assembled a 'lashkar' and threatened to repeat their exploit of the previous year by attacking British posts. A small party did attack Sambaza Post in the Zhob but speedily retired. Partly owing to internal dissensions and partly to the prompt action of King Nadir the lashkar dispersed at the end of May.

With only two months remaining before the migration to India begins again there is nothing to indicate any change in the present peaceful situation.

## X

### KANDAHAR PROVINCE.

Gul Muhammad Khan (W. W. 315-A) held the post of Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Administrator) throughout the year.

The province was on the whole quiet and Gul Muhammad able to devote his energies to the improvement of the administration, the army and conditions generally.

A certain amount of raiding occurred from time to time but the Government forces were as a rule successful in dealing with it.

In November Malik Zakkum, Achakzai, who was arrested in 1930, on account of the raiding proclivities of his tribe, and sent to Kabul, was allowed to return to his home, a sure indication of the Government's confidence in its ability to maintain law and order.

Gul Muhammad was active in touring his province and seeing things for himself. Corruption has been sternly punished, passport regulations tightened up; motor drivers must possess driving licenses and no one may carry arms without a license.

A project for the electrification of Kandahar city is under consideration. Two German engineers more than once visited the city in connection with this plan. In October Brigadier Haswell, R. E., at the invitation of the Prime Minister, went to Kandhar to advise the authorities regarding the water supply and bridges over the Argandab and Arghastan rivers.

One of Gul Muhammad's innovations was the substitution of Pushtu for Persian as the official language—a sign of the growth of Afghan nationalism. He found however that sufficient Pushtu speaking clerks were not available and was compelled to restore Persian until such time as sufficient clerks with a knowledge of Pushtu are forthcoming.

There is no doubt that Kandahar is efficiently governed.

## XI

## HERAT PROVINCE.

In June 1931 Abdur Rahim, the Governor of Herat, for the first time since King Nadir's accession showed signs of acknowledging the central government. In August he gave further proof of his change of attitude by sending his son to Kabul to attend the Independence celebrations.

His son returned to Herat in October accompanied by Major-General Muhammad Shuaib who had been appointed G. O. C. Herat by the King. This was yet another indication of the changed state of affairs, Abdur Rahim having previously refused to accept officials appointed by Kabul. Little else of note occurred in the province during the year. There have been some minor incidents on the Persian frontier. Abdul Karim, the Baluchi brigand who was the cause of some friction in 1930-31 with Russia, was removed from Herat in the autumn to a safer distance from the frontier.

As in Kandahar a scheme for the electrification of Herat city is under consideration. A new town is being built and the famous walls surrounding the old city are being dismantled. Considerable attention has been devoted to the improvement of communications.

Abdur Rahim is said to be friendly with the Russians but there is nothing to indicate that Russian influence in Herat is unduly marked, although much of Herat's trade is with Russia and the bazaars contain a high proportion of Soviet goods. Rumours have been rife to the effect that the Afghan Government intends to relieve Abdur Rahim, but, although reports that the Herat garrison was being gradually replaced by troops from Kabul lent some colour to these rumours, there have been no real indications of any change.

## XII

## THE PROVINCES NORTH OF THE HINDU KUSH.

The year was one of steady progress in the work of reconstruction which was begun in June 1931 on the successful conclusion of the operations against Ibrahim Beg.

In July the administrator Muhammad Yakub (W. W. 676) fell sick and went to Russia for treatment. His place was taken by Major-General Ahmad Ali (W. W. 141) who in turn was relieved in January by Abdul Jamil (50 A) who remained as Governor for the rest of the year.

One Hatim Beg (he has also been reported as Halim Beg, Autan Beg and Utan Beg), a lieutenant of Ibrahim Beg's who escaped capture, periodically carried out small raids, but these were not apparently of a serious nature.

There were some minor incidents on the Russian frontier. In February (1932) a small Russian force pursuing some escaping emigrants penetrated into Afghan territory. They were fired on by Afghan troops and a Russian officer is believed to have been killed. The Soviet promptly apologised.

In the spring the Russians seized a large number of sheep belonging to inhabitants from the Afghan side of the Oxus. These sheep had been taken into

Soviet territory to graze, a practice which is apparently quite normal. Proposals by the Afghan Government have been of no avail.

A number of inhabitants of Soviet Turkestan have sought refuge from Russian rule by emigrating into Afghanistan. Their description of Soviet methods has been said to arouse the horror of the Afghans who are therefore unlikely to show any anxiety for such rule in their own country.

With these exceptions the country remained quiet. Revenue is being paid, communications improved and recruits provided. Locusts did considerable damage to crops in the summer. They are a factor which might seriously affect the supply problem for any force operating in this area.

The bulk of the trade in these provinces is with Russia and the bazars of the bigger towns contain a high proportion of Russian goods. The Russians pay promptly and are evidently bent on securing the Afghan trade for themselves.

In the autumn two German students came down from China through Wakhan to Kabul. They stated that conditions in Wakhan were most peaceful.

### XIII

#### THE AFGHAN ARMY.

(a) *General.*—The efforts to improve his Army which King Nadir inaugurated in 1930-31 have continued, and considerable progress, especially in the Kabul forces, has been made. Apart from the measures taken to deal with the Ghilzai situation, which necessitated a considerable increase of the normal garrison in that area, the calls on the army for internal security purposes were few. More time was thus available for training.

(b) *Organization.*—Two big changes were made in organization. First the 2nd Army Corps, which was in reality little more than a paper organization, was abolished in November.

Secondly an Artillery Division was formed in Kabul in July (1931). This Division consists of 3 Ghunds (Brigades) each of 2 groups each of 2 or 3 batteries. Another change in organization which has not been without effect was the substitution of mixed for tribal units. This innovation has not been welcomed by other ranks, particularly in the Eastern Province and Kandahar.

The number of machine guns in a battalion is supposed to be four, but this varies. In Herat the number was reduced to two.

In the Eastern Province the fourth infantry brigade was disbanded in the autumn of 1931, the personnel being sent to swell the ranks of the other three brigades.

(c) *Training.*—Much was done in the year to raise the standard of training. Artillery and Infantry schools were opened in July (1931) and a cavalry school in September. All three are situated in Kabul. The Chief instructor at the Infantry School is a German, Major Christenn, and at the Artillery School Captain Cafieri, an Italian officer, who is assisted by an Italian under-officer named Rosnardi. The Cavalry School is commanded by an Afghan Colonel who was trained in Turkey.

All three schools are for officers only. The duration of the courses is about 9 months and hours of work are said to be from 5-30 A.M. to 9 P.M. The Artillery and Infantry schools go to Jalalabad in winter, the climate there being less severe than that of Kabul.

Small arms training was inaugurated and a certain amount of field firing carried out. The shooting seen was poor but the point is that the Afghans have realised the necessity for weapon training.

Artillery shooting with live shell was also carried out on occasions and a certain amount of field training by all arms took place. Three instructional films were presented by the British War office and A. H. Q., India.

(d) *Recruiting*.—There appears to have been a steady supply of recruits, although most of these have come from such tribes as the Hazaras, Wardakis and Kohistanis, tribes who are probably inferior in fighting quality to those on the Indian frontier. The tribes in the Eastern Province shewed some reluctance in producing recruits as did some of those in Kandahar province. A few Afridis were enlisted but it appears that the pay of a sepoy in the Afghan Army is not sufficient inducement to bring the Afridis forward in any numbers. Ghilzais were recruited for the first time. As a result of the supply of recruits it seems that the Army is approaching its establishment of 50,000, and it has been found possible to release time-expired men at the end of their engagements instead of keeping them on indefinitely as used to be the practice.

(e) *Weapons*.—The bulk of the army is believed to be now armed with .303 rifles, though various other patterns exist.

The Light automatics are chiefly Lewis Guns although a number of Mitralleuse are also in use.

The artillery includes French 105 m.m., Italian 75 m.m. and 65 m.m., Russian 122 m.m. and 76 m.m., as well as some old German guns. These are probably the best of the Afghan artillery armament, but even they are reported to be in indifferent condition and short of ammunition. The spare parts for 8 Italian batteries which were ordered last year have not yet arrived.

(f) *Posts and Barracks*.—Considerable activity was displayed in the improvement of posts and barracks. In July 1931 a number of posts on the Baluchistan frontier were re-occupied. In April (1932) plans were approved for the construction of posts at Shamshao Kandao and Torkham Sar in the Khyber. Ten guns, 2 field and 8 mountain, are to be placed in these two posts, on which work has begun and which are being linked to the main Kabul-Torkham road by motor roads. Nine new posts were established near the Persian frontier in the S. W., and the forts at Ghazni, Mukur and Kilat-i-Ghilzai are all being repaired.

(g) *Militias*.—Recruiting for the Khost militias was opened in July 1931. These militias consist of two corps—the Urgun and the Khost. Headquarters are at Urgun and Matun respectively. Their strengths are believed to be about 700.

(h) *Mechanical Transport*.—There are believed to be 300 lorries in Kabul, 80 in Kandahar and about 40 in Herat. Those in Kabul include 150 Government lorries. No information is at present available regarding their organization.



In April a Mr. Fetters, agent for an American engineering firm, visited Kabul with a tractor. The Afghan Government ordered twelve of these, eight of them for the Army with the object of drawing medium guns.

(i) *Conclusion.*—There is no doubt that a considerable improvement has been effected in the army but much still remains to be done before it can be called an efficient fighting machine. A statement showing the general distribution and estimated strength of the Army is given in Appx. B.

#### XIV

##### AVIATION.

(a) *Military.*—The Afghan Air Force appears to have been neglected; there have been no changes in the past year. Only 4 aircraft are believed to be serviceable, and these are all D. H. 9 As which have been in Kabul since Amanullah's time. All four flew past at the review held at the Independence celebrations in August (1931), and occasional flights were carried out from time to time in the vicinity of Kabul.

There has been some talk of getting Russia to repair some of the unserviceable machines still lying in Kabul but so far nothing has materialized.

The following landing grounds are known to exist.

MAZAR-I-SHARIF.<sup>1</sup>

KHANABAD.<sup>1</sup>

KABUL.<sup>1</sup>

JALALABAD.<sup>2</sup>

GHAZNI.<sup>2</sup>

GARDEZ.<sup>2</sup>

MATUN.<sup>2</sup>

KANDAHAR.

HERAT.

(b) *Civil.*—The Russians operated the service Termez-Kabul throughout the year with regularity, although the agreement for the service has not been renewed. It is believed that the Afghan Government intend to close this service as soon as the new road from Kabul to the North (see para. XII) has been completed. The Soviet on the other hand is naturally anxious to renew the agreement. As it is unlikely that the new road will be completed for some time the Russian service will probably continue to operate as at present.

The proposals inaugurated in 1930-31 for a trans-Afghanistan service to India either by Junkers or Russians fell through.

#### XV

##### COMMUNICATIONS.

The improvement of road and telephone communications throughout the country has continued steadily.

(a) *Roads.*—The road Kabul-Torkham is being repaired. Its condition leaves much to be desired. Several of the bridges are broken and diversions

<sup>1</sup> In use.

<sup>2</sup> Orders issued in April 1932 for these to be made fit for use.

are not always good. The surface is in many places bad and cars cannot expect to average more than about 14 miles an hour. Petrol pumps have been installed at Dakka and Jalalabad. The Afghan Government has recently sanctioned a project for a diversion from Butkhak to Deh Saleh *via* the Lataband Pass. This route will have the advantage of avoiding the difficult defile of the Khurd Kabul Pass and the steep climb of the Haft Kotal.

The road Chaman-Kandahar, although used regularly by lorries, is in bad condition. Repair work has however been begun and the road is being re-aligned in places. Plans for the construction of bridges over the Arghastan and Tarnak were sanctioned during the year and work begun, but heavy rain in March washed all traces of this away.

A number of subsidiary roads South-East of the Kabul-Kandahar road have been made fit for motor traffic.

The road between Kandahar and Herat is also reported to be in poor condition but cars use it regularly. Six boats were built in Kabul in May for the crossings of the Farah Rud and Khash Rud.

From Herat the road to Andkhui *via* Kila Nao has been completed, and in the North several roads are now fit for motors, and others are projected.

The road however on which the Afghan Government is expending most energy, and to which it attaches most importance, is the new one from Kabul to the North *via* the Darra-i-Shikari.

This road takes off from the Ghorband Valley route near Bulola. It then runs through the Darra-i-Shikari, a deep narrow gorge, to Doab-i-Mekhzari. From here the road will go *via* the Kotal-i-Sinjitak and Shuluktu Pass to Dahana (Ghori), from which place one branch will go to Haibak and another to Khanabad.

The road will be fit for motors and, avoiding the height of the Khawak Pass and Ak Robot routes, will be open for traffic all the year round. It will reduce the distance to Mazar-i-Sharif *via* the Ak Robot pass by approximately 60 miles, and the duration of the journey to both Mazar-i-Sharif and Khanabad from about 21 to 2 or 3 days.

The task however is a difficult one and progress is slow : it seems unlikely that the road will be completed for at least another two or three years.

Another route which may prove of importance is the road to Herat *via* Daulatyar. The work of making this fit for cars was begun in 1931 but has not yet progressed beyond Besud. If this road is completed it will reduce the journey by motor to Herat from Kabul by 200 miles.

(b) *Telephones.*--The main telephone work completed during the year was the Herat-Kila Nao-Maimana-Andkhui line.

There is no Afghan telephone at Chaman. The line however exists and it is expected that an office will be established in the near future.

At present there is no telephone connection from Kabul to towns North of the Hindu Kush. On the Khawak Pass route the line only goes as far as Ruka, and on the Ak Robot route has not yet been extended beyond Bamian.

Map No. 2 shows the principal motor routes and telephone lines known to exist at present (July 1932).

(c) *Wireless*.—There has been no change in W/T communications.

It is understood however that the Afghans are pressing for the delivery, by France, of the W/T sets for Provincial Headquarters arranged for in the time of King Amanullah.

## APPENDIX A.

## LIST OF MAJOR APPOINTMENTS.

Numbers in brackets refer to W. W. in Afghanistan.

- Prime Minister—Muhammad Hasham Khan. (337).  
 Foreign Minister—Faiz Muhd. Khan. (243).  
 War Minister—Shah Mahmud. (414).  
 Home Minister—General Muhammad Gul Khan. (315A). Officiating Hashim Khan. (337).  
 Education, Minister—Ali Muhammad Khan. (179).  
 Justice, Minister—Officiating Fazal Ahmad Khan. (255A).  
 Trade, Minister—Mirza Muhd. Khan. (450).  
 Revenue, Minister—Muhd. Ayub Khan. (211).  
 Court, Minister—Ahmad Shah Khan. (149).  
 Health, Minister—Muhd. Akbar Khan. (161A).  
 President National Assembly—Abdul Ahad Khan. (4).

## PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS.

- Kabul—Muhd. Umar Khan. (658).  
 Eastern Province—Ghulam Faruq Khan. (273).  
 Southern Province—Sher Ahmad Khan.  
 Kandahar—Muhd. Gul Khan. (315A).  
 Herat—Abdul Rahim. (89).  
 Farah and Chakansur—Sher Ahmad Khan. (601).  
 Hazarajat—Muhd. Akbar Khan. (160).  
 Maimana—Sher Muhd. Khan. (606).  
 Mazar-i-Sharif—Abdul Jamil Khan. (50A).  
 Kataghan and Badakshan—Muhd. Ayub Khan. (211).

## ABROAD.

- Ambassador, Moscow—Muhd. Aziz Khan. (216).  
 Ambassador, Persia—Sher Ahmad Khan. (598).  
 Ambassador, Turkey—Sultan Ahmad Khan. (624).  
 Minister, London—Ahmad Ali Khan. (140).  
 Minister, Paris—Shah Wali Khan. (585).  
 Minister, Egypt—Gul Agha. (613).  
 Minister, Rome—Abdul Hussain Khan. (47).  
 Minister, Berlin—Ghulam Siddiq Khan. (309).

## FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES IN AFGHANISTAN.

- Ambassador, Russia—M. Stark.  
 Ambassador, Turkey—vacant.  
 Ambassador, Persia—Mirza Muhd. Taqi Isfandiari.  
 Minister, Great Britain—Sir R. Maconochie, K.C.I.E.  
 Minister, Italy—S. Vincenzo Galanti.  
 Minister, Germany—Dr. Schwoerbel.  
 Minister, France—Mons. Bodard.

## APPENDIX B.

*Summary of Distribution and Estimated Strength of Afghan Regular Forces.*

## NOTES.

1. The Afghan Army consists of the forces in the nine provinces. In Kabul the Minister of War is also Commander-in-Chief. In each of the other provinces there is a G. O. C. in command of all troops in the province.

The old 'Hasht-Nafri' (1 in 8) system of conscription has been abolished. Each tribe now has to provide a quota.

In Kabul the forces are organised as an Army Corps of three infantry and one artillery Divisions. In addition there is the Guards Division—the best trained body of troops in the country. The Kabul Corps is the striking force of the Afghan Army.

In the other provinces the organisation is sketchy, the main role of the troops being the preservation of law and order. For this reason they are largely disposed in numerous small posts and detachments, with reserves in Provincial Headquarters.

Administrative organisation is very backward, in fact it hardly exists. Transport, for example, has to be commandeered when required.

2. Cavalry, Artillery and Infantry are organised as follows :—

## (I) Cavalry—

100 sabres=one risala

4 risalas=one Ghund (Bde.)=450 sabres.

## (II) Artillery—

4 guns and 100 men=one Kandak (bty.).

3 Kandaks=one Ghund (Bde.).

## (III) Infantry—

100 rifles=one toli (coy.).

3 rifle and

1 M. G. Coy.=one Kandak (bn.) 400 rifles and 4 M. Gs.

3 Kandaks=one Ghund (bde.).

3 ghunds=one Firqa (Division).

3 Firqas=one Qaul-i-Urdu (Army Corps).

As units are believed to be below strength infantry units have been estimated at 350 rifles per battalion.

| Location, formations, etc. | Personnel.          |         | Guns.   |        |           |
|----------------------------|---------------------|---------|---------|--------|-----------|
|                            | Men (excl. sabres). | Sabres. | Medium. | Field. | Mountain. |
| <i>Kabul</i> —             |                     |         |         |        |           |
| Guards Division .. ..      | 2,600               | 400     | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| 1st Army Corps .. ..       | 8,000               | ..      | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| Artillery Division .. ..   | 1,800               | ..      | 8       | 16     | 48        |
| Total .. ..                | 12,400              | 400     | 8       | 16     | 48        |

| Location, formation, etc.                     | Personnel.                |         | Guns.   |        |           |
|---|---------------------------|---------|---------|--------|-----------|
|   | Men<br>(excl.<br>sabres). | Sabres. | Medium. | Field. | Mountain. |
| <i>Eastern Province—</i>                      |                           |         |         |        |           |
| Jalalabad Division ..                         | 4,000                     | ..      | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| One Artillery Brigade ..                      | 600                       | ..      | ..      | 6      | 27        |
| One Squadron Cavalry ..                       | ..                        | 100     | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| One Company S. and M. ..                      | 100                       | ..      | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| Total ..                                      | 4,700                     | 100     | ..      | 6      | 27        |
| <i>Southern Province—</i>                     |                           |         |         |        |           |
| Six Infantry Brigades ..                      | 4,500                     | ..      | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| Artillery detachments ..                      | 1,400                     | ..      | ..      | 7      | 49        |
| Total ..                                      | 5,900                     | ..      | ..      | 7      | 49        |
| <i>Kandahar—</i>                              |                           |         |         |        |           |
| Two Squadrons and Body<br>Guard.              | ..                        | 300     | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| Two Batteries and detach-<br>ments Artillery. | 450                       | ..      | ..      | 7      | 15        |
| Four Infantry Brigades ..                     | 4,200                     | ..      | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| Pioneers .. ..                                | 220                       | ..      | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| Police Brigade .. ..                          | 850                       | ..      | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| Total ..                                      | 5,720                     | 300     | ..      | 7      | 15        |
| <i>Farah—</i>                                 |                           |         |         |        |           |
| Two Cavalry Brigades ..                       | ..                        | 900     | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| One Artillery Brigade ..                      | 300                       | ..      | ..      | 6      | 12        |
| Two Police Battalions ..                      | 600                       | ..      | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| Total ..                                      | 900                       | 900     | ..      | 6      | 12        |

| Location, formation, etc.       | Personnel.                |         | Guns.   |        |           |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------|---------|---------|--------|-----------|
|                                 | Men<br>(excl.<br>sabres). | Sabres. | Medium. | Field. | Mountain. |
| <i>Herat—</i>                   |                           |         |         |        |           |
| Two Cavalry Brigades ..         | ..                        | 900     | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| One Artillery Brigade ..        | 450                       | ..      | ..      | 6      | 6         |
| One Division Infantry ..        | 3,200                     | ..      | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| Police .. ..                    | 600                       | 150     | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| Pioneers .. ..                  | 400                       | ..      | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| Total ..                        | 4,650                     | 1,050   | ..      | 6      | 6         |
| <i>Maimana—</i>                 |                           |         |         |        |           |
| One Infantry Brigade ..         | 1,050                     | ..      | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| Total ..                        | 1,050                     | ..      | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| <i>Mazar-i-Sharif—</i>          |                           |         |         |        |           |
| Two Cavalry Brigades ..         | ..                        | 1,000   | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| Three Artillery Brigades ..     | 900                       | ..      | ..      | 6      | 18        |
| Three Infantry Brigades ..      | 3,200                     | ..      | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| Total ..                        | 4,100                     | 1,000   | ..      | 6      | 18        |
| <i>Kataghan and Badakhshan—</i> |                           |         |         |        |           |
| One Cavalry Brigade ..          | ..                        | 450     | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| One Artillery Brigade ..        | 300                       | ..      | ..      | 4      | 8         |
| One Infantry Division ..        | 3,000                     | ..      | ..      | ..     | ..        |
| Total ..                        | 3,300                     | 450     | ..      | 4      | 8         |
| Grand Total ..                  | 42,720                    | 4,200   | 8       | 58     | 163       |

